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The Islamic revolution, followed by the eight-year Gulf war, has caused 
severe disruption and extensive changes in the structure of the Iranian 
economy. This thesis is concerned with an analytical study of Iran's 
economy in the period from the Shah's western-style modernisation to the 
Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq. Thus, the thesis provides first, an 
overview of the economic development and industrialisation activity under 
the Shah, which gives a yardstick for understanding the post-revolutionary 
economy. 
Secondly, the thesis examines the concept of Islamic economics as 
articulated by the prominent contemporary Shi'i figures that continue to 
influence the post-revolutionary economic policies. 
Thirdly, the major part of the thesis devotes considerable attention to 
the study and evaluation of the post-revolutionary economy, focusing on 
agriculture, industry, foreign and domestic trade, Islamic banking, public 
finance, the oil sector and the oil war.The latter was a determining factor in 
the continuation of the Gulf war. 
The appraisal and the overall picture of the post-revolutionary 
economy makes bleak reading. The negative impact of the revolution and 
the war has left Iran with a shattered infrastructure and a moribund 
industrial base. Unprecedented destruction of wealth, both in human and 
non-human terms, has further exacerbated the pre-revolutionary economic 
problems. The politico-religious government has not been able to address 
the country's economic ills effectively, partly owing to self -imposed 
constraints. A lack of active and structured economic policies has adversely 
affected all sectors of the economy, in particular, agriculture. While facing 
the daunting task of post-war reconstruction, Iran, more than ever before, is 
dependent on trading oil in exchange for basic commodities and consumer 
goods. 
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The Third World has its own economic spectrum. At one extreme lie the poorest 
of the less-developed countries. At the other extreme are the OPEC members, 
both underdeveloped and rich, many with income and growth rates far higher 
than the former, even before the oil price shock of 1973. 
Iran, a member of the OPEC, prior to the revolution of February 1979, could 
hardly be termed least developed. To many western observers, the country's 
seemingly flourishing economy was promising and its apparent political 
stability seemed unshakable. 
The revolution took the world by surprise and its shock waves were felt 
regionally and globally, ft ran against many theories , based on the belief that 
lasting political stability can be shaped in Third World countries by progress in 
modernisation. In reality, the very progress of modernisation, especially its 
rapidity, created the socio-economic conditions in which challenges to the 
Shah's regime grew. Economically, the country turned from an Import-oriented 
boom to bust. Parallel with that, Iran was transformed from an apparent 'island 
of stability' in the Middle East into a caldron of chaos and turmoil. And, when 
the revolution came about, Shi'ism emerged as a motivating ideology and led 
Iran indirectly to a war with Iraq, which has had significant repercussions In one 
the most important oil regions of the world. 
Since the revolution, many problems of dualistlc economic development, 
which came to exemplify the failures of the Shah's regime, have recurred and 
in many cases larger in scope, partly as a result of the war. Though the Islamic 
regime is aware of these economic problems, is either unable to deal with them 
or in some cases, the self-imposed ideological constraints make any solution 
impossible. 
This thesis is a case study of Iran's economy in the throes of modernisation 
and revolution while facing war with a comparatively powerful neighbour. It 
traces the achievements and progress, but the overall economic picture of Iran 
is one of a dramatic failure. 
Iran differs widely from other Third World countries in population, income, 
natural and human resources, political system and the government's role in the 
economy. But, It shares some important characteristics with less developed 
oil-exporting countries and many lessons of the Iranian experience can be of 
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importance to these countries, in particular to other Islamic states. 
An Historical Perspective 
At the beginning of the century, few foreign banks would lend money to Iran, as 
the risk was too high and the country had few resources to guarantee a 
loan.When the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia provided three loans for 
the Shah between 1892 and 1911, they were raised against the security of the 
caviar-producing Caspian fisheries and the custom dues of the Persian Gulf 
ports, as only these two assets were then considered to be easy to sell and 
easy to seize. These humiliating foreign loans then were the price imposed on 
a weak government and a poor country.i 
The role of the Shahs of the Qajar dynasty during this era was confined to 
selling several concessions to foreign enterprises, in an effort to stimulate 
utilisation of the country's national resources and at the same time, acquire 
much needed income for the royal coffers. 
In selling such concessions, the nation suffered both economically and 
emotionally. As a result, some concessions met stiff criticism and consequently 
were forcibly repealed. The tobacco concession, the D'Arcy oil concession, the 
Reuter banking concession, the Lianazov fisheries concession, the 
Indo-European Company's telegraph concession and various railway 
concessions, were among the major ones. 
The range of concessions were varied. In one instance in 1890, the Shah 
with total disregard for the basic rights of ownership, sold the produce of all 
olive trees belonging to the people of the county of Gilan, to a Russian 
company, Kossis Theophylactos, for a period of 25 years.2 
Although some of the concessions had the effect of introducing modem 
techniques into Iran, they were not integrated in any way into an overall 
programme for development. Indeed the concessions, almost by their nature , 
were directed towards the countries of the concessionaires. 
After 1901, no new concessions for foreigners were effectively introduced 
and it was only after the establishment of the Pahlavi rule in the mid 1920s, that 
Iran's stagnating economy witnessed brief spurts of economic growth, though it 
was reversed by the effects of the Second World War.3 
Reza Khan, on becoming the Shah, guided and shaped Iran's 
industrialisation, westernisation, secularism and intense nationalism. During 
his reign (1924-1941), Iran pursued a remarkable consistent development 
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strategy, following the lines defined by Reza Shah, that is , to modernise Iran's 
economy as rapidly as its resources would permit. In practice, this meant that 
industrialisation, self sufficiency and integration of the national economy, were 
stressed.4 
Under Reza Shah's leadership, a number of major national projects were 
initiated, though the plannirig'was rather on an ad hoc basis. The famous 
trans-Iranian railway, from the Caspian sea to the Persian Gulf was not based 
on any cost benefit basis which might have attracted private Investment. Instead 
this bold project (1927-1938) was financed through the imposition of a tax on 
tea and sugar. 
While Reza Shah's etatist model of industrialisation served him well in the 
1930s, it did not provide for anything more than a series of ad hoc actions taken 
by the various ministers, co-ordinated at the top again in an ad hoc fashion, so 
as to be in line with the ruler's visfon.5 
Economic gains in simple Industrialisation in the 1930s were negated 
during World War Two and the national economy broke down under conditions 
of shortages and weakened central government. The country faced a spiral of 
rising prices, although during the war and in the 1940s, the level of government 
expenditure fell substantially. The post war recovery led Iran's economy back 
almost to where it started at end of the 1930s, as if Iran was caught in a 'vicious 
circle of poverty and stagnation'^ 
The Three Decades of Economic Development 
In the years immediately following the war, attempts to bring about certain 
structural changes within the economy failed.The first seven-year development 
plan adopted in 1949 became meaningless, owing to the nationalisation of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which 1n effect, cut the flow of funds to the plan. In 
fact, during the 1950s, any hope of a sustained development, i.e. growth plus 
positive change, appeared remote. 
By 1960, five years after the launch of the second development plan, the 
country was facing an economic crisis due to a host of problems and was 
compelled to Implement an 'Economic Stabilisation Programme'. However, the 
inception of a set of reforms, later associated with other social and economic 
changes introduced by Mohammad Reza Shah, brought about a relatively brief 
success during the period of 1965 to 1973. The structural transformation of the 
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economy altered the living standards of the majority of Iranians, though the 
costs of this alteration were very high and varied. For example, it caused a 
massive drift of people away from rural areas, which consequently 
compounded the agricultural stagnation in Iran. 
Throughout the development activities, oil remained the backbone of the 
economy and development planning to a large extent was confined to an 
analysis of utilising oil revenues for the creation of new assets. This became 
more so as Iran accrued incredible wealth from the 1973 oil price rise. 
The Shah envisaged Iran as being on the threshold of becoming one of 
the world's industrial nations. The objectives of creating a strong non-oil and 
export ^oriented economy seemed easily achievable. Though, Iran was rich in 
oil wealth, it possessed a weak socio-economic infrastructure and was 
incapable of absorbing the enormous investment envisaged in the Fifth Plan. 
By mid 1970s, the country's economy was overheated and almost out of 
control. There was severe inflation, marked agricultural stagnation and 
infrastructural bottlenecks that could not cope with the expansion of the 
import-oriented boom. Consequently, the government's economic policy 
continuously changed and finally the investments were substantially reduced. 
In other words, the economy went into sharp reverse after a frantic push 
towards growth maximisation. As the growth lacked positive changes, more and 
more people found themselves economically and socially useless and the 
wealth and the income of the country was increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a few elite groups. The magnitude of the adverse changes in the 
economic and social structure of the country led to the political upheaval in 
1978 which marked the beginning of the downfall of the Shah's regime. 
Post Revolutionary Developments 
In 1979 the revolutionary regime came to power and inherited a crippled 
economy which was closely associated with western-style modernisation, 
propagated by the Shah. The revolutionary leaders rejected the existing 
economic system and intended to reverse its course. Their goals had their roots 
in 'Islamic economies' or somtimes dressed up as the 'Economics of Divine 
Harmony'. The Islamic regime, initially attempted to replace large industrial 
projects with small ones and put an emphasis on self sufficiency in agriculture. 
It also sought to improve trade with Third World countries. AH these were aimed 
at reducing Iran's depedency on the West. Oil production was reduced and 
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reliance on revenue for foreign exchange was de-emphasised. 
Khomeini's brand of Shi'ism led Iran indirectly to the war with Iraq in 1980 
and soon the war overtook the revolution. The general mobilisation and needs 
of the war first hindered the achievement of the economic aims and 
subsequently displaced them. With prolongation of the' war, the country more 
than ever before, became dependent on oil exports for foreign exchange to 
finance vital imports, such as arms and food. By 1984 the oil became a 
determinant factor in the Gulf war as its vulnerable infrastructure was subjected 
to sustained attacks by Iraq. 
Scope of the Thesis 
Having briefly traced the historical perspective of the economic activities in Iran 
and the post revolutionary developments, the presentation of this thesis will be 
in the following manner. 
Overall, the first two chapters examine briefly the three decades of 
economic development prior to.the revolution. The remaining chapters analyse 
the profound effects of the revolution and the Gulf war on the Iranian economy. 
These two seemingly separate parts of the thesis are closely interconnected. 
There are many similarities and in order to understand the post revolutionary 
situation, one has to know the past. In total, the thesis is divided into seven 
chapters. Chapter one will focus on early governmental efforts towards 
economic development covering the period of 1949 -1973. The processes of 
development, policy formulation and implementation and the structural 
transformation of the Iranian economy will be discussed. 
Chapter two deals with the period after the oil price shock of 1973 when 
oil prices quadrupled. The original and revised Fifth Plans, which aimed at 
complete and comprehensive industrialisation with a greater sense of urgency, 
will be analysed. Causes of the economic crisis and shortcomings and failures 
of the pre- revolution era will also be dealt with. 
Chapter three gives an account of Shi'i views on economics and finance 
which continues to be influential on some the country's economic policies. This 
chapter also gives a background against which Iran's economic activities and 
the performance of post 1979 can be judged. 
In chapter four Iran's post revolutionary economy will be discussed. This 
chapter is divided into five sections. Section one begins by looking at the 
immediate economic decline during the 1977-1979 upheaval. The second 
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section will be a study of the agricultural sector which remains a major source 
of conflict between the radical and the conservative groups within the Islamic 
Republic, Section trtree deals with the industrial sector followed by section four 
which will shed some light on the state of domestic and foreign trade. The final 
section provides an appraisal of the First Development Plan of the Islamic 
Republic. This plan was prepared in the early and heady days of the revolution 
and despite parliamentary approval, it was not given financial support, in view 
of unending demands of the military budget. 
Chapter five is an analytical study of the country's finance in the post 
revolution era . The chapter consists of two sections. Section one studies the 
proceeses and implementation of the full Islamic banking legislation in Iran, 
which has completely transformed the old banking system. Section two 
provides a study of the public finance and the budget under the constraints of 
the war economy. 
Chapter six deals with the oil sector, the principal engine of growth of the 
Iranian econony. This chapter is divided into two sections.Section one 
discusses the evolution of the oil policy and examines productions, 
consumptions and exports. Section two provides an economic - military 
analysis of the oil war in the Persian Gulf and traces the maritime implications 
of the Iran - Iraq conflict. 
Chapter seven is the reckoning of the thesis. Here the conclusions of the 
earlier chapters will be summarised. The achievements, failures and prospects 
of the Islamic Republic will be evalued, as it faces the daunting task of post war 
reconstruction. ; i 
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As Iran began to recover from the chaos of the Secdnd World War, attempts 
were made towards preparation of institutions to facilitate economic planning 
and channel natural resources to development projects. First a formal seven 
year plan was designed to guide the government specifically in its expenditure 
allocation throughout this period. Second a Plan Organisation was set up to 
oversee and control these expenditures according to predefined national 
objectives. Hence, Iran's economic development experience within a planning 
framework began. In this chapter, attempts will be made to study Iran's efforts 
for economic development during 1949-1972. Development policies with their 
undue emphsis on maximum growth and hasty industrialisation will be traced. 
1.1 The First Development Plan (1949-1955) 
Preparation for the First Development Plan began in 1946. In this attempt, the 
U.S State Department and International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (I.B.R.D.), the Morrison Knudson Construction Company and 
subsequently the U.S consulting firm Overseas Consultants Incoporated were 
chosen to help Iran. By September 1949 the plan had been prepared and the 
Plan Organisation had been set up. The plan was approved by the Iranian 
parliament in the same year. 
Table 1.1 shows the planned and actual expenditure of the First 
Development Plan. The figures indicate a plan that did not fulfill the expected 
results, as only 53.6% of the planned expenditures were in fact spent and the 
expenditure pattern was in favour of agriculture over transport and industry. The 
Intention of the plan was a fair even distribution of expenditure between 
agriculture.industry and transport.1 
The intended sources of revenue for the plan were a combination of oil 
revenue, sales of government property, private participation and loans from 
Bank Melli Iran and I.B.R.D. (World bank).2 Out of the total projected 
expenditure of 26.3 billion rials, 14.0 billion rials were to be provided by the 
public sectors 
Table 1.1- Planned and Actual Expenditure of the First Plan.fblllion rials! 
Estimated Actual % of Estimated 
Sector. Expenditure %of Total Expenditure Expenditure 
1. Agriculture and 7.3 27.8 5.7 78.1 
Irrigation 
2. Transport and 7.7 29.3 3.5 45.5 
Communication r 
3. Industries and 5.3 20.1 4.1 77.4 
Mines 
4. Social Services 6.0 22.8 0.8 13.3 
5. Regional - -
Development 
fiJZtbfiDi : : : : 
7. Total 26.3 100.0 14.0 53.6 
Source: Plan Organisation. Tehran. One U.S.S - 67.5 rials. 
In the event, no loan was forthcoming from the I.B.R.D. and Bank Melli Iran 
could only provide only a small proportion of its own estimated loan. The oil 
revenues which therefore became the main source of development finance, 
were denied to Plan Organisation due to internal conflicts and the problems 
with the Anglo-Iranian Oil company, over the nationalisation of the Iranian oil 
industry.4 
The political turmoil of the years 1951-53 overshadowed the early 
development efforts and in fact the First Development Plan. The Implementation 
of the plan due to loss of oil revenue became impossible and for all practical 
purposes the plan was suspended. 
Overall the plan achieved little. There were unexpected administrative 
bottlenecks, as the Plan Organisation was a new institution and much effort had 
to be made into building it up. Setting up an efficient planning organisation 
proved much more difficult than the formulators of the plan led the government 
to believe. 
It was almost impossible to employ Irainlans with suitable educational 
qualifications to fill sensitive planning positions and planners with experience 
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were scarce in Western countries. Even if the political stability had allowed for a 
smooth running of the planning process, still a lot of energy would have been 
siphoned off in order to build the Plan Organisation and set up the planning 
process.5 
From a structural point of view, the First Development Plan was hardly a 
plan. It has been criticised as deficient in both planning methodology and 
objectives. In fact the plan was a collection of infrastructure projects to be 
carried out by the newly established Plan Organisations The Plan did not take 
the total economy into account (possibly due to lack of data). It did not even 
cover the whole of the public sector and did not account the role of investment 
by the private sector. 
The physical achievements of the plan were the establishment of six new 
industrial factories, some road and rail construction and a few small 
developments in irrigation and mechanisation in the agricultural sector.7 The 
main achievments were in fact the renovation of industries established under 
Reza Shah's rule, plus setting up a planning machinery . In fact "what had 
started out as a tig push' to attain economic self sufficiency, thus ended as a 
feeble puff ".* 
The Nationalisation of the OH Industry. 
The nationalisation of Iran's oil industry during the premiership of Dr. 
Mohammad Mosadegh, which drained the Iranians economically and 
emotionally, must be understood in the context of its time.9 In purely economic 
terms, the net result of the abortive nationalisation was disasterous.10 The role 
of oil in the provision of the First Development Plan financing was crucial. 
According to the projected estimates of sources for the plan , oil revenues 
constituted 37.1% of the funds, yet owing to the interruption of the oil production 
during most of the First Development Plan, Iran' oil revenues amounted to a 
mere £76 million or on an average £10.8 million per year.11 From 1944 to 1950 
production of oil and royalties both were increasing dramatically, the former 
from 13 million long tons to 32 million , the latter from £4.46 million to £16.03 
million. In 1951 with the start of political instability, the production dropped 49% 
to 16 million long ton with a revenue of £8.30 million.12 
Consortium and N.I.O.C. 
After the coup of 1953 resulting in the downfall of Mosadegh's government, 
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production increased rapidly but It was not until 1957 that the 1950 level was 
reached.The agreement between Iran and the consortium comprising seven 
major oil companies (The Seven Sisters) in October 1954, provided the country 
with a royalty of roughly half the difference between the market value of oil and 
the cost of production, in other words, Iran obtained a fifty / fifty division of the 
consortium's profits.Offldally Iran's share of the oil profits was paid in sterling, 
but could be transferred into other currencies at the request of the 
government.Part of the agreement was the disbandment of the Anglo Iranian 
Oil Company, particularly due to pressure from the U.S. and other international 
groups keen to aquire a share of the rich Iranian oil operation. 
The new company ,as mentioned above.was known as the 'Consortium', 
comprising British Petroleum (the former A.I.O.C) with the leading share of 40% 
followed by Royal Dutch Shell (14%) and five major U.S oil companies, i.e. 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socany Vacuum Oil Company, Standard Oil 
Company of California, the Texas Oil Company and Gulf Oil Corporation, each 
8% and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles with a 6% stake. The five 
aforementioned American companies later surrendered 1% of their shares to a 
group of eight independent American companies.i3 
The consortium, under a secret agreement, which was leaked in 1967, 
prepared a production plan to determine the level of oil prduction from Iranian 
fields, thereby balancing it against the global oil interests of the major oil 
companies so that any increase in production was the result of an internal 
agreement. This agreement made Iranian revenues entirely dependant on the 
level at which the consortium chose to produce.i4 
In the meantime, Iran formed a new corparate entity , namely the National 
Iranian Oil Company (N.I.O.C.) to assert ifs independence and maximise its 
potential oil resources. N.I.O.C.'s first experience to carry out a joint exploration 
and production agreement which had an important catalytic effect in the 
creation of OPEC, was with AGIP (a subsidiary of the Italian State Oil Co, ENI). 
In this agreement N.I.O.C took 75% of the proceeds on discovery of oil. 
In fact what Mosadegh could not acheive unilaterally,i.e full control of the oil 
industry, finally was gained on 29th March 1973 in an agreement whereby the 
consortium handed over operations and ownership to N.I.O.C.is 
1.2 The Second Development Plan (1955-1962) 
The Second Development Plan was drawn up with promises of generous 
provision of loans from the U.S. and I.R.B.D. It was also drafted on the basis of 
the agreement between Iran and the consortium, for it was also regognised by 
the Iranian planners that the oil revenue would fuel the plan.ie 
The plan took effect in 1956 lasting for seven years. Similar to the First Plan, 
the emphasis was given to infrastructual projects. 
Table 1.2 - Planned and Actual Expenditure of the Second Plan, (billion rials) 
Estimated Actual %of Estimated 
Expenditure %of Total Expenditure Expenditure 
1. Agriculture and 18.9 23.3 17.4 92.1 
Irrigation. 
2. Transportand 30.4 37.5 27.3 89.8 
Communication. 
3. Industries and 6.7 8.3 7.0 104.4 
Mines. 
4. Social Services. 11.7 14.4 9.3 79.5 
5. Regional 12.2 15.0 8.6 70.5 
Development. 
6. Others. 12 L5 OA 3&2 
7. Total 81.1 100.0 70.0 86.3 
Source: Plan Organisation. Tehran. One U.S.ft - 67.5 rials. 
The total allocation of funds for the Second Plan was 81.1 billion rials with 
37.5% of it earmarked for transport and 23.3% for agriculture. As shown in table 
1.2, the actual expenditure was 86.3% of the planned expenditure compared 
with 53.6% actually spent in the First Plan. 
As far as the structure of the plan was concerned, it was a set of 
independent projects with financial allocations, presumed to be available 
mainly from the oil and spent under the control of the Plan Organisation. The 
methodology of planning was weak and there was no use of mathamtical tools 
at any stage of planning levels (macro, sectoral and project levels). The lack of 
both statistical data and familiarity with planning methodojgy and techniques 
was a major limitation. It appears that it was the size rather than the 
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composition of the projects which received the highest official consideration. 1.7 
The Second Plan lacked well defined objectives and specific targets of the 
plan were very vague. The goals of the plan were outlined as below:-
Increasing production, developing exports, preparing public necessities within 
the country, developing agriculture and industries, discovering and exploring 
mines and subterranean resources, improving and completeing means of 
communication, improving public health, fulfilling any operations designed for 
the development of the country, raising the educational and living standard of 
the people and improving living conditions. 
Given the lack of clearly defined objectives of the Second Plan, It appears 
that very little consideration was given to a proper balance between economic 
growth and social justice. 18 
Investment in the plan and the selection of projects did not follow the 
application of any investment criteria including any type of cost benefit 
analysis. Almost all of the plan's allocation for the agriculture sector went to 
construct three large dams, (Karaj, Sefid Rud and Dez). However, the people 
who actually benefitted most from these dams were the urban population. In the 
case of the Karaj Dam, although handled by the Agricultural Division of the 
Plan Organisation, it was mainly used to supply water to people in Tehran. At 
the same time such a large and extensive project imposed heavy demands for 
the management of the water, water rights' laws and arrangements, 
maintenence and canal work. 19 
Parallel to undertaking such large projects, the government did very little to 
train farmers to use better techniques, seeds, fertilizers, etc. In contrast to Iran's 
agricultural tradition, no serious effort was made by the government to improve 
or maintain the water supply, (i.e. underground irrigation water was known as 
•qanats', deep wells, etc). While almost all the agricultural sector's allocation 
were spent on the above mentioned three dams, it did very little to provide 
water for agriculture, instead the dams provided water and electricity for Tehran 
and other large cities. It should be noted that the dams contributed an 
additional 93,000 million cubic metres to water storage capacity and an extra 
692 mega watts to hydroelectric generating capacity.20 
The allocations in the industrial sector were concentrated in several major 
projects involving the construction or modernisation of large textile, sugar and 
cement factories. Among them were four government owned intergrated 
spinning and weaving mills with a total capacity of 110 milion metres of cloth a 
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year and two new cement plants (Loshan and Dardud Cement), providing 
cement requirements for the Sefid Rud and Dez dams. By the end of the plan, 
Iran's productive capacity of cement rose from 82,000 tons to 1.2 million tons. 
The textile capacity (both public and private) was raised from 60 million metres 
to 418 million metres and the capacity to produce sugar rose from 85,000 to 
212,000 tons a year.21 
The expenditure on transportation and <Jommunication was confined to 
construction of roads and extension of the railway network with little attention to 
feeder roads and. other rual projects. This sector of the plan which absorbed the 
largest share of expenditure (i.e. 27.3 billion rials) was originally intended to 
construct or improve 10700 killometres of roads ended actually with 5500 
kilometres (2700 kilometres of paved main roads and 2800 kilomtres of 
secondary roads). The railway network was also extended from Shahrud to 
Mashad and from Mianeh to Tabriz. Also the annual combined capacity of 
Khorramshahr and Shahpour ports was expanded from 870,000 to 2 million 
tons and most of the major airports were futher equipped and expanded.22 
In the social service sector, certain strides were made towards controlling 
certain diseases among them malaria, smallpox and diptheria. 
Shortcomings and Problems. 
Despite the achievements and problems mentioned above, especially the lack 
of cost benefit analysis, the Second Plan was beset by other difficulties 
described below in brief: 
- The administrive inefficiency, especially in the area of cooperation between 
the Plan Organisation and other government agencies exacerbated the rather 
low level of achievements.23 A contributory factor to these inefficiencies were 
some aspects of the Iranian culture, chiefly the Iranian individualism .with its 
harmful effects upon interpersonal relations and national development. An 
explanation of this Iranian individualism relating to the task of development has 
been given by K. Mofid: "We are not attempting to suggest that Iranians are by 
nature uncooperative and fearful of each other; and thus, the task of 
'development' is an impossible one. What we are trying to say is that the 
'despotism' from 'above' has trickled' dowm to 'despotism' from 'below'. This 
has created an environment which lacks to some extent the qualities of 
tolerance, trust, participation, delegation and acceptance of authority and 
cooperation, which in our view, has made the task of 'development' much more 
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dlfflcuit."24 
- Another serious problem during the Second Development Plan was the 
recession of 1960-1962. An exchange rate devaluation brought rapid increases 
in government expenditures/This, together with the unprecedented expansion 
of credits to the private sector, produced a severe economic crisis manifested 
by a deteriorating balance of payments situation and rising inflation. 
As for the expansion of credit for the private sector, loans increased by 46.1% in 
1957, 60.5% in 1958 and 32.4% in 1959.This was an attempt to attract a 
considerable amount of personal and business savings into productive capital 
formation. Expansion of the private sector was most noticable in urban housing 
and industry e.g. private sector investment in construction in Tehran rose by 
85% in 1958 and 130% in 1959.25 
- As for the inflation, the cost of living index during the first five years of the 
plan rose about 40% although the prices of goods and services such as food 
and rent rose more than average. The sharp rises in prices contributed to a loss 
of confidence in money and consequently people resorted to speculation in 
real estate, land, stocks of standardised commodities, foreign exchange and 
construction.26 
- The balance of payment problem was also significant. The cumulative 
shortfall for 1958-61 was around $276 million and had to be financed through 
the running down of reserves. By the end of 1960, the country had only enough 
foreign exchange to finance several weeks essential imports. The main source 
of this mounting payments deficit was clearly the rising trade deficit which could 
be traced to liberalisation and consequently uncontrolled expansion of imports 
and the stagnant level of exports. In fact, the excess of imports over non-oil 
exports during 1955-1960 was 263% and for the period of 1957-1970 it 
amounted to 363%. 27 
From Monetary-Induced Boom to Recession and Revolt 
By this time Iran was facing a serious problem. The country, comparatively rich 
in oil revenues and in receipt of $1278 million in foreign aid and investment by 
the end of 1960, was forced to embark on an 'Economic Stabilisation 
Programme' initiated by the IMF. As a result of this programme, (i.e. control of 
private sector credit, the raising of interest rates, the restriction of imports, 
reduction in government expenditure) the country turned into a deep recession. 
The more traditional sectors such as agriculture, construction and domestic 
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trade, were seriously affected by the recession. Domestic trade, including the 
bazaar suffered the most because of a restriction on imports and credit control. 
As a result of stabilisation , there appeared to be growing discontentment 
among both low income urban groups ( a large proportion of them were 
unemployed migrant construction workers) and the bazaar merchants. The 
administration reponse to this deteriorating situation was a set of reforms which 
the Shah referred to as the White Revolution, covering land reform, the sharing 
of factory profits with workers.emancJpation of women, nationalisation of forests, 
the sale of shares in government owned factories to underwrite the land reform, 
creation of literacy corps and electoral reform. 
These reforms were clearly a threat to the interests of the upper class land 
owners if not to the propertied middle class. Therefore, instead of relieving 
social and economic tensions, the reform aroused the combined wrath of 
landlords, clerics and bazaar merchants, especially in their joint opposition to 
the regime. The culmination of unrest was In bloody street battles and mass 
demonstrations against the regime in 1963.28 
1.3 The Third Development Plan (1962 -1967) 
Following the Economic Stabilsation Programme of the early 1960s, the Third 
Development Plan was introduced. This was Iran's first comprehensive 
development plan, broadening the planning scope as a result of the main 
findings of the Second Plan's evaluation. The content of the plan was an 
investment programme for the public sector and some forecasts for the private 
sector with an emphasis placed on a planned growth rate specified as 6% 
annual growth rate of GNP or a total of between 35% and 40% in the duration 
of the plan period. Although the economic growth target was the main objective, 
there were also some secondary objectives, the most important were as 
follows: 
- To expand employment opportunltes; 
- To achieve a more equal distribution of income; 
- To maintain relative price stability and equilibrium in the balance of 
payments.29 
The Third Development Plan had several revisions during its course, chiefly 
due to oil revenues, as it grew much faster than the 6.5% per annum originally 
anticipated, therefore additional resources were made available to the Plan 
Organisation. The original, revised and final allocations are shown in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3 - Planned and Actual Public Expenditure of the Third Plan 
Million rials) 
Original 1964 1965 %of 
Ptenr Sfcof Total Rawfafan Si, of Total Ravfebn % of Total Actual Original 
1. Agriculture 30.0 21.5 45.0 22.5 49.0 21.3 47.3 158 
and Irrigation 
2. Industries 16.6 11.8 21.9 11.0 27.0 11.7 17.1 103 
and Mines 
3. Electricity 26.1 18.7 27.0 13.5 41.5 18.0 32.0 123 
and Fuel 
4.Commun- 30.0 21.5 50.0 25.0 56.0 24.3 53.8 179 
cations and Telecommunications 
5.Education 13.5 9.7 17.9 9.0 17.4 7.6 17.5 130 
6. Health 10.0 7.2 13.9 7.0 13.5 5.9 13.2 132 
7.Labourand6.2 4.4 8.0 4.0 3.6 1.6 2.8 45 
Manpower 
8. Urban 4.5 3.2 8.0 4.0 7.0 3.1 7.2 160 
Development 
9. Other 2.8 2.0 8.3 4.0 15.0 6.5 13.7 489 
10. Total 139.7 100.0 200.0 100.0 230.0 100.0 204.6 146 
Expenditure 
Source: Plan Organisation. Tehran. One U.S. & - 67.5 rials 
As can be noted the original proposed public expenditure was 139.7 billion 
rials. This was subsequently increased first to 200 and finally to 230 billion rials. 
Private sector investment forecasts were put to 135 billion rials ($2 billion) 
As far as the sectoral allocations of the public investment was concerned, 
agriculture, industry and services were equally emphasised . While the 
development stratergy called for the continued investment in agriculture and 
infrastructure in an attempt to lay the foundation for industrialisation, it also 
emphasised the need to increase industrial production. In all the Third Plan in 
its sectoral allocations reflected a balanced growth stategy for development. As 
for the sources of revenue, oil formed the main component of the Plan 
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Organisation income as shown in Table 1.4. so 
Table 1.4 - Planned and Actual Revenues of the Third Plan f billion rials 1 
1964 %of 1965 %of %of 
Source Bfivjsjoji Total Revision lotai Actual Total 
1. Revenue 134 61 154 62 153 67 
from Oil 
2.Treasury 10 5 13 5 14 6 
Bonds 
3. Foreign 17 8 61 24 21 9 
Loans 
4.0omestic 48 22 19 8 36 2 
Loans 
5. Other 11 5 4 2 5 2 
Total 220 100 250 JQfl J223. 100 
Less Admin 4 4 5 
Expenses 
Less Loan 16 16 19 
Repayment 
Bfiffioufi 200 23SL .205 
for the Plan. 
Source: Plan Organisation. Tehran, One U.S.S - 67.5 rials 
As shown in Table 1.4 allocations of oil revenue to Plan Organisation 
amounted to 67% of total funds expended through the plan. Foreign loans 
during the Third Plan were on a modest scale. In fact it was only in the last year 
of the plan as the pace of domestic economic development accelerated, mainly 
in the industrial sector, that more demands were made on foreign loans. Only 
53.3% of the total foreign loan ($518.6 million) drawn in the Third Plan was 
utilised by the Plan Organisation. 31 
Objectives and Outcomes. 
As mentioned above the primary objective of the Third Plan was to achieve 6% 
annual growth rate of GNP. This was surpassed by over 3% during the plan 
period. The real GNP increased as below: 
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Year 
1962 
(billion rials) 
324 
1963 342 
1964 376 
1965 417 
1966 462 
1967 517 
Thus the average annual growth was 9.6%. The agriculture had a growth 
rate of 4.5% per annum, domestic oil 13.6%, industries and mines 12.8%, 
manufacturing 11.8%, construction 12% and services 8%.32 These growth rates 
indicate that oil and the industrial sector dominated the economy while 
agriculture and traditional sectors were lagging behind. 
As for secondary objectives of the plan and the employment situation there 
was an acceleration in population growth. Between1956 and 1966 the 
population of Iran rose from 20.38 million (6.32 million urban and 14.06 million 
rural) to 27.07 million (10,56 million urban and 16.51 million rural) with the 
urban component of the poulation increasing faster than the rural component.33 
At the same time the sectoral distribution of the labour force changed in favour 
of the industrial, construction and service sectors. The employed labour force of 
the country in agriculture between 1956 and 1966 fell from 56.5% to 49%. In 
manufacturing the increase was from 13.8% to 17.5% during the same period. 
This upward trend also applied to construction as it rose from 5.7% to 7% for 
the said period.34 
As these sectors were concentrated in the large cities, people from the rural 
areas were attracted to cities, especially Tehran. Between 1960 and 1970 
Tehran's population increased at roughly 6% a year to reach 3.2 million. This 
growth rate was twice the national average. As a result, food, housing 
shortages, traffic jams and pollution in Tehran became major issues.ss 
Regarding the more equal distribution of income, this secondary objective 
was embodied in the Shah's reforms named the White Revolution', launched 
in 1963, though at this stage budgetary support for it had not been included in 
the Third Plan. Neither was it integrated with the plan in terms of both Its 
developmental strategy and priorities and its financial implications, thus one of 
the contributary factors for the revision of the Third plan. 
The Shah, after the dissolution of the landlord-dominated national assembly 
12 
(the 20th Majlis) initiated the White Revolution, incorporating land reform aimed 
to abolish the large landowner class by reducing individual land holdings to 
below a ceiling of one village. All lands over this limit were redistributed to the 
peasants. Land reform after its second, third and fourth phase, was officially 
completed in September 1971. Despite the highly publicised objectives of the 
land reform, it did not really bring about a more equal distribution of land 
among the rural population. For one thing, the reform did not apply to at least 
one million landless peasants.37 
In all as K. Mofid points out:" the benefits of land reform and industrialisation 
did not trickle down' as it was apparently hoped they would." In 1968, the 
Economic Research Department of the Bank Markazi Iran in a report regarding 
income distribution, points out that the income distribution curve for 1959/60 
and 1965/66 shows that in 1965766 the curve has moved further away from the 
line of equal distribution.38 
As for the secondary objective of relative price stability and equilibrium in 
the balance of payments, both of these remained under control during the plan. 
Economic development during the Third Plan did not suffer from the inflationary 
tendencies experienced under the Second Plan and from balance of payments 
constraints. There were various reasons for that: 
- There was a significant increase in the domestic supply of goods though there 
was also a rapid rise in imports, as the average annual growth for imports 
during 1962-1967 was 16.8%. 
- During the last two years of the plan, the government followed a price 
stabilization policy by importing those goods such as agricultural products 
where shortages were pronounced. 
- Many of the second plan projects began to pay dividends in the Third Plan. 
- Oil revenues were increasing to meet some of the growing import bill. The 
total balance of trade (including the oil revenues) for 1962-1967 was - $295.7 
million. 
- The government also pursued a more cautious monetary policy compared 
with that of the Second Plan, as 
Attainments of the Plan 
The Third Plan, in terms of its main and secondary objectives was a success. 
The most notable achievement of the plan was that it expanded the capacity for 
the productive sectors, i.e. agriculture and industry. 
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The actual expenditure in the public sector surpassed Its initial target by 
46% (Table 1.3 ). The expenditure called for an emphasis in the direction of 
infrastructure to keep pace with the progress in the productive capacity. As well 
as this, the public sector expenditure allowed for additional expansion in the 
coming Fourth Plan by providing in advance some excess capacity in the form 
of roads, railways, ports and power generation. 
In 1966 an agreement was signed with USSR for the construction of a steel 
mill at Isfahan with a capacity of 600,000 tons a year, rising to 1,200,000 tons 
under first and second stage developments respectively. A machine building 
plant located at Arak was also included in the agreement with USSR . Other 
agreements included one with Czechoslovakia for a machine building plant in 
Tabriz , which was to start operation in 1968. In 1965 a tripartite agreement for 
the establishment of an aluminium smelting plant at Arak was signed between 
Iran, Pakistan and Reynolds International of the U.S.A. Another major 
agreement during this period was for the establishment of a tractor factory , 
which was signed with Romania. In all, the bilateral agreement with the 
Comecon countries comprised the major part of the state industrial schemes, 
begun during the Third Plan period. 
Also the state took an active role in the development of the petrochemical 
industry. At the beginning of the Third Plan the country had only one fertilizer 
plant, near Shiraz. By the end of the Third Plan, three more and large scale 
petrochemical projects had been adopted under the auspecies of the National 
Petrochemical Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of N.I.O.C. The first was a 
joint venture on a 50/50 basis with Allied Chemical called the Shahpour 
Chemical Company, located at Bandar Shahpour at the northern end of the 
Persian Gulf, in keeping with its role as an export-oriented plant. The output of 
this large scale plant was ammonia, sulphuric acid, urea, phosphoric acid and 
diammonium phosphate. The second located at Abadan, was with 
B.F.Goodrich, on a 74/26 basis for the production of PVC, detergent and caustic 
soda for domestic consumption and finally an agreement with AMOCO 
International on a 50/50 basis, for the production of liquefied petroleum gas and 
sulphur for export. This project was at Kharg Island. The petrochemical plants 
began during the Third Plan period, laid the basis for Iran's rise for primacy In 
the Persian Gulf as the most rapidly developing and largest existing 
petrochemical producers 
The above mentioned agreements and the joint venture projects accounted 
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for the bulk of the allocations made to the industrial sector in the Fourth Plan. 
They also absobed the main share of public sector expenditure during the Third 
Plan, i.e 9.6 billion rials (56% of the total). 4i 
The private sector, despite the recession of 1960 -1962, responded well to the 
lead taken by the government, due to the opportunities which arose to service 
state-owned ventures and also because of enhanced volume of credit 
provided to private sector. Automobile developments included the Iran National 
'Paykan' car in association with Rootes, later Chrysler of the U.K. A second 
Leyland factory was established at Tabriz for the manufacture of up to 6000 
diesel engines per year, while expansion took place of the existing Leyland 
plant near Tehran. Arrangements were made for the creation of a Mercedes 
Benz diesel engine plant near Tabriz. At the same time, Citroen of France 
began to lay the basis of production for light cars and Rambler opened a large 
luxury car plant in Tehran. Deutz of West Germany contracted to set up a bus 
assembly plant in Tehran. 
Among the many factories that came into production during the last half of 
the plan were the sugar beet processing plants at Neyshahpour, Kermanshah, 
Khoy and Isfahan. A glass factory was commissioned at Qaivin and a nylon 
thread plant at Tehran. Private sector investment for these diverse projects 
were channelled through the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, 
(IMDBI). The greatest achievements of the IMDBI were in steel rolling. One 
rolling mill, with a capacity of 65000 tons per annum was inaugurated and a 
second one with a capacity of 85,000 tons per year also at Ahvaz, was begun. 
As well as these, contracts were agreed before the end of the Third Plan for the 
Ahvaz Rolling and Pipe mills, a plant of 100,000 tons per year capacity.42 
As for power and electricity, the construction of a national grid gave flexibility 
in the use of electric power for the growing industrial sector. Electric power 
production rose from 1,235 million K.W in 1962/63 to 4500 million K.W by the 
end of the Third Plan. 
Transport and communication were also improved, although main roads 
received the highest emphasis. Between 1964-66 out of a total 21,711 million 
rials spent on the road projects, 16,189 million rials were spent on the major 
roads, representing 74.5% of the total expenditure on the road programme.43 
The main north-south and western trunk roads were converted to all 
weather highways. Railway development was given low priority under the Third 
Plan until the Isfhan steel mill project agreement, which prompted the 
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government to restart work on the long proposed line between Kashan and 
Kerman and to add links to steel mill and the ore and coal fields. 
In all, the Third Plan was a vital turning point for the Iranian economy. Iran 
was the scene of many changes. Social and political reform with a strong 
programme of industrialisation induced profound change in the fabric of the 
country and set the course for still more changes to come during the Fourth 
Plan. 
1.4 The Fourth Development Plan ( 1968 - 1972) 
Iran's Fourth Development Plan covering the period of March 1968 to March 
1973 was an Improvement over previous plans in terms of its formulation and 
implementation. It was the most comprehensive plan formulated for the period 
when a sustained rise In Iran's national income was expected.The overall 
objectives of the plan were as follows: 
- To increase the rate of economic growth by gradually increasing the relative 
importance of industry by raising the productivity of capital and by introducing 
advanced techniques of production. 
- To achieve a more equitable distribution of income arising from an increase in 
employment and the extension of social welfare to all and expansion of 
development and rehabilitation activities, especially in rural areas. 
- To decrease the nation's dependence on foreign countries in meeting Iran's 
basic requirements: 
a) by accelerating the rate of growth in the agricultural sector in order to meet 
as far as possible, the food requirements of the population; 
b) by the production of the raw materials required by industry; 
c) by producing the basic industrial consumer goods domestically. 
- To diversify exports by the expansion of existing markets and gaining access 
to new foreign markets. 
-To improve administrative services by introducing basic changes in the 
administrative system and extend modern management techniques to all 
ministries and public and private organisations. 
The Fourth Plan aimed to increase real GNP by 57% during the five year 
plan period or about 9.3% per year. Employment was to rise from 6,932,000 in 
1967 to 7,898,000 in 1972, an increase of 996,000. Also it was envisaged that 
foreign exchange receipts during the plan would be $9448 million (in current 
prices), about 74% of which was to come from oil revenues and 6% from 
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petrochemical exports. 44 
The total planned investment by the public and private sector during the 
plan was set at 810 billion rials. The size of public sector investment was fixed 
at 443.5 billion rials (55% of the total) and the share of private sector amounted 
to 366.5 billion rials (45% of the total.) In the event, the size of the public sector 
programme was increased several times and eventually reached 554.6 billion 
rials while there was no mention of the size of the private sector outlays.4sThe 
plan in terms of private investment was by and large 'open-ended* 
Table 1.5 - Planned and Actual Expenditures of the Fourth Plan (billion rials) 
Approved Cred&s Actual Actual as % 
Sector ( Revised Version) Disbursements Approved Credit 
1. Agriculture 
.Vain 
46.7 8.4 
Valua 
41.2 8.1 88.2 
2. industry & Mines 115.6 20.8 113.1 22.3 97.8 
3. Oil & Gas 61.7 11.1 57.3 11.3 92.9 
4. Water 45,3 8.2 42.0 8.3 92.7 
5. Electricity 42.2 7.6 37.7 7.5 89.3 
6. Transport & 84.3 15.2 71,4 14.1 84.7 
Communication 
7. Telecommunications 46.5 8.4 38.7 7.6 83.2 
8. Rural Developmenmts 10.3 1.9 9.8 1.9 95.1 
9. Urban Development 9.1 1.6 8.3 1.6 91.2 
10. Housing & Construction 43.0 7.8 41.6 8.2 96.7 
11. Education 19.0 3.4 17.7 3.5 93.2 
12. Culture 1.5 0.3 1.4 0.3 93.3 
13. Tourism 3.5 0.6 3.3 0.7 94.3 
14. Health 15.7 2.8 14.2 2.8 90.4 
15. Social Welfare 5,7 1.0 5.1 1.0 89.5 
16. Statistics & Research 1.8 0.3 1.7 0.3 94.4 
17. Regional Development 2.6 0.5 2.3 0.5 88.5 
18 .Total. 554.5 100.00 506.8 100.00 91.4 
Source; Bank Markazi Iran • Annual Report 1972 . One U. S .$ - 67.5 rials. 
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As can be noted from table 1.5, the actual expenditure of the public sector ran 
slightly more than 91.4% of the approved credits. The Fourth Plan, unlike its 
predecessors, saw no excessive fluctuations in the social, political and 
economic variables, and the level of expenditure closely corresponded to the 
pattern laid down in the plan. Iran's economy at this stage was seen to be able 
to build upon the gains of the Third Plan. 
The Fourth Plan was to give momentum to the newly gathered speed of 
industrialisation of the Third Plan. The data in tabe 1.5 shows that the sector of 
industry and mines received the highest priority, both by 20.8% allocation and 
22.3% actual expenditure.Credits made availible to agriculture, amounted to 
only 8.1% of the total but infrastuctrural investments remained at a high priority 
level, e.g. investments in oil, gas and electricity. A comparison of sectoral 
allocations and expenditure between the Fourth and Third Plan (Table 1.5 and 
Table 1.3) shows a dramatic switch in emphasis by the government to induce 
radical structural changes in the economy. 
il Comparison of Actual Expenditure under the Third and Fourth Plan 
Plans 
Agriculture 
and Water 
Third Plan 23.1% 
(Table 1.3) (Sector 1) 
Industry 
and Mines 
8.3% 
(Sector 2) 
Electricity 
Gas and Fuel 
15.6% 
(Sector 3) 
Transport 
Communication 
andTetaooms 
26.3% 
(Sector 4) 
Fourth Plan 16.4% 
(Table 1.4) (Sectors 1&4) 
22.3% 18.8% 21.7% 
(Sector 2) (Sectors 3&5) (Sectors 6&7) 
This comparison indicates the shift in the direction of industrialisation. It also 
reflected an explicit government wish to shift the workforce into sectors more 
amenable to rapid growth than agriculture.46 
Income for the Fourth Plan was drawn from its 80% share of oil revenues, 
which itself comprised 70% of funds at the disposal of the plan. The remaining 
sources were the utilization of credits of the banking system, utilization of 
foreign loans and others. Allowances were also made for recurrent costs of 
projects carried over from the previous plan and for projects begun during the 
Fourth Pian.47 
18 
Implementation, Gains and Shortfalls 
In terms of perfomance, the primary objective of the plan was to achieve an 
annual rate of growth in GNP of 9.4%. The actual rate of growth during the plan 
period was 11.6 % or an overfulfilment of about 2 percentage units. With the 
exception of agriculture and construction, all the sectoral annual growth rate 
targets were either attained or surpassed. Agriculture had the lowest growth at 
3.9% per annum, oil achieved 15.2%, construction 7.1% and services 14.2%, 
almost twice the planned rate. Industry grew at an average annual rate of 
13.8% In real terms.48 
With regard to the agricultural sector's growth, it was slightly faster than that 
of the population, which grew by an average of 3% per annum between 1968 -
1972. In all, during the said period, agricultural production was not sufficient to 
satisfy domestic needs. Imports of agricultural goods though fluctuating, were a 
major burden on foreign exchange reserves. Gross imports of agricultural 
goods amounted to 79.6 billion rials during the Fourth Plan. Iran imported 
meat, dairy products, pulses, vegetable shortening and wood. However, 
production of certain agricultural items e.g. cotton and dried fruits showed a 
surplus, and a certain amount was exported. 
During the plan period, these exports amounted to 61.2 billion rials, 
therefore the trade in agricultural products (imports - exports) amounted to a 
18.4 billion rials deficit. In all, the net value of imports of agricultural products 
which had been 1.3 billion rials at the beginning of the plan, increased to 18.4 
billion rials during the plan period.49 
Meanwhile, implementation of the second phase of land reform produced 
revised tendencies for the majority of the peasants and did very little towards 
creating the new egalitarian rural society promised in the Shah's reform 
programme. If anything, the second phase of the reform heightened tensions in 
the villages between owners and tenants. Reform also left unsolved the 
position of lands that were uncultivated for various reasons.so 
Finally the relative decline of agriculture during the period under study was 
evident in the agricultural sector's contribution to GDP, (in constant 1959 
prices) as it declined in a decade from 26.6% in 1962 to 16.1% in 1972,while 
the share of other sectors had continuously increased during the same period. 
As noted before, industrial and infrastructure development received the 
highest priority, a continuity established since 1965. Government investment 
showed a tendency towards capital intensive industries held prominently by 
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state controlled organisations. Private sector ventures were also encouraged 
and extremely generous credits were also made available to private industry 
mainly through the industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, (17.337 
billon rials 1968-1973} and the Industrial Credit Bank,(7.664 billion rials 
1968-1973). si 
The major elements of investment In heavy industry made by the Plan 
Organisation included iron and steel, petrochemicals and machine building, all 
projects begun during the Third Plan period. Metal smelting industries, of which 
the largest was the Isfahan steel mill (Arya Mehr Steel Mill complex) were 
completed during the Fourth Plan. This mill accounted for 53% of the 
expenditure of the Plan Organisation on industries and mines, while 
petrochemicals took 21%. Exploitation of Abadan, Kharg and Shapour 
petrochemical plants began in 1970.52 
With regard to gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF), it was 
interesting to note that the public sector played a major role. GDFCF grew at 
13% annually between 1968-1972, rising from 126 billion rials to 212 billion 
rials.The private sector was responsible for 43% and the public sector was 
responsible for 57% of investment. 53 
As for the employment situation, the targets were overachieved with actual 
employment increasing by 1.2 million as against the planned target of 966,000. 
Agricultural employment however, declined by 202,000 instead of the planned 
increase of 226,000. Industrial and mining employment on the other hand, 
increased much more than its planned target, i.e. 737,000 as against the 
projected figure of 417,000. Lastly, the most significant increase was in the 
service sector which increased by 720,000 or 60% of the total increase in 
employment during the period. 54 
With regard to the ojective of achieving a more equitable distribution of 
income, the result of assessment carried out for both urban and rural area by 
M.H.Pesaran of the Bank Markazi, show that this goal was not achieved. 
Between 1959/60 to 1971/72 there was increasing income inequality. The 
Lorenz curve during the aforementioned period moved further away from the 
line of perfect equality, indicating a uniform worsening of income distribution. In 
addition to this increasing inequality of income, during the period 1959/73 the 
income gap between the rural and urban areas widened substantially, which 
underlines some of the reasons for increased internal migration. 55 
Price stability, another objective, was not fully realised. During 1968 and 
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1970, prices remained relatively stable, while in the final two years off the plan, 
prices increased at about 6% per annum. Specifically speaking, the wholesale 
and retail price indices rose by 7.1% and 5.5% respectively in 1971 and by 
5.7% and 6.3% in 1972. In all during the Fourth Plan, the general price level 
was positively correlated with the overall shortage off supply, especially in the 
agricultural and construction sectors and with movement in world prices.se 
The objective of decreasing the country's dependence on the outside world 
in meeting its basic needs was not achieved. Iran's non - military imports 
increased from $1389 million in 1968 to $2570 million In 1972, showing an 
increase of 85%. Primary products, intermediate and capital goods absorbed 
the highest share off total imports during the same period. By 1972, the final 
year of the plan, 62.2% of total imports were primary and intermediate goods 
and 24.9% were capital goods and 12.9% were consumer goods. In all 
between 1968 and 1972 the total imports increased by 16.6% on average 
every year. 57 
The large share of imports allocated to intermediate and capital goods was 
not a coincidence. Iran was following a strategy of import substitution. Thus the 
increase of imports of these types of goods was justified for the purpose of 
building an industrial base, leading to self sufficiency and consequent savings 
in foreign exchange. 
While an import substitution strategy was followed at the time by a number 
of other developing countries, Iran's strategy differed from the others. Many of 
the newly industrialising countries, as well as relying on primary exports and 
foreign loans, promoted their manufacturing exports to pay for a proportion of 
their imports of capital and intermediate goods, but Iran continued to rely 
exclusively and heavily on oil exports. Between 1963 and 1972 foreign 
exchange receipts from oil and gas were 76% off Iran's total export earnings 
and the average annual rate of growth of oil and gas revenue during the Third 
and Fourth Plan was 14.5% and 25% respectively, ss 
In all there was a failure of attempts to diversify and modernise the non-oil 
sector, the agriculture of Iran being a good example. The share of manufcturing 
in the country's exports continuously declined from 18.8% in 1970 to 14.6% in 
1972, also declining was the share of chemicals from 13.8% to 9% 
respectively, SQ 
Finally in terms of Iran's foreign exchange, the plan's forecasts were not 
achieved. Oil production was reaching its capacity level and foreign debt 
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repayments were a major drain on the country's foreign exchange holdings, 
despite the incremental oil price adjustments between 1971 and 1973. From 
1971 due to the action of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) there was an improvement in the unit price of crude oil exports. As a 
result, oil revenues increased to $2399 milion in 1972 as against $1268.4 in 
1970. Iran also started to recieve revenue from gas exports to the USSR in 
1970. This revenue amounted to $102.8 million between 1970 and 1972. In all 
Iran's oil revenues alone between 1968-1972 amounted to $7836.9 million, 
surpassing the projected oil revenues of $7032.2 million for the same period. 
Despite these revenues, nontheless the cumulative surplus on the balance of 
foreign exchange during the life of the Fourth Plan, was less than envisaged 
about $277 million as against $633 million, eo 
As noted earlier, this was mostly as a result of foreign debt repayments and 
interest. Furthermore, both development and military costs were growing 
rapidly. Relative stagnation of the agricultural sector and rising income levels 
that produced growth for demand for food in the urban areas, compounded by 
increased urbanization, all aggravated the problems. Food requirements had to 
be imported to meet domestic needs and this reduced the availiability of foreign 
exchange. 
At this juncture; it should be noted that the government took various 
measures to improve the productivity of the agricultural sector, one being the 
establishment of large scale private farm units known as agri-industries or 
agri-business, located in virgin lands lying below the reserviours impounded by 
the dams built in the 1960s. These heavily mechanised and capital intensive 
agri-business units were mainly in Khuzestan. Since most of them were in the 
course of construction during the Fourth Plan, their success or failure in 
providing large volumes of agricultural produce was not apparent, ei 
During the plan period, the government strengthened the country's defence 
capability as in 1968 Britain announced its intentions to withdraw its military 
presence from the Persian Gulf. This move, plus the growing rebellion in Dofar 
in Oman, brought a major shift in the government budget towards defence, thus 
military costs grew rapidly and contributed to drain the country's foreign 
exchange holdings. 62 
The Fourth Plan overall was successful, although the agricultural sector was 
the subject of the largest shortfall. The overall growth rate was achieved with an 
overfulfilment of about 2%. However, in terms of other objectives, i.e. equity, 
22 
less dependence on foreign countries, export diversification and price stability, 
the goals were not realised. 
1.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The abortive First Plan exacerbated the country's economic problems. In spite 
of continuing problems during the Scond Plan, where the economy came 
almost to a position of stagnation, Iran was still overwhelmingly agricultural, the 
Second Plan emphasised a number of large prestigious projects and lacked a 
coherent development strategy. Its achievments in the industrial sector was 
confined to the modernisation or construction of a few factories. In respect of 
agiculture, almost all the allocation to this sector was devoted to the 
construction of three large dams . During this plan, the deep recession that 
followed the monetary- induced boom, seriously affected the traditional sectors 
of the economy i.e agriculture, construction and domestic trade. 
After 1963, there was a major shift of emphasis by the government to 
induce radical structural transformation in the economy. Iran headed for hasty 
industrialisation while the viable traditional sectors , in particular the agriculture 
was ignored. As a result, the urban component of the population grew faster 
than that of the rural. Rapid pseudo-modernisation from above was 
emphasised and an industrial structure, similar to that of the West, wrongly 
became the goal. 
During the Third and Fourth plan, industrialisation was pursued on the 
basis of import substitution stategy. Emphasis was put on heavy industries such 
as petrochemical and metal smelting. Iran continued to rely heavily and almost 
exclusively on oil exports to pay for its imports. Investments were undertaken In 
the agricultural sector, chiefly on heavy mechanised agri-business units, which 
were against the traditions of the indigenous agriculture. 
The Third and Fourth Plans were successful in terms of GNP growth, 
however, this is misleading as much of GNP growth was reflected by the 
expansion of the oil sector during this period. In addition, the adoption of the 
import substitution strategy, coupled with rising oil revenues ensured a 
sustained growth rate of the industrial sector. Industrialisation was sustained 
by excessive exploitation of the country's oil reserves. 
During the Third and Fourth Plans Iran aimed for maximum growth, 
industrialisation and foreign technical assistance while its viable traditional 
sectors were undermined. The plans should have focused on better income 
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distribution, balanced growth and economic self-reliance. In all the planning 
was misguided and Iran was led to the wrong direction. Iran's market could 
have not brought about an industrial structure like that of the West. The 
planning was more slanted towards the ambitions of the Shah .The population 
was never consulted regarding desirability of the goals or the direction that the 
country was aiming for. 
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The Fifth five-year Plan began on 21st March 1973. To all intent and purposes 
this was a continuation of the Fourth Plan. As oil prices rose in the last quarter 
of 1973, the plan, In operation for less than a year, was abandoned in favour of 
a revised version, prepared hastily and with great optimism over future oil 
revenues. The revised Fifth Plan in essence was similar to that of the original 
plan, but contained most of the projects rejected by the original plan as being 
uneconomical. In addition to doubling or tripling the funds for many sectors, the 
government allocated a vast budget for nuclear energy development and 
launched programmes of aid for Middle Eastern and African countries and 
equity investment in major industrial countries. 
The Fifth Plan was basically more of an investment programme. During 
1974-75 the government announced several trade and investment agreements 
including purchases of nuclear reactors, arms from the U.S.A. and Britain, and 
its intension of investment in a number of firms in Europe and the U.S.A. The 
Fifth Plan was to bring great changes and transform the social and economic 
structure of the country. The introduction to the revised Fifth Plan indicates the 
ambitions of the planners:-
"It is the earnest hope of all Iranians, guided by their great leader His 
Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr and inspired by his wise 
commands, that this plan will prove to be the spearhead of one of the country's 
greatest and most brilliant and significant transformations, and that Its 
implementation will bring greater prosperity to the nation and its people and 
guide Iran more rapidly to the period of the Great Civilisation.'i 
In the event, the magnitude of changes in economic structure and social 
fabric of the country, eventually led to a politico-economic explosion. 
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to briefly study the original and 
revised Fifth Plans. The effect of the 1973 oil price increases on the Shah's 
vision for Iran and the consequences of development policies and strategies 
that hastened the revolution will be discussed. With sudden accrual of wealth, 
Iran instead of redressing the economic and social inequalities of the 1960s, 
opted for the big - push strategy. Economic resources were allocated while no 
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serious attention was paid to the constraints and absorptive capacity of the 
country. It will be noted that the government extravagance resulted in a marked 
acceleration of inflation. The prices were pulled upwards as aggregate 
demand of the country persistently exceeded its output potential and the 
capacity to import goods and services. 
This chapter will also focus on major causes of the economic crisis that 
preceded the revolution. As such, the country's absorptive capacity constraints, 
infrastructure! bottlenecks, agricultural stagnation and shortfalls of 
industrialisation will be analysed. 
2.1 The Original Fifth Plan 
The original Fifth Plan was itself an ambitious plan. It called for a total fixed 
Investment (private and public) of 2,460.4 billion rials, of which 62.9% was the 
public sector's share and the rest 37.1% was the private sector's share of 
investment (see table 2.1). 
The largest allocation was to industry with 20.4%, followed by housing, oil, 
communication, agriculture and education. The projected average annual 
growth rate for industry and mining was set at 15%, oil 11.8%, services 11.5% 
and agriculture at 5.5%. The plan's projected real rate of growth for GDP was 
11.4%. 
The government's projected revenues during the plan was to be 3344.0 
billion rials. 
Table 2.2 - T h e Government's Original Allocation to the Fifth Plan by 
Sectors. 1973 - 1978 (billion rials) 
JOS 
1. Oil and Gas 1577.4 1. Development Expenditure 1560.0 
2. Payment of Foreign Loans 221.7 
3. Payments on Domestic Credits 63.9 
4. Current Operating Expenses 1498.4 
2. Direct Taxes 350.5 
3. Indirect Taxes 438.1 
4. Foreign Loans 433.4 
5. Treasury Bonds 
and Bank Credits 364.5 
6. Other Incomes 180.1 
Total 3.344.0 
Source: P B O . Iran's Fifth Pian 
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3,344.0 
As is evident from the table 47.2% of the revenues was to come from the oil, 
23.5% from direct and indirect taxes, 13% from foreign loans, 10.9% from 
treasury bonds and bank credits and 5.3% from other incomes i.e. incomes 
derived from government monopolies. The total government expenditure was 
set at 3344.0 billion rials, with development expenditure absorbing 1560.0 
billion rials. 
This plan was expected to strain domestic resources to the full, not least 
transport and communications where the second largest government allocation 
of credits was made to help expand facilities and prevent likely bottlenecks.2 As 
noted earlier, events were to make a nonsense of PBO's calculations and 
replace this plan with the revised Fifth Plan, due to an explosion in oil price 
increases. 
2.2 Twilight of the Economic Boom 
Since the abortive nationalisation of the oil industry by Dr. Mosadegh, the 
government of Iran had been unable to control the rate of oil production and 
exports. In spite of this, oil exports and their revenues dominated the 
government's fiscal resources. 
By the end of the Fourth Plan, greater control over the operation of the oil 
industry was a major government goal. Oil was by far the largest and most 
dynamic individual Hem In the country's export sector and the implementation of 
the development programmes was largely dependent on oil revenues. 
By 1970, world demand for crude oil began to place the oil producers in a 
seller's market and with increased militancy within OPEC, Iran's bargaining 
position gradually improved in relation to the Consortium. The changed 
circumstances were marked in the Tehran agreement in 1971, where Iran for 
the first time was able to rely with confidence on oil revenues.3 Finally on 20th 
March 1973, in an agreement with the Consortium, Iran took over all remaining 
operation and ownership of the country's oil industry. 
On the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war In October 1973, the disruption in 
the supply of oil from the Middle East and the use of oil as a political weapon by 
the Arab oil exporting countries, brought to a head the underlying instability in 
supply and demand for oil. As a result, the price of crude oil sharply 
increased.4 
31 
2.3 The Tehran Oil Agreement 
Following the OPEC meeting in October 1973 held in Kuwait against the 
background of the Arab-Israeli war, the Tehran Oil Agreement was reached, in 
December 1973. As a result, Iran's government revenue per barrel of oil 
jumped from $1.85 to $7.0. By the end of 1974, this figure climbed to $10.21 
per barrel. This meant that government oil revenues in 1973 rose to $4.6 billion 
(310.5 billion rials) as against $2.8 billion (189.9 billon rials ) in 1972. The 
revenue was further increased to $17.8 billion (1201.5 billion rials) in 1974. 
Put another way, in 1973 and 1974 Iran's oil revenues increased by 65% and 
287% respectively.5 
These huge augmentations of Iran's annual oil revenue led the Shah to feel 
over- confident, both at home and in International areas. He over-evaluated his 
own strength and lectured the industrialised world on its short-comings and 
made statements that came back to haunt him in later times. 
In an interview on 25th December 1973, the Shah, responding to questions 
on the increased price of oil had this to say:-
"We are only pricing the minimum it could be priced in comparison with 
other sources of energy... Well, some people are going to say this is going to 
create chaos in the industrialised world; that it is going to be a heavy burden 
on the poor countries...That is true; but as to the industrialised world, they will 
have to tighten their belts, and they will have to work harder or eventually this 
help to the other countries of the world will be diminished, and this role taken 
up - in my opinion - by the new wealth of the oil countries.^ 
Thus in 1973 while the West was put off balance by the sudden leap in the 
energy import bill, the Shah outpoured confidence. He turned critical of 
Western society and made provocative statements, admonishing the West for 
waste and inefficiency.7 
2.4 The Shah's Vision of the Future 
On the eve of the Tehran Oil Agreement, the Shah was assuming the role of 
statesman in the international arena and Iran was rapidly becoming a regional 
power to be reckoned with. At home, the newly acquired revenue and the 
accompanying self-confidence merged together and led the Shah to give 
promises to Iranians, especially in the area of welfare expenditure. The Shah 
propagated in earnest the idea of Iran being at the threshold of the Great 
Civilisation, a national state of material well being, with industrialisation 
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achieved and a full regeneration of Iran's ancient heritage. As R.E. Looney 
noted:-
"According to the Shah, Iranian society at the end of the century, will be one 
that has eliminated many of the major worries that concern the population today 
- the lack of financial security, limited availability of adequate educational 
opportunities and so on."e 
He hoped to achieve something akin to a Utopian dream with plans based 
on the utilisation of the vast oil revenues. All these pronouncements and 
promises created a high level of expectation among the population for an 
immediate improvement in their standard of living and the achieving of the 
Great Civilisation, within their own lifetimes. 
Moreover and most importantly, the Shah's improved confidence led to 
more concentration of power and centralised decision making. This was 
contrary to what should have been, given the increasingly complex economy, 
whose efficiency requirements would have been achieved by an increasing 
delegation of authority at all levels. In fact the new confidence reduced such 
delegation as the Shah relied increasingly on his own decision making 
powers.9 
2.5 The Big-Push Strategy 
The sudden accrual of wealth during 1973 and 1974 subjected Iran to a 
financial shock. The basic constraint on Iran's development until then had 
been insufficient foreign exchange. As the foreign exchange constraints were 
removed, the possibilities for the Shah seemed limitless. The dream was 
announced, expectations of the population were raised and his vision of a 
Great Civilisation was to be fulfilled rapidly by a big-push strategy, financed by 
oil revenues.10 
In March 1974, studies and preliminary findings for the big-push strategy, 
undertaken by PBO, were presented to the Shah, for the purpose a preliminary 
dialogue before the start of deliberations on the revision of the Fifth Plan. The 
Shah was determined to press ahead immediately however, and he dismissed 
the views of his technocrats and pressed for a rapid big-push in development 
and modernisation. In fact, the Shah in his solitary confidence had already 
decided how the 287% increase in oil revenues ought to be disbursed, if not in 
detail, at least in broad terms. 
Some of the objectives of the big-push strategy were as follows:-
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Electrification of the railway system, the setting up of several nuclear power 
plants, building oil refineries and petrochemical plants, construction of six lane 
super-highways from the Persian Gulf ports to Tehran, rapid development of the 
country's ports and last but not least, the development of an impregnable 
defence infrastructures 1 
2.6 Resource Allocation 
The Great Civilisation became an article of faith for the Shah as vision and 
reality further emerged into one. 12 He was not prepared to listen to realists. 
The planners knew the Shah wanted a large upwards revision of the 
expenditure, therefore the PBO began to work with the problems of resource 
allocation . A series of alternatives aimed at achieving a macrobalance was 
set. The focus of the PBO's attention was on how much public investment the 
society could productively absorb in the remaining years of the Fifth Plan. 
Unfortunately, within the PBO itself, there existed a division. The Planning 
Division was not in favour of a maximum expenditure scenario and warned 
against the dangers of inflation, while the Supervision and Co-ordination 
Division pushed for a maximum increase in development expenditures, 
worrying only about the allocation between sectors. 
By July 1974, the PBO prepared a framework for the revision of the Fifth 
Plan and consequently, the special session of the Economic Council met at 
Gajereh (a resort near Tehran) to hear the PBO recomendations.13 As noted 
before, the PBO was split on its strategy during the post 1974 period. The 
PBO's Planning Division presented three scenarios. They were as follows:-
- A modest 31% increase (from 1545.8 billion rials to 2031.8 billion rials) in 
public sector investment over original allocations due to absorptive capacity 
constraints. The main bottlenecks were identified as the shortage of human 
resources and inefficient infrastructure. 
- A medium 98% increase to 3064.5 billion rials. 
- A high 141% Increase to 3732.8 billion rials. 
The Planning Division argued that both 98% and 141% increases were 
above Iran's absorptive capacity and if adopted would lead to a hyperinflation. 
The unused funds were to be invested in markets abroad. The overall 
conclusion was that public investment over and above 2031.8 billion rials 
would subject Iran to inflation, distortions, waste and inefficiency. 14 
The Supervision and Co-ordination Division, at the same time had been 
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asked to submit their views which presented the ministers views, i.e. a 
maximalist, approach whereby Iran, as well as spending its new financial 
resources, would even opt to borrow. 
Finally, the Prime Minister opted for a 2848.5 billion rial public investment. 
This represented an 84% increase on the original Fifth Plan allocation (see 
table 2.1) and 816.7 billion rials more than the recommendations of the 
Planning Division.15 The result of the Gajereh meeting i.e. a redrawn blueprint, 
came to be known as the revised Fifth Plan (1973-1974), was presented to the 
Shah from 1st to 3rd August 1974 at Ramsar, a Caspian resort. At the Ramsar 
meeting many serious issues were pushed aside. The issue of investing in 
markets abroad was superficially dealt with and it was decided that 9% of the 
projected total resources will be invested abroad. No serious intention was 
paid to the problems of absorptive capacity. 
In all, the constraints were ignored and the assembly agreed officially on a 
slightly expanded version of Gajereh spending programme. The Shah, as R. 
Graham pointed out, was dismissive of those who did not share his vision of 
Iran's future as the world's fifth industrial power by the turn of the century. In the 
end, those who had doubts stood silent out of fear, or in the belief that the 
realities of the situation would impose their own logic on the new plan. The 
Shah genuinely believed that the problems underlined by the head of PBO 
could be solved and were subordinate to the lofty objective of accelerating the 
occasion of a self-sustaining economy, independent of oil. The Shah told the 
dignitaries in Ramsar The Great Civilisation we promise is not a Utopia either. 
We can reach it much sooner than we thought. We said we will reach the gates 
in twelve years, but in some fields, we have already crossed its frontiers".™ 
2.7 The Revised Flffh Plan 
As noted before, the revised Fifth Plan did not differ from the original plan in 
substance. The change was that of form i.e. more money to be spent on bigger 
projects in a shorter time. 
Qualitative objectives of the revised Fifth Plan in order of importance were:-
-To raise the living standards of all social strata in the economy and to enhance 
social justice by providing equal economic, political and cultural opportunities 
for all individuals and groups. 
-To maintain a high sustained rate of economic growth, consistent with relative 
price stability and a more equitable distribution of national income and welfare. 
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-To improve the quality and size of the country's active labour force to increase 
productivity. 
-To preserve, rehabilitate and improve the environment, especially in the 
overpopuiated areas. 
-To upgrade the level of science, technology and creativity. 
-To preserve the country's cultural heritage and enhance the quality of life.17 
In respect of quantitative allocations and priorities the plan was based on an 
overall growth target. The GNP in real terms was set to advance at a rate of 
25.9% annually, from 1165 billion rials in 1972/73 to 3686 billion rials in 
1977/78. With the population growth rate of 2.9% per annum, it was assumed 
that a per capita GNP growth rate of 22.3% during the plan would be achieved. 
The plan also called for 25.9% annual real growth rate for GDP, increasing from 
1226.0 billion rials in 1972/73 to 2110.0 billion rials in 1977/78.18 
The plan also envisaged that the government's revised projected revenues 
during the plan will be 8296.5 billion rials. 
Table 2.3 - Projection of Government's Revised Allocations to the Fifth Plan by 
Sector. 1973-1978 (billion rials) 
Share% Expenditure Share% 
6628.5 79.8 1. Current Expenditure 3393.3 40.9 
547.0 6.5 (General Affairs) (425.8) (5.7) 
668.0 8.1 (Defence Affairs) (1968.7) (23.7) 
150.0 1.7 (Social Affairs) (754.0) (9.0) 
& 50.0 0.5 (Economic Affairs) (217.8) (2.5) 
Revenues 
1. Oil and Gas 
2. Direct Taxes 
3. Indirect Taxes 
4. Foreign Loans 
5. Treasury Bonds 
Bank Credits 
6. Other Incomes* 253.0 3.0 2. Fixed Capital 
Formation 
3. Repayment of 
Foreign Loans 
4. Other Payments 
2848.1 43.3 
405.0 4.8 
905.0 10.5 
5. Investment Abroad Z45J fi£ 
Total 8296.5 100.0 8296.5 100.0 
* Includes 135 billion rials ($2 billion) revenue from investment in and loan to 
other countries. 
Source: PBO. Iran's revised Fifth Plan 
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By comparing the figures In this table to those of table 2.2, we can note that 
the projected revenues rose from 3344.0 billion rials to 8296.5 billion rials, an 
increase of 148% with oil and gas revenues, contributing the highest 
augmentation. Gas and oil revenues were increased from 1577.4 billion rials to 
6628.5 billion rials, a rise of over 320%. Current expenditures were also raised 
by 126% to 3393.3 billion rials as against 1498.4 billion rials. The development 
expenditures were increased from 1560.0 billion rials to 3368.8 billion rials, an 
increase of almost 116%. 
Table 2.4 gives the Plan's total projected fixed capital formation by the 
public and private sectors. As can be noted, the total fixed investment was 
envisaged at 4698.8 billion rials. The public sector's fixed investment which 
was supposed to be 2848.1 billion rials (table 2.3) was increased to 3118.57 
billion rials, thus 66.4% of the total investment. The private sectors share 
amounted to 1580.23 billion rials representing 33.6% of the total investment. 
General affairs was allocated 8.1%. Social affairs, with the. principal objective 
of improving material welfare and quality of life in Iran, were to have a share of 
27.4%. The economic affairs sector, covering the care of material development 
in various segments of the economy, represented 64.5% of the total allocations. 
Also the comparison of public and private investment between table 2.4 and 2.1 
shows that the total investment was raised by 91% from 2460.4 billion rials to 
4698.8 billion rials. 
With reference to table 2.5, total government expenditure during the plan 
was envisaged to be 6241.35 billion rials comprising funds for general affairs 
13.3%, defence affairs 31.5%, social affairs 21.0% and economic affairs 34.2%. 
As can be noted, defence affairs absorbed a large proportion of the total 
allocation. 
A comparison between the government's allocation to social and economic 
affairs (revised plan) and the original plan shows that the programmes relating 
to these two headings had increased significantly. In the area of social affairs, 
housing allocations increased by 177%, public health by 104%, rural and 
urban development by over 73% and 47% respectively. In the economic field 
allocations to electricity increased by nearly 353%, oil by 154%, transport and 
communications by 113% and gas by nearly 76%. All these increased 
allocations were indicative of an attempt based on the big - push strategy of 
development and industrialisation aimed at making Iran the fifth industrialised 
nation by the turn of the century. As a result great emphasis was put on 
37 
m 
15 3 
o 2 -3 3 * CP 2 71 IS. 8 
3 
3 
3 
3 8 
8. 
I 
en 
o 00 - * M - ' O S i « J O M O ) C Ul CO O 
8fe 
63 £ <J> > | IO 
onooaoou ioa 
ooo-*ootno~>j 
oooooooa i»g en Is 
CD 
o 
00 
«g ->i 
£ 8 8 8 S 8 8 2 
o s 
CO * » 
8 8 
9} 
S 8 8 8 8 8 a l i : b , f e S i 
^ t t c o o c n c n o u i c n ^ 
8 8 8 2 3 3 
Ol 
SOD 
• • * . -»• 
38 
o 
a. 
r l 
8 s l l l | mum 
pa 
i 6 
o a 
8 D 
E. § 3 -
I 6 g o 
r i 
to 
is 88 8 O l f O 88 858 
>l M _ W 
ro -* <n o 
in £ 
N> to 
M -» <J> -» OJ !0 3 S 6 2 o Sfca 
f f f 
l i t 
i 
o 
I n * 
i l l 
a 9 
CO 
s 3 88285^2 09 IO © o 8 OOOODIO o o o i S * 
8 
o> 
IO IO U l D 1 ^ 
fe88§g8°5!-8^ EO 1 * 9> K» 
s-S 
• 
E 
3 . 
3 
3 
I U CO as 2 8 
* . u u to ^ 
8888882 fS2^ui88i2§ 2868!86o,3!o,$2 
to 
5 
5' 
3-8 8 P P 8 W cn -» ft: • oa o 
p oi cn it ro 
co u io o o> 
cn 
co 
^ P r * ro cn co o o u - ' o u o a i • • • • • • • • l 
u i o > j o a i o > < n o a | 
CO 
# o 
O •iw o o u a >J >i a ro p S p * A O S 
335288 
_ ™ • • • • • 
© o» o to o o 
0 0 
<§-§ 
5' i 
J cn u o I S 
59 
industrialisation based on achieving diversification in exports. In fact Iran's 
industrial development during the Fifth Plan was regarded as the basic 
measure in preparing the groundwork of an advanced economy, to pave the 
way towards the Great Civilisation.19 
2.8 Inflationary Pressures 
The Iranian economy has had relatively low rates of inflation. In the final year 
of the Fourth Plan (1971-1972) prices increased at about 6% per annum, a 
result of growing inflationary pressures. However, owing to the increased 
government expenditures explained earlier, the inflation rates for the Fifth Plan 
were all in excess of 10% ammuonting to as much as 25% in 1977. 
Specifically speaking, in 1973 retail and wholesale prices increased 11.2% 
and 13.1% respectively, a much higher increase to that of 1972. Though the 
economy was subject to inflation, the government, against the advice of PBO, 
embarked on a massive public sector expendlture.20 
Table 2.6 illustrated the extraordinary change in Iran's financial position 
during the course of one year. 
Table 2.6 - The Budget Transition based on Actual Expenditures on Revenues 
1973/74. 1974/75 (billion rlalsl 
1973/74 1974/75 Change % 
Revenues 459.0 1390.5 203 
1. OH and Gas 310.5 1201.5 287 
2. Others 148.5 189.0 27 
Expenditure 479.3 1140.8 138 
1. Current 317.3 729.3 130 
(Defence) * (128.3) (371.3) (189) 
2. Capital 162.0 344.3 113 
3. Advance Payments - 67.5 -
Deficit/Surplus -20 3 249.7 
* R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, p.84. Conversion based on $1.00 « 
67.5 rials 
Source: H. Razavl and F. Vakil. The Political Environment of Economic 
Planning In Iran. 1971-1983 P.79. 
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As can be seen, oil and gas revenues Increased by 287% and expenditure by 
138%. More significantly is the jump in defence spending which increased by 
189% almost keeping pace with the increase in total revenues. 
The unprecedented increase in government expenditures, almost 140%, 
inevitably led to a corresponding expansion of liquidity which resulted in a 
rapid increase in general demand. As R. E. Looney notes that in a situation like 
this, unless the rate of growth of the supply of goods escalates to accommodate 
the demand, inflation results.21 
While supply of goods from both foreign and domestic sources was 
increasing rapidly in Iran, yet it was not meeting the speed of demand. In fact 
as a result of the government's fiscal actions, all producers in Iran were 
encouraged to make the most of their means of production. At the same time, 
the traders were also responding quickly to increased imports, to balance 
supply with demand. 
As a result, the demands for means of production and for primary and 
intermediate goods increased while at the same time, the available 
Infrastructure! facilities were used to its maximum capacity. However, due to a 
general shortage of skilled workers and limitations of infrastructure capacity in 
certain key areas, the supply of domestic goods could not match the rate of 
demand. Thus inflationary pressure mounted, while at the same time an 
acceleration in the world inflation, due to oil price increases, in effect increased 
import prfces.22 
Although from the outset of the revised plan it was recognised that the plan 
would trigger a powerful inflation, the government could not understand the 
seriousness of the inflation. As H. Razavi and F. Vakil point out, the 
government, top echelon bureaucrats and policymakers did not, could not or 
would not conceive the potential social disequilibrium to be generated by 
strong inflationary pressures.23 
In August 1974, Bank Markazl in its annual report complained of inflationary 
pressures in a boom atmosphere. The IMF Mission, which visited Iran in late 
1974, was particularly concerned by this problem. The Iranian response was: 
The government is willing to pay this price (higher investment costs) in order to 
make use of the opportunity of accelerated development which has been 
provided by the increase in oil revenues. The authorities believe that sufficient 
domestic productive capacity should be established in certain major areas and 
the longer the expansion of these basic industrial sectors is postponed, the 
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more costly their development would be."24 
The IMF mission advised Iranian authorities to reduce the planned level of 
the government's domestic expenditure to avoid serious inflation but this advice 
was ignored.25 
The mood was that of big spending and the reality was that the Shah 
wanted increased spending in line with his vision of the future for Iran and the 
chief economic policy makers were giving way. Quantitatively speaking, as a 
result of government policy, the money supply increased by 61% between 1973 
and 1974 as against 27.8% in the previous year. 
Table 2.7 - Money Supply and Banking System Assets (billion rials) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1. Foreign Bank 
Assets 93.5 166.4 543.9 554.0 724.6 898.8 882.5 
(Foreign 
Exchange) (80.0) (152.7) (528.6) (536.7) (705.2) (872.4) (836.2) 
2. Loans and Credits 
to Private 
Sector 364.7 494.2 704.6 1092.5 1516.6 1868.8 2199.0 
3. Public Sector 
Liabilities to 
Banking System 221.4 298.4 445.9 624.8 960.2 1038.8 1435.5 
4. Public Sector 
Deposit with 
Banking System 132.1 209.9 384.3 521.9 837.6 700.9 781.5 
MoneySupply 158.7 202.7 372.2 446.5 611.2 790.5 1236.5 
(growth) (27.8) (61.0) (36.4) (37.0) (29.4) (56.4) 
Quasi Money 240.7 313.1 482.9 669.0 982.3 1306.5 1342.1 
Source: K. Mofid. Development Planning In Iran. Manas Press Ltd.1987. p.116. 
However, in 1974/75 as there was a fiscal surplus (table 2.6), there was no 
need to increase money supplies. 
In 1974, because of increased public expenditure, retail and wholesale 
prices increased to 15.5% and 16.9% respectively. (See table 2.8.) 
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Table 2.8 - Annual Rata of Price Increases In the Iranian Economy 
1973-1977.% 
Year 
1973 
Retail Prices 
11.2 
Wholesale Prices 
13.1 
1974 15.5 16.9 
1975 9.9 5.3 
1976 16.6 13.5 
1977 25.1 14.1 
Source: K. Mofid. Development Planning in Iran. Menas Press Ltd..1987 
The greatest inflationary pressures were recorded for construction and the 
housing sector. Rapid increases in incomes and the increasing migration from 
rural to urban areas, had a major effect in creating shortages, not only in 
available living quarters but construction materials as well. The result was a 
sharp increase in the price of land, building materials and wages for 
construction workers. In turn, the acceleration of inflation in the construction 
and housing sectors spilled over to other sectors and increased inflationary 
pressures in all other activities of the economy.26 
In 1974 the highest recorded price increase was for building materials, 
22.1%, followed by home produced and consumed goods, 15.7%, and 
imported goods, 11.0%. What this suggests, as K. Mofid noted, is that inflation 
in Iran at that time.was mostly due to the monetisation of foreign exchange 
inflows and structural rigidities rather than to imported inflation.27 
Although the problem of inflation in Iran was aggravated by the feed back 
effect of the oil prices, (a jump in the international inflation rates) it would be a 
mistake to suggest that domestic inflation was due to purely international 
factors. Most studies on the subject show that in general, international price 
increases contributed no more than 25% to domestic Inflation, therefore leaving 
a substantial portion to be accounted for by domestic factors.28 However, 
despite the inflationary pressures, the 'big' spending continued as can be noted 
in table 2.9. 
P. 113. 
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Table 2.9 , Actual Budget Receipts and Fypendjture I billion rials! 
1975/76 1976777 1977/78 
1. General Budget 
Taxes 259.2 296.3 397.6 
Oil and Gas 1193.4 1314.9 1314.2 
Domestic Loans - - 143.1 
Foreign Loans 5.4 77.0 95.2 
Others 273,4 109.4 143.8 
Sub Total 1731.4 1797.6 2093.9 
State Enterprise 483.3 1042.9 1107.7 
2. Total State Receipt 2214.7 2840.5 3201.6 
3. Total Expenditure 2214.7 3019.3 3319.0 
4. Gross Deficit - (178.8) (117.4) 
Source: H. Razavi and F. Vakil. The Political Environment of Economic 
Planning in Iran. 1971 - 1973. p. 91. ^ 
While Iran's expenditure continued to rise rapidly at an increasing rate, the 
oil revenues were not increasing at the projected rate. Comparing table 2.9 
with 2.6, K shows the trend of the budget from a small deficit of 20.3 billion rials 
in 1973/74, to a 249.7 billion rials surplus in 1974/75, to a gross deficit of 178.8 
billion rials in 1976/77. In other words, the government's anticipation of a much 
higher oil price after 1973/74, did not materialise, therefore resulting in a 
shortfall in revenues. The revised plan had envisaged a total oil revenue of 
6628.5 billion rials during the plan (table 2.3) while from tables 2.6 and 2.9 the 
actual oil revenues were 5334.5 billion rials, i.e. a deduction of 19.5% during 
the plan period. 
The overestimation of oil revenues in the revised Fifth Plan as H. Razavi 
and F. Vakil noted, was related to the optimistic and confident mood following 
the 1973 Tehran Oil Agreement. None of the policy makers had bothered to 
forecast a possible recession or carry out a careful analysis of the impact of 
rising oil prices in the Western economies. No one anticipated what the 
anomalies of the oil market could do to the carefully laden development plan of 
an oil exporter. The government in pursuit of its domestic target, regardless of 
social costs assumed the necessity of oil in the revised Fifth Plan.The 6628.5 
billion rials figure in that plan was based on steadily increasing output and 
price assumptions.29 
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2.9 Iran's Economy Adrift 
By early 1975, the Iranian economy was almost out of control. Government 
spending was Increasing to an unprecedented level and the money supply was 
still increasing. Contrary to the government's expectations oil revenues were 
not increasing. In 1975/76, oil sales fell by about 7% and there was more or 
less no change between 1976/77 and 1977/78 (tables 2.6 and 2.9). Oil prices 
agreed on at successive OPEC meetings increased but at a rate less than 
those anticipated in the plan. The agreed prices were as follows; Vienna, 
September 1975 10%;Bali, May 1976, price freeze; Doha, September 1976, 
10% tor Iran and others, 5% for United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia; 
Stockholm, July 1977, 5% for Saudi Arabia and UAE, others price freeze; and 
Caracas, December 1977, price freeze tor 1978.30 
With expenditure outpacing the oil revenues, the government had to turn to 
international money markets for survival. In 1975/76 it borrowed 5.4 billion rials 
and this increased to 77.0 In 1976/77 and 95.1 billion rials in 1977/78. 
Financing the deficit not only resulted in a 25.1% and 14.1% lincrease in 
retail and wholesale prices respectively in 1977, but also resulted in an 
increase In public expenditure and a nearly 30% increase in money supply 
between 1976 and 1977, (table 2.7). 
Despite the promises and lectures of the Shah and other policy makers, the 
1976/77 budget figures were a shock to both domestic and international 
investors. As the prospects of the international oil market in terms of oil 
revenues for Iran dimmed, the government tried to maintain the development 
programme, refusing to slow its target rates of growth throughout much of 1976, 
but finally the Shah's vision gave way to grim realities. The conclusion was 
slower growth and tighter control on government spending. The Shah, in an 
interview in 1976, abruptly reversed the course. The politics of plenty of money 
was abandoned. Instead, he told the government to economise in all areas, 
finish the projects now underway and leave the rest of the Fifth Plan objectives 
for the Sixth Plan. In fact by late 1976, for all practical purposes, the revised 
Fifth Plan was no longer followed and worries of future problems led to the 
early preperation of the Sixth Plan. Two weeks after the aforementioned 
interview, the Shah announced the creation of an Imperial Commission to 
Investigate wastage, delays and corruption in the administration of 
development projects. This was the first attempt by the Shah to find out what 
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was going on in the almost out of control economy .si 
2,10 Absorptive Capacity 
Iran's absorptive capacity is taken here as the ability of its domestic economy to 
absorb the resources at an acceptable rate of return within a given period. In 
most developing countries, the factors hindering acceleration of growth are lack 
of managerial and entrepreneural skills, insufficient financial capital, shortage 
of skilled workers, resistance to social change and so on. In.Iran, where to 
some extent the problem of inadequate financial capital had been solved, the 
incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) should provide a good measurement of 
its absorptive capacity, given the other constraints. 
Since the absorptive capacity constraints are expected to be binding, 
simply adding to capital through physical investment, will reduce the 
productivity of that capital. Therefore, the ICOR will rise.indicating the decline In 
additional aggregate output generated by the marginal change in capital stock. 
Thus an increase in the ICOR could imply a lack of absorptive capacity.32 
Table 2.10- Incremental Capital Output RatTo. 1959-1972 (billion rials at 1959 
prices) 
Year JGQR Year C O R 
1959 3.53 1970 1.59 
1960 5.50 1971 1.61 
1961 3.67 1972 1.34 
1962 1.72 1973 2.48 
1963 1.62 1974 9.22 
1964 1.54 1975 2.22 
1965 1.87 1976 11.17 
1966 1.69 1977 -2.33 
1967 2.05 1978 0.93 
1968 2.38 1979 -
1969 1.94 
Source: K. Mofid. Development Planning In Iran. 1987. p.133. 
As can be noted from table 2.10, the ICOR in 1960 was 5.50 rials, i.e. for 
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every extra rial output produced, 5.5 rials of additional capital was needed. 
This figure fell to 1.69 rials in 1966. Between the Fourth Plan (1968-1972) the 
ICORs were quite good, falling to 1.34 rials in 1972. In all, the ICOR on average 
during the Fourth Plan was 1.77 rials compared with 2.69 rials between 
1959-1967. 
In 1974 the ICOR figure rose to 9.22 rials as against 2.48 rials in 1973. In 
1977 ICOR was - 2.33, indicative of the sheer magnitude of waste at that time. 
This negative return on investment could have been decreased by a reduction 
in the size of investment, yet financial resources were applied in great 
quantities during this time. 
In 1978 the ICOR was 0.93 rials. This however, does not mean that the 
absorptive capacity had increased. This was owing to a fall of investment in 
1978 to 858 billion rials, compares with 1114 billion rials in 1976, i.e. a 23% 
decrease. As a result of the revolution in Iran and increased oil prices, the GNP 
increased by 28.3% in 1979 as to that of 1978. In all the low ICOR was the 
result of high GNP and low investments 
To sum it all up, there were several underlying causes for the fall in 
investment productivity. They were diminishing returns on Investment 
stemming from high rates of growth, infrastructure! bottlenecks, waste, problems 
in implementing aspects of land reforms, the destructive effects of inflation and 
price control on labour motivation, planning implementation inadequacies, 
political, socio-cultural and institutional restrications.34 
2.11 Infrastructure! Bottlenecks 
The problems of infrastructural bottlenecks in Iran was the result of a boom in 
expenditure after 1973, which developed a sudden increase in demand. As a 
result, greater pressure was put on the already strained infrastructure and 
problems appeared in production, ports, power, transportation and the like. 
Firms relying on inputs such as electrical power, were forced to operate at less 
than full capacity due to an energy shortage. After 1973, Tehran and other 
urban centres had to face a forced programme of blackouts as the power 
generating capacity was insufficient to meet the demand. 
At one point, the foreign contractors working on the Reza Shah Dam were 
blamed for not delivering the required power to the national grid. Yet the blame 
in people's minds remained squarely placed on the government.35 However, it 
is fair to say that the government was aware of the importance of the need to 
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increase electricity production in order to absorb high investment rates 
efficiently. As a result, by the end of 1977, the electricity production by the 
Ministry of Energy increased to 15,755 million MWH, representing an increase 
of 129% over 1972 production. Though this was a significant achievment, ft 
was not obviously a good enough one, given Iran's aspirations and its pace of 
development during that period. The government failed to increase production 
to the projected level, despite all the attempts and efforts (the projected level for 
1972 by Ministry of Energy was 32,800 million MWH).36 
Unlike many of the governments mistakes, the power failures could not be 
hidden behind a bureaucratic curtain of silence and were the most visible signs 
of an economic strategy that had gone bankrupt. Power shortage had a 
devastating effect on industry. According to the Imperial Commission's 
committee on Industry, a watchdog responsible to the Shah, the country's sole 
aluminium plant, Arak Aluminium, experienced interruptions in its electricity 
supply 760 times for a total of 33,000 minutes between March 1976 and March 
1977. As a result, the company had lost millions as well as disrupting the 
production schedule of its major buyers.37 
The problem of port capacity was also another case of infrastructure 
bottleneck. At the begining of the Fifth Plan, port capacity was 3.8 million metric 
tons and the plan envisaged a 9.8 million metric tons capacity by 1978. The 
plan revision increased requirements to 29 million tons by the end of the same 
year. In the words of H. Razavi and F. Vakil, the time lag in delivery of the 
expanded capacity was not even taken into account when the spending plans 
were made. It was simply assumed that the inclusion of a sufficient budget for 
the port expansion would suffice.38 
The boom in expenditure stimulated imports and the pressure on port 
infrastructure was catastrophic on the southern ports of Iran. Insufficient and 
poorly maintained port handling equipment, inadequate provision against 
humidity and scorching summer temperatures, shortage of skilled workers, 
insufficient berthing space, limited wharehousing compounded by elephantine 
bureaucracy, brought chaos to the ports. By mid 1975 there were 200 ships 
waiting to unload their cargoes at Khorramshahr. Some ships had to wait 160 
days or more before entering harbour. At Khorramshahr 12,000 tons were 
being loaded per day but only 9,000 tons were being removed every day. At 
the most congested point, in September and October 1975, there were one 
million tons of goods piled up on the jetties and around the port. 
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To overcome the congestion, an emergency programme was launched by 
the government. As a result, 2,000 trucks and 6,000 trailers were purchased, 
though It was no immediate relief as there was a shortage of Iranian drivers. As 
a further emergency measure, the government decided to employ 800 South 
Korean and Pakistani drivers.39 
The delays in the ports affected the construction sites and other projects. 
There was a built In delay of six months on the start up of virtually every project. 
There was also an increase in the price of land. Land values were changing, 
not even monthly but weekly. The rises were phenomenal, especially in 
Tehran. A side effect of this dramatic rise was higher rents and consequently a 
demand for higher wages, as housing became the major elements In living 
costs. 
Due to the shortage of manpower, there was a massive inflow of expatriates 
of all nationalities from the West, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Bangaldesh, and 
Sri Lanka. Finally, to work on the increasingly depopulated agricultural lands, 
there were Afghanis. Apart from the social repercussions of such a massive 
inflow of expatriates, there were also economic repercussion. Some 
expatriates were paid well above the Iranians of the same skill, as an incentive 
to work in Iran. Added to this, expatriates increased the strain in an already dire 
housing situation and thus contributed to a runaway black market in housings 
In sum, given Iran's insatiable demand for goods, infrastructural bottlenecks 
frustrated the needs of the market place by adding costs to already expensive 
goods and services, contributing to inflationary pressures, loss of production, 
delays, waste, disruption and the like. While some of the costs could be 
measured, others were difficult to quantify. Cross cultural difficulties between 
expatriates and Iranians led to an increasing number of problems. The Iranian 
middle classes were resentful of the expatriates because they could not share 
the same pattern of life and privileges, though their skills were no less in most 
cases. The resentment of the lower classes stemmed from the expatriates 
values and attitudes which clashed with those of the Iranians. Clashes and 
cultural hostility contributed to alienation with modernisation and development 
programmes. In addition, in a working environment, cross-cultural problems 
led to losses in output and money. They manifested themselves in higher rates 
of labour turnover and a reduction in the production and thus the output of the 
workers. 
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2.12 Agricultural Stagnation 
The agricultural sector had been the weak point In all development plans. 
Despite considerable investment, It persistently failed to provide the growth 
demanded of it. This failure led to changes in policy that followed the break up 
of the big estates through the land reform. In the early 1960s, small scale 
farming, based on the traditional Iranian village was encouraged. 
As this policy put a large proportion of the country's arable land into 
inefficient small holdings, it was reversed and official finance and 
encouragement began to be centred on large scale co-operatives and 
agri-business. 
The change in agricultural policy created a good deal of uncertainty about 
the direction of agriculture and consequently affected the confidence of the 
farming community. This was reflected in poor performance of agriculture. For 
example in 1963 and 1978, the share of agriculture in both the total and the 
non-oil QNP fell. There was a very high rate of migration from the rural area 
into towns and the relative output per worker was much lower than that of 
industry and services. Throughout that period, the average annual rate of 
growth of agricultural output was between 2.5% and 3%. Against this, the 
consumption of foodstuff was increasing significantly.41 
Despite substantial outlays by the state and the private sector for the 
agricultural sector, the co-operatives and the agri-business (the modern sector) 
performed extremely badly and the peasant agriculture (the traditional sector) 
was starved of funds and pushed around by state officials that could not 
compensate so well for the failure of the modern sector. 
As a result, little was achieved in the way of increasing the income of 
farmers and the income gap between the urban and rural areas widened. In 
1976 the urban output per capita of $1830 was about seven times the 
agricultural output of $251, not including oil revenues, which were spent in the 
urban areas by the state.42 
The land reform which was intended to distribute the land among the 
majority of peasant households, was reversed for the sake of creating farm 
corporations and agri-businesses. At the same time, the growth and sharp 
increase of the oil revenues encouraged the government to pursue its strategy 
of urban industrial expansion. The state was no longer dependent on the 
agricultural surplus as a source of finance, food and exports as the oil revenues 
more than compensated for all the agricultural contributions. 
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In all, there was a sharp decline In agricultural overall importance in the 
economy.. The government showed no interest in the developing agricultural 
sector as a whole. Instead, it diverted state credits and capital to agri-business 
and farm corporations. The combination and interaction of these policies 
resulted in zero growth of agricultural productivity, mainly due to the modern 
agricultural sector in spite of grants and credit privileges. 
Poverty and insecurity amoung the peasantry led to an increased migration 
to towns and cities, turning the majority of peasants into urban wage labour. 
Meanwhile, the difference in urban and rural wage levels increased 
substantially. Higher incomes in urban areas stimulated demand for foodstuffs, 
leading to a marked increase in Imports to offset the shortfall in agricultural 
production. 
The government resorted to subsidies for imported foodstuffs from 1974, so 
the amount the consumer paid for basic commodities was reduced. This 
reduced price coupled with higher incomes, stimulated demand even further, 
resulting in a growing food deficit which could not be relieved by imports, and 
which led to a higher rate of food inflation. As Katouzian notes, in a word, it was 
a case of total and unmitigated failure.43 
2.13 The Shortfalls of Industrialisation 
Intense industrialisation in Iran began in the late 1950s and continued 
throughout 1960s and 1970s prior to the start of disturbances in Iran. Before 
the 1950s the country's economy was dominated by oil and agriculture. 
The dramatic shift in the direction of industrialisation came during the Fouth 
Development Plan when the government induced radical structural changes in 
the economy, providing the conditions for the workforce to be shifted from the 
agricultural sector into the industrial sector. 
The Shah was commited to industrialisation and as a result the 
government's energy was devoted to industrialisation with harmful disregard for 
agriculture. The culmination of devotion to industrialisation finally manifested 
itself in the Great Civilisation propagated by the Shah, whereby the goal of 
industrialisation was supposed to be achieved fully. In the event, Iran never 
reached that status and the reasons are varied and complex. There are 
economic, socio-political, cultural, historical, internal and external reasons. 
Here, an attempt will be made to briefly outline some of the serious shortfalls. 
1. The adaptation of import substitution strategy for development in the 
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early19608 was a mistaken strategy for Iran's development. Iran heavily and 
exclusively relied on oil revenues as a means of providing the foreign exhange 
for development. Unlike ordinary developing countries, Iran did not promote 
the exports of its goods to pay for proportion of its imports of capital and 
intermediate goods. This would have not been possible in other developing 
countries similar to Iran in productivity and efficiency but with no oil revenues.44 
As a result, drawbacks such as skilled labour shortages, lack of 
socio-economic infrastructure, inefficiency* low productivity, the high degree of 
wastage and so on were brushed aside. 
2. Lack of correspondence between the imported technology and Iran's 
indigenous endowments. Technologies developed in the developed countries 
quite naturally directed towards solving their own problems by methods suited 
to their circumstances and resource endowments, which differ significantly to 
that of a developing country. This is not to say that the transfer of technology 
from advanced to developing countries is doomed to failure. Problems arise, 
however, when technology is imported with no serious attempt being made to 
provide a hospital environment for its efficient use or instead of 'suitable' 
technology 'modern' or 'advanced' technology is used. That is, 'modern' or 
'advanced1 nearly always mean more capital intensive and less labour 
intensive.45 
Clearly there exists major differences in the physical, cultural, religious, 
historical and socio-political aspects of Iran and Iranians, to those of the 
countries providing technology. Thus the problem of unsuitable technology 
may well have arisen in the case of Iran. 
3. In order to encourage the import of capital and intermediate goods and 
assist the rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector, the exchange rate was 
kept artificially overvalued. The unfavourable exchange policies towards 
exports as well as high inflation rates in Iran, led to a continuous decline in the 
index of competitiveness (real exchange rate). The index of competitiveness 
foil from 113 in 1972 to 48.2 in 1978.46 
4. Cultural problems can be identified as another important reason. Attitues 
and values have profound economic implications that cannot be ignored. 
Fatalism (taqdir), bazaar mentality (i.e. quick profit), the traditional attitude 
towards time (e.g. God willing, tommorow for distorting the sense of urgency), 
nepotism, despotism all affect economic performance, commercial relationships 
and the attempts at industrialisation in many adverse ways.47 
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5. An inefficient state machine without a proper planning apparatus marked by 
widespread corruption and an inability to implement social and economic 
refoFms.48 
6. Superpower politics as a contributing factor deprived Iran of an opportunity 
to build strong and coherent socio-political and economic institutions which are 
vital for a successful drive towards development and modernisation. For 
example the CIA-inspired coup against Dr. Mosadegh in 1953 disrupted an 
indigenous process of development, leading to further underdevelopment of 
institutions with their harmful consequences on the development process.49 
All these factors demonstrate the inefficiencies derived from the 
underdeveloped institutions in Iran, which themselves are the result of 
economic and socio-political shortfalls, caused both internally and externally. 
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S . SHOD OSOLAHO© IQQDOQINDG 
The 1979 Iranian revolution overthrew the monarchy and after some turmoil 
replaced it with an Islamic Republic. The revolution caused severe disruption 
and extensive changes In the structure of the Iranian economy. The Shi'i 
revolutionaries who seized power, had their own ideological baggage for 
transforming society politically, socially and economically. The direction of this 
transformation was suggested in advance in the literature on Islamic 
Economics and writings concerned with economic systems, values, goals and 
policies of an Islamic society. 
After the revolution, as a result of the ideology, internal disorder, 
revolutionary fervour of the people and the pressure from the militant clerics, 
many developments in respect of the economy occured. Measures were taken 
to efface the planning machinery and the economic activities of the old regime. 
The moral dimension of economic activities took precedence over Its material 
dimension. The Islamic government adopted measures to spread economic 
opportunities In favour of the poor in an effort to improve their lot, though these 
had only limited impact. 
More significantly, the government took over large sectors of the economy 
through nationalisation and expropriation, including banking, insurance, major 
industries, large-scale agriculture and construction, and an important part of 
foreign trade. In addition, it also involved itself with the domestic distribution of 
goods. As a result, the economic role of the state increased with all the 
accompanying problems of a deteriorating economy, started towards the end of 
the Shah's rule and expedited by the revolution and the war with Iraq. Below, 
we will attempt to: 
- Study analytically the Islamic concept of economics and contemporary 
economic thought, especially those of lay and clerical Shi'i figures that 
continue to be influential on Iranian clerics seeking justification for Islamic 
economic policies and state intervention in the economy. 
- Briefly compare the Islamic doctrinal disputes and disagreements of the 
leading Shi'i figures on economic matters. 
3.1 The Totality of Islam 
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Brief remarks about the Islamic religion may serve as background to the topics 
under discussion. Islam, from a fundamentalist point of view, is not merely a 
religion in the common meaning of the word, confining itself to the private life of 
man. It is perceived as a complete way of life, catering for all the fields of 
human existence. Islamic guidance through the Quran supplemented by the 
Sunnat (way) and Hadiths (traditions) permeates all walks of life - individual 
and social, material and moral, economic and political, legal and cultural, 
national and international, i 
The purpose of human existence in Islam is to serve God, both inwardly 
and outwardly. That is, inwardly acknowledging God and submitting to his 
supremacy and will, and outwardly complying with God's teachings pertaining 
to ritual and non-ritual activities. Divine ritual guidance is to be accepted and 
taken at face value and leaves little room for choice or modification. This 
covers the observance of the sacrosanct 'Five Pillars' of Islam which are the 
affirmation of the faith, prayer, fasting, alms giving and pilgrimage to Mecca, 
called the Haj. The non-ritual devine guidance covers the domestic, socials, 
political, judicial and economic areas of human activities. 
The purpose of Islamic guidance is to provide man with a range of choices 
to satisfy his physical and psychological needs, through progressive processes. 
In the particular area of economics, this is to be achieved with a set of basic 
values that define the area of permissible economic activities with general 
guidelines, injunctions and the laws (Sharia or Fiqh). The economic values are 
not to be violated and within the set limits, man is free and even urged to use 
his intellectual and physical endowments for the betterment of his life and that 
of his society. 2 
In brief, Islam is a total and unified way of life, both religious and secular. 
It is a spiritual and human totality. 
3.2 The Islamic Concept of Economics 
The Islamic concept of economics is closely related to and is part of the Islamic 
concept of life. It is a framework tor motivated but free human action which must 
respect specific ordanances pertaining to economic life and take into account 
the spiritual and material needs of the Individual and his society in a balanced 
and harmonised way. 
One of the relevant values that delineates the economic framework 
prescribed in Islam is complete commitment to God, the creator and provider of 
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all ecological resources. Wealth Is a favour from God, which should be 
sensibly treated, not abused, destroyed or wasted, or laid idle, a 
In Islam, the economic pursuits are not independent of the spiritual 
objectives and they should not be separated from the religious content and 
become purely materialistic. Emphasising this issue and the idea of value 
judgement in economics, in the words of a leading contemporary Shi'i cleric, "If 
man Is taken to be an instrument of production and distribution, and he exists 
solely to satisfy needs and attain food and shelter - totally preoccupied with 
satisfying these needs - only then can there exist, independent from man, a 
place for imaginary theories of economics and their application." 4 
3.3 Nonscarclty 
According to Islamic beliefs, resources are given in abundance and scarcity is 
caused by human limitation. The economic problem, in the Islamic cultural 
milieu, is not scarcity of commodities, nor lack of efficient organisation of the 
means and sources of production and distribution, rather the problem lies with 
human greed. 5 
Man is encouraged to develop greater knowledge and skills, and should 
endeavour to explore, discover and exploit the resources in moderation for his 
own best interest. God could have made all our needs easily accessible in 
unlimited abundance, but without the economic challenges man would be idle, 
dull and given to criminality. 6 
Some of the Qur'anic 'A'yehs' in respect of resources are as below:-
"Lol We have created everything by measure."7 "And if God were to enlarge the 
provision for his servants they would surely rebel in the earth, but he sends 
down by measure as he wills. Lol He is informed, a sear of his bondmen".8 
Given the abundance of resources, Islam attributes scarcity to social rather 
than physical factors. The remedy to scarcity is through eliminating human 
greed and elevating the human soul, calling for satisfaction of human wants in 
moderation, social justice and mutual responsibilities. 
However, in Shi'i Islamic Economics, the role of economics and the call for 
social justice is seen in a different light. Economics, as defined by Bani Sadr is 
to challenge the social factors causing scarcity and regulate the activities of 
production, distribution and consumption in order to bring about human 
freedom from the fusion of power. 9 
In this way, Islamic economics rejects classical and Marxist economics, 
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both of which are based on the premise of scarcity of physical resources. 
3.4 The Theoretical Structure 
Scarcity forces upon most communities the necessity of making choices. That 
is, how to allocate scarce resources to the production of various goods and 
services to satisfy people, and how to distribute these goods and services 
among them. To overcome these problems a society has to choose ways and 
means of regulating its economic life through what is known as the economic 
system. 
Shi'i Islamic economics claims to have an economic system within the 
framework of an Islamic life, but to describe, define and develop such a system, 
there ought to be a series of theoretical constructs describing and predicting the 
outcome of the system. Shi'i Islamic economics lacks a framework in respect of 
theory, method, sources, historical experience and current practice. In fact it 
claims not to be a science of existing reality but an ideology and a universal 
vision which would establish a completely different framework for economic 
activity and social relations. In the words of a contemporary Shi'i faqih (jurist) 
and leading writer of Shi'i political economy, "Islamic economics is not a 
science of political economy. It is a revolution [a revolutionary ideology] for 
changing the corrupt reality." In fact, there is no major past or present example 
of Shi'i Islamic political economy. As H. Katouzian states, this is sometimes 
used as an explanation of why a science of Shi'i Islamic economics does not 
exist. Ayatollah S.M.B. Sadr explains: 
"Islamic economics has not yet been applied or experienced in the real world, 
therefore Muslim scholars have no contemporary experience of Islamic 
economical 1 "It will be impossible for Islamic economics to reveal itself in its 
true sense unless it is applied to the real world, passes through all its 
vicissitudes and systematically studies all the events and experiences which it 
comes across." 12 
As for the lack of general economic theory based on Islamic philosophy, 
some attempts have been made in recent years by a few traditional Muslim 
scholars and Western-educated Muslim economists, with no satisfactory results 
yet. Rather there has been merely the modification of western economic logic 
and methods in order to Islamise western economic theory by introducing a few 
out of context verses from the Qur*an and quotations from the Hadith. These 
scholars.while rejecting Marxism analysis on the pretext that it is Godless, 
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nevertheless showed respect for capitalistic analysis on the grounds of being 
at least monothestic in its world view. Nevertheless it needs to be humanised 
and Islamised. It is this thinking that has diverted the attention of Muslim 
scholars from appropiate solutions to economic problems of Muslim societies.13 
3.5 Islam, Socialism and capitalism 
Islam has some affinities with both socialism and capitalism but it departs from 
each in certain basic ingredients if its own. In Islam, people are created equal 
and no one may claim inherent merit over another, though they are created with 
different capacities and diverse capabilities and talents. Consequently people 
are bound to attain different degrees of success in material awards and 
earnings. Islam does not approve of a completly equality in the distribution of 
wealth and it is the man's duty to accept his fortune, not to despair or to be 
resentful, although he should struggle as hard as he can for his best interest. 14 
This description resembles a free-market system, but according to 
Abdul-Rauf the individual's possessiveness and his concern for satisfying 
personal needs have to harmonise with obligation to society. is 
The Islamic welfare economy is not based upon increasing the aggregate 
welfare of the community througth encouragement of the individual to maximise 
his or her own interests and to be indiffrent to the interests of others. Instead it is 
based upon the bond of universal brotherhood in which the individual, in 
seeking to benefit himself, avoids malevolence towards another. Every Muslim 
is obligated to pay the prescribed alms to help the poorer section of society. 
Usury and earning without effort is prohibited, is 
This new description may sound like a socialist system. By combining this 
description with the one mentioned above resembling the feature of a free 
market, we may be inclined to believe that Islam offers an economic system 
similiar to that of the mixed economies In which elements of a free market 
system and socialism interact to bring about a system more equitable than 
capitalism and more efficient than socialsm. However, it is not possible to arrive 
at an answer so easily. Islamic principles with respect of scarcity, property, 
ownership,production,distribution,trade and its strong concept of social justice 
based on divine revelation, do not accord with those of contemporary 
economics in the West. 17 
Shia Islam refutes the systems of economic thought prevelant in world at 
large especially that of Marxism. Leading Shi'i clerics such as S.M.B. Sadr and 
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S.M.Yaleqani, have devoted part of their economic works describing and 
refuting both capitlisiam and Marxism, espciailly the latter, is Taleqani 
depicted capitiallsm as grasping and exploitative. He described it as a system 
under which "the capitialist are free to suck the workers dry and then cast aside 
their empty shells without taking any responsibilty". u Marxism apart from 
being Godless.was described as a system "basing itself on a revolutionary 
class ideology, is inseparable from class dominance and the denial of indivdual 
freedom and independence". 20 
However, the greater pro-occupation in Shi'i economic works is with the 
refutation of Marxism, with reference to the superiority of the Islamic approach 
to economic questions.Thls is an attempt to depict Islam as a religion committed 
to social justice, the equitable distribution of wealth and the cause of the 
deprived classes. Thus Islam is used as an instrument for social and economic 
reform and it is suggesting to the younger generations attracted to socialism or 
Marxism, that Islam could serve as a vehicle for social transformation. 
As explained by H.Katouzian, the political oppositions in the domain of 
Shi'ism, to which many Shi'i religious leaders and intellectuals have belonged, 
oppose their social system, which is usually believed (though wrongly) to be 
capltiallst.Hence Marxism appears to be the main alternative, and Shi'i Islamic 
writers develop a dual attitude towards it. On the one hand, they argue their 
own case through refutation of Marxism and on the other hand they try to 
interpret Islamic laws and traditions so they seem less revolutionary than 
Marxist ideals. In fact, even the attacks on capitialist economics, which is not 
regarded as a serious rival, seem to be part of the attempt to prove to Marxists 
that Shi'ism is not a capitalist system. 21 
3.6 Ownership ^ 
In Islam, the absolute ownership of everything belongs to God alone. Man is 
God's vicegerent on earth and he must follow the command and the will of the 
divine owner. 
Based on this principle, which is derived from the Quranic text and echoed 
in the world of Islam in respect of ownership, man is neither the abolute owner, 
nor the possessor of the earth and its resources. 
As stated by S.M.Taleqanl, man does not have the right to possess as much 
as he desires or to obtain the material wealth in any way he may choose.God 
is the sole creator and owner, therefore the ownership is limited, borrowed, 
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conditional and entrusted.As vicegerency belongs to all people, therefore each 
individual is a guardian of the public trust and his ownership should be limited 
for public welfare. 22 
According to Ban! Sadr, the principle of sole ownership has two aspects, 
namely prescriptive (ijabi) and preventive (salbi). The prescriptive aspect is that 
in benefitting from what belongs to God, all men are equal, and there can be no 
discrimination among them. As a result, the relationship which had existed 
between God and all men in the early days of free human living(that is before 
the emergence of power centres) will once again emerge. The preventive 
aspect is explicit, namely that everything is God's and no one else's. No 
authority whether governmental, religious or scientific, may use ownership as a 
basis of power and become an idol. 23 The only known basis in Islam for 
property ownership is (human) labour. That is, Islam only recognises relative 
(not absolute) property ownership on the basis of labour and its fruits. 24 
While Sadr and Taleqani both describe labour in general as the sole 
foundation of wealth in Islam, yet Sadr*s view regarding prescriptive and 
preventive aspects of ownership differs significantly from those of Bani Sadr. 25 
According to Sadr, the real meaning of preventive aspect of the above 
principles is in its "negation of personal ownership and private rights 
concerning those natural riches and raw materials which are acquired without 
use of the labour. 26 However by application of human labour to natural 
resources, the right of ownership can be acquired especially if this is carried out 
with the permission of an Islamic government. In fact this is what Sadr then 
describes as the prescriptive aspect of the principle. 27 
In brief, Bani Sadr, Sadr and Taleqani all emphasise that private ownership 
of wealth and property in Islam is relative as God owns whatsoever is in the 
earth and in the heavens. 28 Bani Sadr sees this as perpetual until the Day of 
Judgement. Sadr qualifies ownership as not an intrinsic right but that of God's 
vicegerency, so that man can deal with affairs concerning the earth's wealth. 
Taleqani says the power of possession is that of God, and emphasises 
ownership as being limited, due to the limitation of human power and authority. 
3.7 Classification of Property Ownership 
According to Sadr Islam provides three kinds of ownership namely state, public 
and private ownership.The diffrences between state and public ownership is 
that "although from the social point of view, they are similiar, in one of them, i.e. 
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public ownership, the owner is the people, and in the other, it is the authority 
and the apparatus which has been commissioned by God to take charge of the 
people's affairs." 30 
As explained by H.Katouzian, in practice there are two aspects to this 
distinction between public and state property , i.e. descriptive and functional. 
The descriptive difference is laid down by Islamic laws and traditions, for 
example, virgin lands and mines belongs to the state, whereas the public 
revenues from land cultivation are common property or wealth. The functional 
difference is that while public wealth must be spent only on social services, 
state property and income may be used directly by the state or assigned to 
needy people for investment in productive activites. However, ft is difficult to 
make much operational sense out of these distinctions which may lose their 
meaning if applied to any contemporary society. In fact they are entirely due to 
political and theological classifications at the time of the Islamic conquest.31 
According to Sadr, private ownership is a 'priority right of use', a special 
relationship between the individual and property which denies others the use of 
it. As for land, the right of use is conditional. For example, cultivation brings right 
to ownership, but such a right is limited to the length and duration of cultivation 
and under a variety of circumstances, the right could be withdrawn. "Private 
ownership of land is not absolute and is limited in duration, in the sense that if 
the owner fails to carry out his responsibilities in developing and cultivating the 
land, his rights lapse and he may no longer dispose of the land; for this action 
diminishes society's capacity to produce, and results in the deprivation of 
others."32 
Moreover, all uncultivated land (mavat), especially those close to habitable 
places with potential and value for cultivation belong to God and then to the 
Prophet and the Imam. With the Imam's permission, (as he is not present, the 
permission of the leader of the Shi'i Islamic state) provided the land Is 
cultivated, a limited right of ownership for the cultivator remains and is 
conditional as explained above. 33 
As indicated before, private ownership is conditional and is defined in very 
narrow terms, as a result private property, income and wealth are not absolute, 
that is, they can not be held and disposed of with complete freedom. For 
example, tax on both capital and income must be paid (Zekat and Khoms). The 
Islamic ban on hoarding, waste and overconsumption are to be taken literally. 
Violation of these principles or the misuse of wealth could also lead to a loss of 
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ownership rights. Individual property could be limited in order to maintain social 
equilibrium, and to ensure each member of the community a decent standard of 
living. 
As for inheritance and succession, Sadr and Ban! Sadr both emphasise 
that a person cannot dispose of more than one third of his property by 
testamentary directions, the rest of the inheritance must be divided among 
prescribed heirs in specified shares. In fact Sadr claims that the free will for one 
third of the estate is an 'expedient', which it is advisable not to practice. 34 
According to Bani Sadr, with the distribution of inheritance, however 
considerable it may be, the concentration of wealth througth inheritance will be 
avoided.35 However, he does not explain the share of female heirs, which is 
generally one half of that of a male in the same degree. 
Though the share of inheritance may be a factor inhibiting the concentration 
of private wealth and property, it does not leave a permitted mechanism for the 
perpetuation of wealth, property and associated privileges. 
3.8 Labour, Wage and Profit 
As mentioned earlier, both Sadr and Bani Sadr believe that the whole produce 
of labour belongs to the labourer alone. In connection with this abstract 
principle, Sadr attacks capitalist economics for putting the means of production 
at the same level as labour and claiming a share of the product for it too. 36 
However, it should be noted that capitalist economics does not put the means 
of prodution but their owners at the same level as labour and as private 
property is legitimate, therefore it allocates a share of the output or income to 
owners. 37 
Sadr and Bani Sadr both point out that the means of production are a kind 
of 'embodied labour*, the use of which results in their depreciation. Sadr states 
"productive labour can take the means of production from someone else and in 
return pay a reward (ojrat) consistent with its services to its owner. Likewise 
land can be rented out against a certain sum and used for productive 
purposes". 38 
Considering the above, there seems to be little diffrence between a 
capitalist economics and the viewpoints of Sadr and Bani Sadr in these 
respects. Capitalist economics describes the return to the factors of production 
as rewards for their services and it makes no difference whether the whole 
produce or income is owned by the worker.who is then required to pay a share 
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of it for the services of private property and the rest of output (or income) is paid 
to the worker. 39 
As for profit, according to Sadr, it is justified for a merchant on the grounds 
of the costs (including his own labour time) incurred by him in his trade. But it is 
common that a part of the merchant's income is a pure return on the use of his 
capital. If this was not to be allowed, then consistency would require the 
Islamic society to compensate the trader whenever he makes a net loss, similar 
to the manager of a state firm who would receive his salary even if the firm 
loses in a given year. Alternatively, if a merchant was restricted to earn no more 
than the value of his financial and labour costs, then nothing would prevent the 
traders from transferring their capital to the ownership of urban or rural property 
and enjoy its rent (as is clear from Sadfs discussion) as private property and 
income are allowed in Shi'i Islamic economics. 4o 
3.9 Riba, Interest and Money 
Riba Is explicitly prohibited in the Qur*an and Islamic sects.be they Shia or 
Sunni, seem to be on their surest ground on the subject of riba. The word in 
Arabic means to grow or to Inflate and it refers to those transactions In which 
capital automatically increases without any productive labour. Taleqani states 
that "because usurious transactions at the dawn of Islam were strictly in the 
form of money lending, it is assumed that the prohibition of usury only applies 
to revenue gained through money lending . The traditionalists in Islam who 
were also the interpreters of the Qur*an extended prohibition of usury to some 
other transactions. Examples of such transactions are those in which a certain 
amount of a specific measurable commodity is loaned to be returned with an 
additional amount." 41 
Therefore usury is not limited to lending money in exchange of money with 
interest. Rather, it applies to any prepaid transaction (Salafi) either of money or 
goods. Both Sadr and Bani Sadr emphsise the prohibition of riba and assume 
that it is the same as modern interest charged on financial loans.This however, 
Is debatable. It has been argued that excessive interest is usually believed to 
consitute usury but the argument makes little sense. Economically, excessive 
rates of interest at a given time or place may be regarded as normal at another, 
and theologically the prohibition is total and categorical and leaves no room for 
argument about specific rates. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that in the social and historical context of 
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prohibition, riba refers to charges paid for borrowing money to finance goods 
for consumption rather than trade and prodution. Though this is a more 
persuasive argument, it is not totally convincing for those who see riba and 
interest as indentical. 42 
Writers on Islamic law and Islamic economics have worked out a great 
body of literature on usury, based on economic conditions as they existed at 
time of the rise of Islam. The majority of these writers including Shils agree that 
prohibition of riba means that the borrower must return to the lender the exact 
equivalent of the loan when it falls due. On the basis of this meaning, in today's 
world, the law of riba is not applicabable, especially to cases where inflation 
results in a fall in the purchasing power of money. 
However, certain modern scholars without hedging round the issue, 
disagree with the traditional definition of riba. Yusef All from Pakistan has this 
to say about the matter: The definition I would accept would be: Undue profit 
made, not in the way of legitimate trade, out of loans of gold and silver, and 
necessary articles of food, such as wheat, barley, dates and salt. My definition 
would include profiteering of all kinds, but exclude economic credit, the 
creature of modern banking and finance." 43 
As for money, both Sadr and Bani Sadr claim that holding excessive 
money is prohibited by Shi'i tradition. Sadr, on explaining the functions of 
money, (a medium of exchange, a measure of value) describes its secondary 
role as a means of storing values but adds that holding excessive money leads 
to disequilibrium in supply and demand of goods. T h e recent role of money as 
a means of storing and saving [idle cash] , which is encouraged in capitalist 
economics, is a dangerous factor, as this will cause disequilibrium in total 
supply and demand of goods, whereas in the era of direct exchange of goods 
[baiter], there existed an equilibrium, as producer either produced merely for a 
self consumption, or in exchange for other goods, again for personal needs." 44 
However, after further elaboration, he seems to believe that in ail 
circumstances it is better to spend than save. He also appeals to the moral 
principles of Islam and cities from the Sixth Shi'i Imam that extra wealth given 
by God is for spending and not for storing. 
Bani Sadr goes further and speaks of limits to wealth and cities from the 
Imam (presumably the First Shi'i Imam) saying that "it would be impossible for 
anyone to accumulate more than 20,000 dirhams (silver coins) through 
permitted activitiesAS On another occasion he quotes from the Sixth 
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Shi'i Imam that "no one has ever managed to accumulate 10,000 dirhams by 
permitted activities" and he adds that one dirham is equal to one toman (ten 
rials). 46 
While the authenticity of the related Traditions is doubtful, they are also 
contradictory as the earlier tradition puts the limits of wealth at twice the later 
one. The claim that a dirham is equal to one contemporary toman is doubtful. 
Because the purchasing power of money (not its nominal value) is the relevant 
datum, therefore It may have been less in the Sixth Imam's time than in the First 
Imam's and definitely much less now. Thus the relative significance of the 
above figures is open to doubt and if any wealth (not income) more than 10,000 
or 20,000 tomans were to be forbidden, then most Iranians e.g. traders, civil 
servants, religious leaders and so on , would have to be described as sinful 
and corrupt. 47 
As for limits of liquid cash, according to Bani Sadr, the First Imam is said to 
have put the limit at 4000 dirhams, whereas the limit set by the Fifth Imam is to 
be 2000 dirham. 48 
As explained above, the changes in the purchasing power of money are 
ignored and it is overlooked that with an increase in total wealth, the aggerate 
stock of money also increases, resulting in higher levels of cash holdings by 
most members of society. 49 
It should be noted that the Qur*an prohibits collecting and storing gold and 
silver as quoted by Sadr, Bani Sadr and Teleqani. It is directed against 
hoarding of treasure and not against wealth. As Sadr and Taleqani point out, 
Islam prohibits the hoarding of cash, the idleness and its withdrawal from the 
flow of production, so 
However, if Bani Sadr*s personal cash limits of 2000 or 4000 dirhams 
applied to Iran, the people would constantly spend their money (liquid assets) 
on goods and property (real assets) which would have inflationary 
consequences, perhaps necessitating state intervention, si 
3.10 Partnership In Investment and Trade 
According to Taleqani, capital profiteering, as a major goal in the West, has 
already underminded and corrupted its institutions, contributing to deprivation 
of freedom and the exhaustion of the mental and physical resources of the 
workers, wage earners and others who belong to capitalist society. He states 
that Islam with its deep rooted spiritual teachings and through its injunctions 
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and laws, secures freedom for workers and wage earners while bridling the 
greed of the owners of the capital. "Wage earners are free and can earn equal 
and balanced conditions or share in the profits or in the principle capital. The 
employer, whether a private capitalist or the state, cannot singly determine the 
amount of work or the workers' shares in the profit or wages". He adds -Islamic 
jurisprudence provides this very freedom of action and equality of rights in 
partnership through ordinances regulating mozaraba, mozara'a, mosaqat, 
ja'ala and ijarah. 52 
3.10.1 Mozaraba 
It is a contract between a worker and an investor, whereby the two parties 
agree to share in the resulting profit and the loss absorbed by the Investor's 
capital. An example of it might be a venture where a person lends his money to 
another for the purpose of a given business investment without his partnership. 
Hence the 'sleeping partner*, according to a prior contract with the 'active 
partner1 will pay him a mutually agreed share of the profits; but he must bear all 
the losses if the business fails. This arrangement, known as mozaraba is 
described by Sadr and Taleqani. In fact Sadr praises its justice and morality : 
because the 'sleeping partner is not involved in the business (or does not work 
for it), he has to bear all the losses. 53 However, closer examination of this rule 
reveals that there is not much that is especially just or moral in it. In spite of the 
assertion of Taleqani, it is difficult to agree that there exists 'equal and balanced 
conditions' for wage earners. Firstly if the 'sleeping partner* provides the whole 
of the capital and 'active partner* purely runs the business, (the only example 
given by Sadr) then it is equivalent to a owner of capital employing a worker in 
order to use his capital in a business of his own choice, and pay a share of the 
firm's proceeds as his wages by mutual consent. However, if the business 
failed, the capitalist has to bear all the losses without having to pay a wage to 
the worker.Compare this to a capitalist economy, where the capitalist whether a 
'sleeping partner* or a active one, has to pay the wages of workers even if he 
made a net loss. 
Moreover, the wage rates often must be at or above the legally enforced 
minimum wage and negotiated not by mutual consent between the capitalist 
and the individual worker, but by collective bargaining, which is likely to 
increase the workers share in the firms income. In Mozaraba, if a bank as a 
'sleeping partner* provides only a part, say 60 per cent of the capital, then the 
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rule must mean that the bank should pay a mutually agreed percentage of the 
60 percent share of the profit to the active partner, who fully shares his own 40 
per cent shave of the toss. Hence the arrangement could be that if the venture is 
profitable, the bank with 60 per cent of the capital gets 40 per cent of the profit. If 
however the venture is a loss making one, the bank would be liable for 60 per 
cent of the loss. This is not more, but less just than similar contracts and 
institutional relationships in a capitalist economy. 
3.10.2 Mozara'a 
This Is temporary share cropping contract between the owner of a piece of land 
and the worker. The land owner should provide irrigation, fertilizer and other 
means as well as seed. Both sides share the crpp by mutual consent. 
According to Sadr, if the land owner does not provide the seed the contract is 
called Mokhabra. 
3.10.3 Other Contracts 
Mosaqat is an irrrigation contract similar to Mozara's whereby the worker in 
such a contract shares in the profit. Ja'ala is a unilateral contract with a promise 
to the doer of a job, with no time limit specified (e.g. whoever drains this land 
will share in the profit). Finally Ijarah (of a person) is a contract to cany out a job 
within a fixed period. 
As can be seen, these arrangements discussed by Sadr and Taleqani, for 
employment and partnership are not confined to trade and other urban 
activities; they extend to agriculture and production too. The implications of 
these, especially Mozara'a and Mosaqat are the same as the previous case, 
therefore it does not call for a separate analysis. 
3.11 Economic Role of the Islamic State and the Imam 
The Islamic state on Shi'i lines is vested with wide and varied economic powers 
by Sadr, Bani Sadr and Taleqani. It owns, organises, spends 'public' and 'state' 
properties and revenues, imposes taxes on the private sector, lends money and 
property to 'needy people' for them to invest and it can nationalise the private 
sector. 
Sadr has envisioned this major role for the state , partly as an engine for 
economic development and partly as a means of limiting private enterprise. A 
state itself would undertake the major industrial and economic projects that in 
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capitalist societies are carried out by private enterprise and large private 
concentrations of wealth , simply would not exist. Hence Sadr states: "Private 
capital for the most part will lack the means and power to achieve in commerce 
and industry a size and strength that threatens the social equilibrium ... 
therefore private economic activity will remain within reasonable limits ... and 
will not create class differences. As a result, the creation of large industrial 
enterprises will fall within the sphere, authority and activity of the 
government."54 
Given the wide ranging powers, the mechanism through which programmes 
of social and economic reforms could be carried out, is the leader of the Shi'i 
Islamic state. Sadr refers to the leader as the Vali-ye Amr* (Guardian of the 
Cause) while Taleqani and Bani Sadr use the term 'Imam'. 
The authority, legitimacy and authenticity of the Shi'i religious leadership 
is based on and part of the doctrine of the Imamate, that forms the heart of the 
political theory of the Shi'is. Although historically the Shi'i leadership had no 
claim to government (as opposed to political participation), following Ayatollah 
Khomeini's innovative argument in his Valayat-e Faqih (the purported authority 
of the jurisprudent) alternatively titled 'Hokumat-e-lslami' (Islamic government) 
the claim to rule was emphasised. That is, jurisprudents were given the licence 
to rule in the Twelfth Imam's place (the Qa'em or Mahdi) during his occultation 
and shall continue until the realisation of the 'perfect society' which will 
coincide with the reappearance of Mahdi. ss 
According to Bani Sadr, citing All Shariati, after the inception of the first 
Islamic state, it will take twelve generations to reach the perfect Islamic society, 
the universal Kingdom of the Twelfth Imam. This is a society in which all 
divisions, vindictiveness, self seeking, coercion, domination, alienation and 
inequality disappear from experience: "It is the world of equality and economic 
oneness [as opposed to division]", se 
However in the period of purgatory' (before the realisation of the perfect 
society), the Imam has been vested with discretionary power by Sadr, though 
he cannot tamper with those acts that expressly required or specified such as 
daily prayer and he can not suspend the Islamic law on inheritance or riba. This 
is a sphere of primary religious rulings where no flexibility is allowed, however, 
there are a whole category of actions whose performance is merely 
recommended or considered neither good nor bad. Here in the 'sphere of 
discretionary law*, the Imam has been given considerable authority and can 
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Issue secondary rulings to regulate human affairs. 57 
On the basis of this, the Imam can regulate relations between men, society 
and material resources in keeping with the requirements of the time and 
changing concepts of human needs. 
Taleqani, like Sadr who vested ultimate leadership and the rule of the 
Islamic state in Imam, states: "the ruler in his executive capacity, just as he 
controls public resources, exercises complete supervision over production and 
distribution and manages public and governmental revenues, he is also 
charged with securing the lives of individuals", ss 
Bani Sadr envisages a role for the Imam, but in contrast to Sadr does not 
emphasise his authority relating to discretionary rulings and guards against the 
concentration of power in the hands of any authority. He is concerned that the 
Imamate is not alienated from itself and turned into a coercive state. 59 
However he depicts the Imam as the 'continuous repository of the concensus of 
the community', the administrator of the common property of both present and 
future generations and the 'executive representative of God', eo Bani Sadr 
remains equivocal In this question and contradicts himself. 
/ 
3.12 Conclusion 
Shi'i Islamic economics lacks a general theoretical framework and an 
integerated network of proposals for economic action. The proposed economic 
system by Sadr is more of a value system with generalised moralism which 
defines the boundaries of the free area of economic activites - at best it is a 
moral framework for economics. According to Muslims, the Qur*an is God's 
words revealed to prophet Mohammad by the angel Gabriel. If one is to believe 
that, there would be little room left to argue that the Qur"an is nothing but a set 
of a normative statements that is perpectual, timeless and should be taken at 
face value. However, the time-bound statements which are historically specific 
and subject to debate are the Hadith and Sunnat. These and Quranic verses 
serve as the main sources and references of Shit contemporary writings. There 
being no theoretical framework, no major historical experience and no 
systematic method, the writings of Sadr, Bani Sadr and Taleqani on the subject 
of economics tend to combine abstract norms and values with assertions on 
what will happen once the Shi'i economic system is put into operation. It is a 
combination of elements of both idealism and pragmatism. While the idealism 
in Shi'i Islamic economics tends to ignore or underemphasise major problems 
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without a clear programme for their aleviation, the element of pragmatism tends 
to ignore doctrinal difficulties by means of ad hoc interpretation. For example, 
the discretionary power of the Imam on matters which are neither good nor bad 
(neutral) is unclear especially if such rulings contradict the precedence set by 
the prophet and the twelve Sinless Shi'i Imams. In fact Khomeini used his 
power to override even the percepts of the Qur*an. "Our government is a branch 
of Mohammads absolute vice-regency... It takes precendence over all religious 
practices such as prayer, fasting or Haj... I openly say that government can stop 
any religious law if it feels it is correct to do so... The government can 
unilaterally abrogate its contracts with and obligations towards the public 
whenever such contracts are against the country and Islam..." ei 
Shi'i Islamic economics is part of the growing effort to demonstrate that 
Shi'i Islam contains all the ideas necessary to build a just polity in reaction 
against the move of many intellectuals towards western liberal or communist 
ideology. As explained by Khomeini, the Muslim world is confronted with a 
crisis of fundamental identity, a persuasvive alienation in which is rooted the 
Muslim world's apparent political, military, scientific, and mora! debilitation. 62 
Shi'i Islamic Economics as part of its effort tries to portray Islam as a third 
road between capitalism and socialism, though capitalist economics is not a 
major rival. The greater preoccupation is with Marxism. It is refuted to be 
Godless, usurps the individual's liberty, denies him the chance to exercise his 
initiative, kills his incentive to work hard for personal gain and deprives him of 
much of his dignity. 
Shi'i economics combines traditional Islamic doctrines and practices with 
elements of modern radical ideologies. It permits private property in trade and 
agriculture but unlike the laissez-faire capitalism, property does not belong to 
individuals but to God and the individual rights are protected as usufruct rights. 
It identifies riba with interest though it is debatable in theory and may be 
inconsistent with other Islamic principles in practice. It emphasises limits to 
cash holdings, meaning that personal wealth above certain limits must be held 
in non-monetary forms such as property and consumption goods, while 
overlooking the fact that a legal limit to cash holding could be highly inflationary 
if economic resources are fully utilised, or if there existed supply shortages and 
technological constraints.There are clear signs that in the proposed Shi'i 
economic system, the economic activity of the private sector will remain within 
reasonable limits and the state will undertake major industrial and economic 
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projects. 
Because of the nature of the Islamic state, the Imam (the leader of Shi'i 
Islamic state) and his government will be the 'executive representative of God 
on earth'. Shi'i Islamic economics has a multitude of unsolved problems both 
of a doctrinal and a practical nature. In the words of H. Katouzian "ideologies 
and social programmes can only hope to achieve their declared objectives so 
long as the social and economic base does not run against them. In the case of 
Iran, no ideology can succeed in realising its social and moral values unless its 
application begins by an attack on the foundation of Iranian despotism". 63 
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4.1 Introduction 
The fact that the Islamic regime in Iran is facing serious economic problems can 
hardly be disputed, Iran's economy which had stagnated during the last few 
years of the Pahlavi rule, was almost out of control from 1975. The upheaval of 
the revolutionary movement of 1977 - 1979 exacerbated the longer standing 
economic problems. This resulted in structural disintegration following the 
ousting of the Shah. 
Having seized power, the revolutionaries were confronted with staggering 
economic problems. Far-reaching solutions were required to reverse the 
course of economic chaos, but divisions and the struggle for power in the 
predominantly Islamic movement prevented the shaping of any coherent 
economic policy. All the economic measures that were taken from Bazargan's 
provisional government onwards, were aimed to stave off the complete 
collapse of the economy. Indeed Bazargan's main task as defined by the 
decree of appointment drawn up by the Revolutionary Council and signed by 
Khomeini, was to get the government administration and the economy, 
paralysed by a year of strikes and disorder, moving again in order to prepare 
the ground for the Islamic Republic, 
However, Bazargan's efforts and vision of drawing up long term plans for 
changes in the government administration and the economy were challenged 
from several directions: the fervour of revolution in the street; by a rapidly 
developing 'parallel government' of revolutionary committees, courts and 
guards backed by the secret Revolutionary Council; and by an abundance of 
political parties and movements advocating various radical policies. 
Despite the desire and imperative need for sweeping changes in the 
economy of the country, neither Bazargan nor Bani Sadr were able to 
implement their own economic programmes, mainly because of the political 
chaos and divisions within the regime itself. Furthermore, Iran was haunted by 
the spirit of the Islamic tradition, including the values and principles on 
economic matters. The interpretation of these principles and the application of 
Islamic economics on Shi'i lines was widely disputed. The writings of Bani 
Sadr, Taleqani, Sadr and similar works were influential on clerics seeking 
justification for economic measures. For instance they played a significant role 
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in undercutting the legitimacy of private property. However, these writings left a 
host of complex and unsolved problems, both of a doctrinal and a practical 
nature as discussed in the previous chapter. The doctrinal disputes of clerics in 
the Islamic Republic on various economic matters such as land, has manifested 
itself in a set of debilitating failures. These Include the inability of the Islamic 
Republic to agree over basic economic guidelines for sectoral priority or policy 
linking sectoral activity together. The leadership suffered from an 
overwhelming lack of experience to temper the dominance of religious 
dogmatism with a sense of the practical. As a result, the Islamic government 
could not easily decide which development path to follow, as there was much 
internal conflict with its interpretation of Islam. It strongly refuted a 'Godless' 
Marxist type of economics but it did not tolerate the speculation inherent in the 
free market approach, while readaptation of the Shah's policy was 
unacceptable. 
All paths seemed to promise elements of a solution but the Islamic 
government had not yet made a definite choice. Apparantly, the government 
was committed to a development path on the basis of Islamic principles with all 
the accompanying unsolved problems. The delay and hesitation compounded 
with internal rift and continuing struggle for political power and the war had 
catastrophic effects on Iran's economy. Indeed the causes of many problems 
are not connected with the conflict between Iran and Iraq as is often asserted. 
4.2 The Immediate Economic Decline (1977-1979) 
During the months leading to the fall of the Shah, despite the fears about the 
ambiguity of the nature of an Islamic government, there was considerable 
speculation about what Islam would mean for the economy. Ayatollah 
Shariatmadari tried to lessen fears in January 1979 by saying that not all 
interest was usury and the international banks with their interest rates would be 
welcome by the future government. But Bani Sadr, then an aide to Khomeini, 
issued an economic programme that called for radical measure by abolishing 
all interest, nationalising banks, cancelling all international debts owed by Iran, 
establishing worker's committees to run all public enterprises, (eg the banks, 
the oil industry, the media), lowering oil production, raising oil prices and 
introducing high taxes on imported industrial goods to stimulate domestic 
industry.1 
The period of the revolutionary movement of 1977-1979 was characterised 
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by conflicting currents and growing economic disruption that went hand In hand 
with demonstrations, riots and political agitation by secular and religious 
groups. Central to the deterioration of the country's economy was the strike by 
oil workers, which led to a drop in oil production from 6 million barrels per day 
in January 1978 to a mere 250,000 barrels per day one year later.2 The chain 
effect of this on imports, exports, government revenues and industry were 
profound and longstanding. Although the intelligentsia sparked off the 
revolution, its shock troops were made up mainly from the industrial working 
class in Tehran and other major cities, comprising both employed and 
unemployed workers inspired by a profound religious fervour - the form of 
revolution and its pacing owed much to the tradition of Shi'i religious protest, 
while the causes and its timing were economic, socio-political, cultural and 
historical. 
As a result of this changed attitude, the workforce acquired a new sense of 
political involvement and independence. In practice, this meant a considerable 
breakdown of work discipline and the alienation of technical and managerial 
staff. By January 1979, various worker's committees were set up in the oil 
fields, at airports, on the shop floor, in firms, in agricultural co-operatives and at 
many other places. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting expressions of Islamic economics during 
the revolution was the co-operative organisations set up to support the strikes 
as well as feeding the poor and organising relief. In cities, particularly Tehran, 
bazaaris and the religious network developed an organisaiton to subsidise 
food and support people who had no income, either because they were 
impoverished or on strike. Most important, the critical stike by oil workers was 
supported by such nationwide co-operative organisaiton, fuelled by 
revolutionary enthusiasm. 
By February 1979 when Bazargan was charged to lead the provisional 
government, the treasury was nearly empty. There was an equivalent of $700 
million remaining in the government's account with the Central Bank, and the 
$47 billion budget for 1979/1980, drawn up before the fall of the Shah, 
projected a deficit of over $15 billion.3 
As a result of the economic chaos, the banking system was near collapse. 
Depositors and capitalists withdrew funds from the banks on a massive scale, 
mainly to transfer to accounts abroad. The flight of capital had begun in the 
period leading up to the revolution, and continued after the overthrow of the 
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Shah. Within five months from September 1978 until January 1979, the outflow 
of bank deposits reach $4 billion. Banks resorted to rationing withdrawals 
among their customers and were kept afloat only by the injection of credit from 
the Central Bank. The banks that had extended substantial loans to contractors, 
industrialists, businessmen and major shareholders of industries who had 
already left Iran, had little expectation of these loans being repaid. 
Revolutionary upheaval left many projects in the private and public sector 
half completed. Lay-offs and closedowns left 2.5 million men and women out of 
work,neariy one million of them construciton workers, employed by private 
contractors involved in government projects. Many of the contractors not paid 
by the government were not paying their workers.4 In industry, a chaotic 
situation prevailed, exacerbated by the flight of capital and expertise. Those 
managers and owners who stayed behind were under seige by workers' 
committees, if not arrested or jailed. 
As for agricultural land, it became the focus of bitter confrontation. The land 
seizure was started by peasants, the provisional government, the Revolutionary 
Council and its organisations and the landlords. While some clerics protested 
against land seizure, the Mojahedin interpretation of Qur'anic verses on the 
spoils of war (Sureh Anfal) prevailed. This gave support for collective property 
in pursuit of a classless society (jamma'e towhidi). It was applied to mines, 
forests and other national resources. Yet the Mojahedin were condemned as 
Marxists illegitimately manipulating Islamic principles.5 
The immediate result of the revolution was a further decline of the economy, 
the collapse of industrial output and the fall in agricultural production. This 
meant shortfalls in consumption necessitating further imports and ever more 
reliance on oil exports to pay for them. 
In the face of staggering economic problems in all sectors, Bazargan's 
government attempted to restore order in the factories and agricultural sector, 
start up production, reduce unemployment and prevent the flight of capital. It 
also, as a revolutionary government, had to respond to the expectations of the 
masses in overturning the old order in the interests of the underprivileged by 
the redistribution of wealth. 
However, out of the conflicting cross currents of the revolution, emerged a 
series of officially sanctioned measures and unauthorised actions, of decrees 
issued by the government and the revolutionary Council, and of ad hoc orders 
issued by revolutionary courts and judges that eventually saw the transfer of a 
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sizeable part of the private sector to the control of the state.6 
4.3 AGRICULTURE 
On the eve of the revolution with the breakdown of law and order, land seizures 
began to take place In the countryside. The reasons were economic, political 
and doctrinal. Nearly half of the people lived off the land, many near 
subsistence level. Agricultural land also remained an important source of 
wealth. 
The land question exercised a powerful hold on Islamic fundamentalists and 
the political movements of the centre and the left. It also featured prominently in 
Islamic jurisprudence. There existed a large body of laws appertaining to land 
ownership, land taxes, share-cropping and so on. This meant that any policy 
on land involved intimate matters of Islamic law. 
During the first year of the revolution, agricultural land became the scene of 
bitter struggle and violent confrontation. The seizures were initiated by 
revolutionary organisations, landlords, the large majority of subsistence-level 
farmers and a mass of landless rural workers. During this period, governmental, 
organisations acted with little consistency as no clear direction emerged from 
Tehran. Khomeini himself remained silent on the land issue and Premier 
Bazargan emphasized the need to restore order. Finally in late 1979 the 
provisional government secured the approval of the Revolutionary Council for a 
Law of the Transfer and Revival of Land, which was limited in scope and only 
endorsed the distribution of land already owned by the government or which 
had been confiscated from members of the former regime.7 
4.3.1 Land Reform Policies 
Radical land distribution policies and debates emerged within days of 
Bazargan's resignation. The Revolutionary Council considered a new land 
reform measure which called for a sweeping land distribution. The advocates 
of radical economic policies sought legal justification for this measure by 
referring to the articles of the Islamic Constitution on social and economic 
justice. Some people, for example Ayatollah Beheshti, a member of the 
Revolutionary Council, gave these constitutional principles a broad application 
and pressed for the break up of large holdings. He claimed "in agriculture, 
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grounds for share cropping or leasing arrangements simply would not exist, 
since each person would own the tools of his own labour's 
The law approved by the Revolutionary Council in April 1980, limited land 
owners directly cultivating their land to three times the acreage that in each 
district was considered sufficient for the maintenance of one peasant family. 
Absentee land-owners who had no other source of income were limited to twice 
this amount. Since seven hectares was regarded as an average subsistence 
holding, this meant the breakup of middle-sized and even small enterprises. 
The compensation of landlords was vague and depended on their outstanding 
religious dues and debts to the government. Mechanised farms were to be 
retained as units and transferred to a group of farmers on a co-operative basis. 
The law aroused a great deal of excitement as well as chaos in many 
villages, as some revolutionary organisations and semi-official committees 
began to distribute land before instructions arrived from Tehran. The manner 
of implementation was certainly causing a drop in production. However, the 
law met stiff opposition from land owners and prominent clerics. Land owners 
were supported by bazaaris for whom land reform appeared as part of a 
broader attack on other forms of property. They argued their case on the basis 
of the legitimacy of private ownership by stating that the denial of ownership 
and violation of property right of the people is not in accordance with any of the 
principles of lslam.9 
Similarly, prominent clerics voiced their criticism in legal opinions in 
response to questions put ot them by the members of the public. Ayatollahs 
Golpayegani and Rohani, as well as jurists on the 'Council of Guardians' 
declared the law to be in violation of Islamic tenets. Khomeini, faced with the 
traditional alliance of the orthodox clerics, bazaaris and landlords and having 
himself some reservations about the doctrinal aspects of the law, suspended 
the articles of the law dealing with private property.10 However, the havoc 
caused In the villages by the implementation of the law was not removed by its 
suspension. On the contrary, uncertainty over the government's policy 
regarding land and ownership interfered with cultivation, causing a catastrophic 
drop in production. 
4.3,2 Impasse over Land Reform 
The suspension of the land reform law put the government and parliament in a 
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dilemma. They both lacked the authority to act or pursue this matter any further. 
The suspension of the law arose from Khomeini's authority as the laqih' and 
the guardian of the community.n He exercised his authority in a situation 
where overriding necessity required extraordinary decisions to be made. In 
fact, the exercise of this special power lies within the sphere of 'secondary 
rulings' which S.M.B Sadr in his book (Iqtisaduna: Our Economics) described 
as the 'discretionary sphere' of the law, discussed In the previous chapter. 
The impasse was broken and finally Khomeini referred the land distribution 
issue to parliament to decide; he avoided taking a public stand. In effect he 
delegated part of this authority to parliament to exercise 'velayat' (the 
governance), to investigate the problem situation in which the interests of the 
community required a special iaw.12 
As a result, new bills were tabled before parliament and consequently the 
new land reform law was approved in December 1982. This law represented a 
triumph for the advocates of Islamic orthodoxy. It retained the previously 
established upper limits on land holding (two and three times the size of an 
average family farm) for absentee landlords and landlords actively engaged in 
agriculture but obliged the owners merely to lease the excess to the local 
peasants (not their own children) under share cropping, rental or partnership 
arrangements. This law, the result of four years debate and struggle over the 
land question, was vetoed by the 'Council of Guardians' in January 1983 for 
violating Islamic and constitutional principles. 
The search for a way out of this impasse led to the passage of a compromise 
bill in 1985, which gives peasants and squatters a right to settled land but also 
allows land owners who escaped the redistribution of land after the revolution 
to keep their estates. Despite some progress on land reform, the authorities 
have yet to produce a workable land policy for land disputes affecting eight 
hundred thousand hectares; one sixth of the prime agricultural land.13 
To sum up, since the revolution land reform turned into political fight 
between two powerful groups both citing Islam and the constitutional principles 
In their defence. The radicals attempted to fashion out of the doctrines of 
S.M.B Sadr and others the weapon for further redistribution of land to enhance 
Islamic social justice while traditionalists, including the landlords, backed by 
the bazaaris and having the'Council of Guardians' on their side, favoured a 
strong private sector and opposed it as contravening Islamic property rights. As 
a result, land reform bills were proposed, passed, revoked or vetoed several 
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times. Khomeini's position on land reform remained equivocal until January 
1988 when he seemed to be in favour of more reform.™ Out of 
this chaos, the government emerged with its presence in the villages fairly 
enhanced. The government retained control of the majority of the 
agribusinesses and agricultural projects launched under the Shah. The 
Foundation of the Disinherited came into possession of one hundred thousand 
hectares of agricultural land, confiscated from members of the former regime.is 
Each of the land reform measures approved gave the agriucHural officials 
extensive authority to dictate the type of crops to be planted, thereby 
intervening in the agricultural decisions of the individual farmers. 
4.3.3 Land Utilisation 
One thing that the Islamic and the Imperial regimes agreed on was the crucial 
importance of agriculture. The currect Iranian regimes reckoned agriculture 
should be the 'axis of the country's development'ie Despite the official priority 
status, the agricultural sector has been the weakest link and slowest growing 
sector in the economy. In revolutionary Iran, farmers are little better off, 
Iran is by no means a natural garden. Its physical geography, climate and 
topography have perhaps their greatest impact on agriculture. The country has 
a surface area of 165 million hectares, of which 30 per cent is classified as 
cultivable with only 16.2 million hectares (about 10 per cent) under arable 
crops in any one year, including associated fallow lands. Irrigated land, 
counting for less than one quarter of the cultivated area (4 million hectares), 
now produces 80 per cent of non-livestock food output. 17 Yet the main 
traditional but sophisticated irrigation system, subterranean tunnels, (qanats) 
enabled the country to grow enough food to feed itself with output to spare until 
the 1970 s. Agricultural stagnation, discussed in chapter two, made Iran a net 
importer of farm products in 1974 and within a decade it became one of the 
largest food importers in the developing world. Under the Islamic regime, Iran 
buys more than a quarter of its basic food abroad. The long standing problem of 
farming in Iran is serious and embarrasing for the Islamic government that says 
ft believes in self sufficiency and wholesome peasant values. 
4.3.4 Agricultural Output 
Agricultural output has undergone severe trials since the revolution. 
Production has not kept pace with population growth rate and may be even 
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falling in absolute terms. 
Table 4.1 - Agricultural Output Index (1979*1981 «, 1001 
Year ioao 1981 1982 1983 1224 1985 
Index 95.72 110.00 113.32 110.52 109.98 107.73 
%Change 1,5 14.9 3.0 -2.5 -0.1 -2.7 
Source: FAQ Production Year Book: EIU Country Profile 1987-1988 
Productivity suffered during the upheaval of the revolution, followed by the 
uncertainty surrounding government land reform discussed earlier. One of the 
main obstacles to increasing productivity has been the large-scale migration of 
rural population to towns where wages are three times higher than those paid 
in rural areas. The government's policy of heavily subsidising food supplies 
has expedited rural depopulation. This has been further exacerbated by the 
fact that a disproportionate number of volunteers for the war came from rural 
areas. In 1986 for the first time on record, the absolute size of rural population 
declined as against urban communities. 
4.3.5 War and Production 
The Iranian agricultural sector as well as coping with the after effects of the 
revolution and the impasse over land reforms, at the same time had to face the 
major preoccupation with the war since 1980. The movement of the people to 
the war front and the bombings have reinforced the internal migration and the 
displacement of the labour force. Rural migration to towns has affected as 
many as 5 million people since 1980. This, coupled with persistently high 
levels of unemployment - put by official Iranian sources at more than three 
million in 1986 - have caused congestion in the urban areas and major 
economic and social problems including provision of food for an increasing 
urban population. As a result, a very serious reduction in agricultural 
production and an increased dependency on the outside world for food 
supplies can be noted. 
The production of many major items during 1979-1985 had mostly fallen or 
had increased insignificantly. It should be emphasised that during the same 
period the population has grown at the rate of 3.7 - 3.8 per cent per annum.i.e. 
from 38.1 million in 1980 to 46.2 million in 1985. In addition there is the 
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presence of more than 1 million Afgahn refugees in the country. 
Table 4.2 - Production of Principle Crop and Livestock Items 
Wheat Rio* Com Soar Cotton Bovine Mutton Poutoy Cow* Sheep Butter 
Beets Meat and Mk Mk and 
Lamb ctsBaa 
Annual 
growth 0.6 -42 -22 -23 -62 0.7 <X3 22 12 0.7 12 
rate% 
1979-85 
Annual 
growth 4,6 12 21.8 -a7 -3.1 1Z7 2,7 172 5.0 40 5.0 
rata% 
1973-77 
Source: K. Mofid. Development Planning in Iran. Menas Press. 1987. pp. 
121-122 & K. Mofid. the Economic Consequence of Iran/lrad War (paper 
presented in July 1987). 
4.3.6 Food Imports 
The failure to increase agricultural output, to keep pace with population growth, 
has led to increased food imports. During the 1979/1985 period, the value of 
agricultural Imports has increased. Food imports were second in importance 
after imports directly destined for the war. 
Table 4.3-Food Imports 
Year 1977/ 1978/ 1979/ 1980/ 1981/ 1982/ 1983/ 1984/ 1985/ 1986/ 1987/ 
1fl7B 1879 1980 1981 1082 1983 1984 1986 1966 1987 1SSS. 
Value 1,534 1.031 1,518 1.541 2.161 2,164 2.368 na na na 3800* 
fin 
%of 105 9.9 15.7 142 15.9 182 13.0 
Total 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran: EIU Country Profile 1986-87.1988-89 
* ; Estimate 
Since 1982, more than $2 billion each year has been spent on the import 
of foodstuffs. High volume food imports has remained important for the 
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reglme.despite the pressing foreign exchange crisis following the collapse of 
the oil price in 1986. Food imports for the first eight months of 1987 was $2.5 
billion and for the whole year to March 1988 it was estimated to be $3,8 billion 
the highest level so far.is Nevertheless, the combination of low domestic output 
and the limitation of the ability of the regime to afford food imports, produced 
severe shortages during the war. The government subsidised key food items 
and controlled their distribution through rationing. A two-tier market operated in 
the country, in which official prices applied for second grade produce but 
quality items were sold on the black market for inflated prices. 
4.3.7 Problems and Government Measures 
The Islamic regime recognises the crucial importance of the agricultural sector. 
It inherited a sector from the Shah that was neither progressive nor aimed at 
solving the food problem in Iran. The current regime, due to insufficient money 
to invest in agriculture - investment in real terms has fallen markedly since the 
revolution - has put the emphasis on the intensification of agriculture. This 
policy which means the improvement of farming on existing lands, has been 
embodied in the Jihad Sazandegi (Construction Crusade), most of whom are 
strong on enthusiasm but poor on technical competence and tact in handling 
the farmers. In fact, this organisation has combined the roles of three agencies 
of the Shah's White Revolution, the Literacy, Health and Agricultural Extension 
Corps, which dispatched young men of military age to provide simple welfare 
and development services in the provinces as an alternative to their doing 
national service. 
The Jihad has added an emphasis on construction, particularly in building 
roads. Its efforts have been backed by the governemnt's extension of electricity 
to large numbers of villages. In addition, the Jihad has a political role i.e. to 
instil revolutionary Islamic teaching into the farmers, though not without 
breeding resentment. 
To stimulate farm output, the government has increased support prices for 
grains and other crops in an effort to encourage farmers. This policy has been 
particularly successful as the uncertainty surrounding land reform has tended to 
encourage the cultivation of annual crops, yeilding a quick return at the 
expense of high-value perennial crops. The government's need to reduce 
imports in 1986, due to a severe shortage of foreign exchange, has meant that 
priority was given to trim meat imports and as a result, two million hectares of 
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unused pasture is being turned over to fodder cultivation. 
One area of success for the government has been in wheat production. The 
reason lies in the combination of governement policies, i.e. propaganda 
encouraging the cultivation of strategic crops, the direction of credits to wheat 
and the increase in the governemnt's wheat buying price. According to the 
Islamic government, 7.5 million tonnes of wheat was harvested in 1986/1987, 
about 7 per cent more that the previous year. Such pronouncements have 
however, tended to overstate actual output in the past, although production is 
still thought to be above that achieved prior to the revolution (5.517 and 5.526 
million tonnes in 1977/1978 and 1978/1979 respectively). 19 
So far the Islamic government has concentrated on increasing output from 
rain-fed areas. As for the irrigated land, lack of resources had impeded Its 
extension through building dams and irrigation schemes as the old regime did. 
The current regime is only with difficulty, able to maintain the existing water 
supplies as reservoirs accumulate silt and canals and 'qanats' become 
blocked. With the governement's recent change in the direction of energy 
policy, giving greater priority to hydroelectric power generation, an increase in 
irrigated land through efficient water utilisation can be expected.20 
The situation has not been encouraging in respect of agricultural inputs. 
Distribution of seed, fertilizer and machinery has been haphazard. Scientific 
support provided for farmers by young volunteers of the Jihad is limited. In 
general, the quality of inputs is low and the country appears to have gained 
little from the new crop varieties or mechanisation. So far, it has been the 
traditional skills that have kept the sector buoyant. 
4.3.8 Organisational Implication and Likely Prospects 
In early 1987, the Majlis began a debate on a proposal for merging the Ministry 
of Agriculture with the Jihad Sazandegi. The merger proposal faced resistance 
, especially from the organisations themselves. Though the outcome of the 
proposal is not yet clear, but if implemented, the absorption of the Ministry by 
the Jihad, would represent the triumph of the revolutionary organisation over 
the former managing institution responsible for agriculture.Yet the effects of a 
sudden increase in Jihad's staff, mainly by established white collar bureacrats 
of the old school, could cost it the loss of its revolutionary identity. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, since the revolution, has altogether been lacking 
in real strength as its various ministers have failed to impress their own stamp 
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on the sector This had been partly because of the existence of the Jihad and 
partly because the Ministry had neither the financial nor the armed strength with 
which to enforce Its views. 
In most areas, the Ministry and the Jihad operate in rivalry and often in 
conflict. In fact, the two organisations hold conflicting views on almost every 
aspect of agricultural policies. Among the areas of difference is the belief in the 
Jihad that further land reform is needed to revolutionise the countryside. Jihad 
also desires to establish an active, day to day involvement in the management 
of farming. The Ministry however, having years of unfortunate experience with 
land reform and the excessive interference in farming activities behind it, looks 
to a more advisory and technical role leaving farmers to run their own affairs. 
On strategic and ideological grounds, therefore, the two sides are far apart. 
Though the proposal of the merger remains under debate, with the result of 
the third majlis election in April 1988, heavily weighted in favour of the radicals, 
the likelihood of the merger with Jihad as the leading partner prevails. If this 
comes about, more radical execution of land distribution would be one 
inevitable policy for the Jihad. At the same time, a parternalistic and autocratic 
structure would arise from Jihad policies, leaving no role for private land owner 
development, nor an independant function for the peasant farmers. 
If the original land reform favoured by the Jihad were to be resurrected, the 
agricultural sector would become dominated by collective farming 
organisations. While some farmers might benefit from this form of organisation, 
in total farming would decline under uncomprehending political management in 
which farming would be less important than ideology. 
4.3.9 Conclusion 
The agricultural sector has remained a source of conflict between the radicals 
and conservative groups in the Islamic regime. Khomeini reserved his personal 
judgement on these matters. The more powerful voices among the religious 
leadership, except the 'Council of Guardians', have been silent and the search 
for a way out of the impasse over land reform has not resulted In a workable 
policy. 
The agricultural sector has not been able to provide the necessary food 
requirements for the population and Iran's dependancy on external food 
supplies has increased. Overall, in the agricultural sector, the assessment is 
dismal due to its poor performance in recent years. The revolution in Iran 
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inherited a sector which was debilitated and its structure was neither 
progressive nor directed to solving the food problems. However, despite the 
Islamic regime's concern with the fortunes of the farmers and with the 
agricultural sector as a source of self-sufficiency, the allotment of human and 
material resources to agriculture has been sprace and patchy, so the sector has 
continued to suffer a further decline. Agricultural work almost stopped in most 
areas of Khuzestan and Kurdestan. The Gulf war has added another dimension 
to this decline. Indicators of the continuing deterioration in this sector Is the 
high urban drift among the rural population and the mounting food imports. 
As for the role of agriculture in the overall economy, it provides little material 
that is the base of Industrial activity and the industry provides little hardware 
essential for increasing the productive capacity InagricuHure. 
The revolution overthrew a regime that was unwilling to permit the formation 
of sources of power outside its direct control. This character of the old regime, 
more than anything else, compromised every one of its economic initiatives, 
including land reform and farm corporations. For the Islamic regime to do 
likewise through Jihad and Its radicalism, would be to repeat history. 
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4.4 THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
4.4.1 Initial Attempts to Revive Industry 
After the revolution, one of the major problems in the industrial sector and the 
cities was that of getting people back to work. The provisional government took 
several immediate steps to improve the situation and to permit private 
enterprises to resume operations. Bazargan authorised the payment of about 
85 million dollars (6,000 million rials) in outstanding claims to contractors 
working for the government and promised 212 million dollars (15,000 million 
rials) for loans to allow industries to meet thier obligations. This sum, seemingly 
large, was hardly adequate. The government established a fund of over 141 
million dollars (10,000 million rials) for short term loans to certain categories of 
unemployed wage earners. Importers were granted deferred payments from 
customs charges and the government mandated a three to six month interest 
free extension on overdue private sector promissory notes.21 
Despite these initial steps to restore confidence in industry, the flight of 
capital from the country and the loss of further cadres in the technical and 
management field continued. Establishment of workers' committees in a 
number of firms and enterprises, lack of imported spare parts and raw 
materials, continuing insecurity and actions against the business community, 
gave little encouragement for remaining entrepreneurs and skilled workers to 
participate in an industrial revival and the prospects for this sector seemed 
extremely bleak. 
As a result, the government moved to appoint supervisors to such major 
private industrial enterprises as the Iran National Automobile Company in 
Tehran and the Shahriyar Pipe and Rolling Mills Complex at Ahvaz in the 
South. Once the government began to provide supervisors and funding for 
industrial enterprises, further state intervention became virtually inevitable. 
On 14 June 1973, the Revolutionary Council approved a measure, the Law 
for the Appointment of the Managers, authorising the government to appoint 
managers to all enterprises which had shut down, were incapable of continuing 
operations or whose managers were absent. Consequently, 
government-appointed managers began to appear at dozens of industrial 
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enterprises and firms. These managers Initially worked with managing boards 
comprising of government representatives and representatives of workers' 
committees who, In many instances, were in effective control of their 
enterprises. In due course, the right of signature, financial control and the 
power to appoint boards of directors were transferred to government 
appointees. In fact, effective control of enterprises was shifted to the state, even 
before nationalisations 
4.4.2 Expropriation and Natlonalisatlonof Private Industry 
On 5 July 1979, the Revolutionary Council approved the most sweeping 
nationalisation measures of the revolution. The Law for the Protection and 
Expansion of Iranian Industry provided the basis for nationalisation in three 
broad categories: 
1. Heavy industries, including automobile assembly, chemicals, shipbuilding, 
aircraft manufacture, mining and metals. 
2. Industries owned by fifty named individuals and one family who had 
allegedly acquired their wealth illegally through influence with the Pahlavi 
regime. 
3. Industries in economic difficulties whose liabiKies exceeded their net assets. 
In effect, after five months in power, following the nationalisation of private 
banks and insurance companies, the government acquired ownership of the 
largest part of Iran's private industry. This took place in a deeply confused 
political situation within the country when some authorities were mainly 
preoccupied with establishing political control within the framework of the new 
constitution. 
Among industries nationalised were car and truck assembly plants including 
the Iran National Automobile Company, with 12,000 workers; the Shahriyar 
Pipe and Rolling Mills Complex; the Behshahr industrial group with 13,500 
employees; pharmaceutical plants, oil refineries, tyre plants, glass, brick and 
tile factories. Also the government acquired a broad range of consumer goods 
industries such as the Melli Shoe Company, a complex of 26 factories with 
10,000 employees and a turnover of $450 million per year before the 
revolution. In addition, the government nationalised department stores, a 
supermarket chain, home furniture and carpet manufacturers, wine and soft 
drink manufacturing plants, vegetable oil Industries and producers of textiles, 
clothing and synthetic fibres.23 
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The list of industrialists whose property had been sequested was haphazard. 
The criteria for including or excluding some industrialists from nationalisation 
were difficult to discern, however the motivation for the takeover of the modern 
private sector industry was largely punitive, with the Revolutionary Council 
eager to seek revenge on the people, often talented entrepreneurs, deemed to 
have benefitted from the Shah's rule. The Bazargan government, under 
pressure from the Revolutionary Council for nationalisation, made a virtue of 
the action, claimed that the abandonment of industry by its former owners and 
the bleak state of the private sector demanded action to restore confidence and 
production.24 
In the months that followed, further legislation was approved to close 
loopholes in the law. In August 1980, parliament authorised the government to 
decide the fate of small shareholders in nationalised and expropriated 
enterprises. These shareholders became subject to nationalisation or saw their 
shares virtually written off as having no value. Further measures led to the 
nationalisation of specific areas of economic activitiy such as pharmaceutical 
industries, cold stores, warehousing and transport companies. 
Although expropriation slowed down considerably in the second year of the 
revolution, nationalisation and takeovers continued as late as mid 1982 as the 
government began to clarify the status of industries, trading companies and 
businesses, particularly in cases where it had already assumed management 
control or where major shareholders fled Iran. In 1982, the shares of absentee 
owners of a number of medium-sized industries that had escaped expropriation 
were taken over by the government. At the same time, many construction and 
engineering consulting firms were reorganised with absentee owners losing 
their rights of ownership.25 
It should be noted that much of the expropriation took place in a quasi-legal 
framework or without any authority. The actual legislation usually followed the 
property seizures to legalise it. The Foundation for the Disinherited backed by 
the revolutionary guards and Islamic judges were particularly active in such 
seizures, (at present this organization is the largest revolutionary corporation In 
Iran). However, some industrial enterprises survived the wave of expropriation 
and remained In the hands of their owners for many months due to strong 
finances, good labour relations, a tradition of religious philanthropy, good local 
reputation and a workable arrangement with local clerical leaders. Yazdbaf, a 
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textile factory with 2,000 employees In the cfty of Yazd, initially remained in the 
hands of their owners though later changed over to a foundation, operating 
under its former managers and relatively free from government control. 
In the end, even large industrialists who survived the early expropriations 
later left the country. Only small industries remained in private hands. 
Factories and enterprises during the revolutionary upheavals experienced 
waves of employee militancy and changes in management, sometimes 
matching changes in the composition of those who controlled the government. 
As Bazargan was replaced by Bani Sadr who was in turn replaced by Raja'i, so 
too at the factory level management passed to more radical elements in line 
with Islamic fundamentalists. Leadership of the militant forces in manufacturing 
enterprises came primarily from middle-level managers, technical staff and 
skilled workers. 
At the end of 1982 when nationalisation and expropriation subsided, the Iran 
National Industries Organisation, established to administer the nationalised 
industries, was controlling 500-600 enterprises with over 150,000 workers. 
The Foundation for the Disinherited also managing another section of the 
industry, had 90,000 employees followed by the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy, each acquiring various responsibilities. 
The major impact of these revolutionary policies was the destruction of the 
old industrial elite and increasd government control over industry. With the 
flight of the old industrial bourgeoisie, new opportunities were created. Some 
of the smaller factories flourished, taking advantage of the general shortages 
and the decline of the large industrial enterprises. As a result, a new privileged 
business elite emerged, benefitting from links with powerful clerics and 
government officials close to the administration. 
4.4.3 Confusion and Resuscitation in Industry 
Nationalisation and expropriation of much private industry, compounded by 
administrative incompetence and the political need of the Islamic regime to 
reject the Shah's industrial policies and the Western connections, rapidly 
eroded the ailing Industrial base of the country. 
By mid 1980 the modern sector was running at no more than 50 per cent 
capacity at best.26 Increasing problems with imports and internal distribution 
added to difficulties arising from rising wage rates and worker discipline. Those 
plants in operation were heavily subsidised by the state as a means of 
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maintaining employment. The depressed level of output from industry since the 
revolution was well illustrated by the Central Bank indicating that the attempt to 
revitalise industry resulted In an increase of only 0.2 per cent in output in the 
period March to June 1980.27 
A flicker of industrial revival became apparent in August 1980, when the 
government financial allocations to the industrial sector began to come through 
in the form of investments in new plant under a $8 million programme.28 
However, this flicker was extinguished in September 1980 with the outbreak of 
the war which posed even greater problems for industry. The very area in the 
South West, the site of the bulk of the Iranian basic industry, especially that of 
hydrocarbon related, became the worst hit area as the war got under way. 
Almost three years after the revolution, there was no clear policy either 
towards the modern industry left by the Shah or creation of new plant. The 
industries remaining in production in the aftermath of revolution and 
nationalisation were in serious difficulties. By 1981, stringency in allocation of 
import credits by the government reduced the flow of raw materials, spare parts 
and other imports. In general, confusion prevailed as to the future of the 
industrial sector. Despite Iraq's attack on Abadan, Ahvaz and Bandar 
Shahpour (now Bandar Khomeini) attempts were made to resuscitate the 
massive petrochemical complex at Bandar Khomeini, while the official 
industrial strategy elsewhere dictated that only small scale, traditional or bazaar 
related industries should be promoted. 
4.4.4 Renewed Industrial Activity 
Despite the official policies that favoured the growth of agricultural activities, 
Industry made a recovery. In the light of the upturn in oil revenues in 1982 and 
the abatement of nationalisation and expropriation, industrial production began 
to pick up. Initially in its early phase, the recovery affected mainly, small scale 
industrial units. A combination of pressure to reduce unemployment, to make 
good deficits in imported goods through improved domestic output, to meet the 
insatiable needs of the domestic market and the war, forced the government to 
breathe some new life into industry. Encouragement was given to the private 
sector to increase Its role and in particular, the Foundation for the Disinherited 
was given the signal to divest itself of many industrial plants seized from those 
members of the former reglme.29 
According to the Ministry of Heavy Industry, in the last quarter of 1984, the 
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Iranian government industrial agencies concluded 494 agreements for new 
plants (not including the re-opening of existing plants) with private investors. 
These projects ranged from workshops employing four people to a construction 
machinery factory eventually employing nine hundred.so 
The government also concentrated on those major projects in steel, copper, 
petrochemicals, electric power generation, port, railway and road development 
and auto assembly that it had inherited from the previous regime. Having 
control of the major part of the industrial sector, the government also seized the 
opportunity to enlarge heavy manufacturing industries with a series of projects 
to underpin renewed industrial activity. 
One of the most significant projects were led by proposals for a new 3.2 
million tons per year steel plant, 'Mobarakeh Steelworks', for Esfahan, which 
was already a centre for ferros metallurgy. The plant being built by Kobe Steel 
of Japan and to be paid for in oil exports, was expected to be in production in 
1988, will take its iron ore stock from a mining complex at Kerman. Another 
major plant was proposed for the aluminium industry, to make Iran self sufficient 
in aluminium. This will consist of a smelter at Arak and there are also plans for 
a further smelter in Bandar Abbas.3i 
4.4.5 Reactivation of the Shah's Nuclear Power Plans 
Surprisingly the industrial development policies of the Shah have been 
reconsidered in recent proposals for an extension of the energy sector. The 
Shah's programme for the construction of nuclear power stations in conjunction 
with the UK, the USA, West Germany and France was abandoned after the 
revolution as part of the initial attempts towards conservation and restricted 
economic growth. Now, however, the programme is to be restarted and 
attempts are to be made for the completion of two 1300 MW nuclear power 
units at Bushehr, previously undertaken by Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West 
Germany. The costs of the scheme are very considerable and perhaps beyond 
Iran's means at the present time. In any case, the fundamentalists within the 
Islamic regime, always highly critical of the Shah's nuclear development 
programme, have stated that the Islamic Republic will abandon all such 
schemes. Iran's current eagerness in respect of nuclear energy is thought to 
arise from a mixture of ambition by individuals within the government and by 
some elements in the military that Iran should keep pace or overtake Iraq and 
its other neighbours in this area of potential weapons technology. Argentina will 
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be supplying enriched uranium to the small nuclear research plant at Tehran, 
via the International Atomic Energy Agency.32 
4.4.6 Petrochemical Industry 
The other critical area of state involvement in industrial development is in the 
field of petrochemicals. In fact there has been a rush into new petrochemical 
ventures. Technipetrol of Italy will be involved in engineering and material 
procurement programme for the proposed Arak linear low density polyethylene 
plant. The contract is worth some $60 million and is in addition to the $93 
million ethylene unit being supplied by Technipetrol to the same complex. It is 
expected that the $1.5 billion complex will ultimately contain chloride, polyvinyl 
chloride, vinyl acetate and acetic acid units. The Esfahan petrochemical plant 
is expected to be expanded with a construction of a 100,000 tons per year high 
density polyethylene unit using naphtha feedstock from the nearby refinery. 
Plans are also being proposed for new petrochemical works at Bandar Abbas 
in return for crude oil for potential winners of the construction. 
The aim of the government, apart from the general expansion of the 
economy, is to increase serf sufficiency from the inland petrochemical plants to 
replace imports. The export of petrochemical units have a low priority as Iran 
will find itself operating in an overstacked market and in direct competition with 
Saudi petrochemicals from Yanbu and Jubail. 
As for the massive petrochemical complex created at Bandar Khomeini, 
progress in this area has been impeded by the inability of the authorities to 
bring the plant into production in the face of Iraqi air attacks and the reluctance 
of the Japanese partners to keep up their involvement. In July 1987 it was 
reported that Mitsui, the principal collaborator at Bandar Khomeini was 
seeking an official end of the $3 billion project.33 
4.4.7 Mining 
The Islamic government began to promote private sector investment in mining 
during 1982/1983 but no significant result was achieved. Recent developments 
have been concentrated on the iron and coal deposits needed for the steel 
industry. As for copper mining in Sar Cheshmeh, where exploration revealed 
one of the world's largest deposits of copper, the revolution brought difficulties 
in recruiting foreign partners at the site. Moreover, the recession in the world 
copper market rather damaged the prospects of the Sar Cheshmeh scheme. 
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However, it continues to run on a smaller scale than originally envisaged and 
copper exports are negligible. Copper production in 1981 was 2,000 tons, 
increasing to 43,000 tons in 1982. In 1983,1984 and 1985 the production was 
65,000 , 60,000 and 60,000 respectively.34 
4.4.8 Electric Power 
Iran is suffering from chronic shortages of electric power as a result of the war, 
failure In power station maintenance, over exploitation and the inability to 
complete major power schemes in hand. Peak period demand has led to 
breakdowns and severe problems for industry. Prolonged power cuts are quite 
common. However, attempts have been made by the Ministry of Energy to help 
to solve the problem. Contracts for two new 1,000 MW power stations at 
Siabisheh in the Alborz north of Tehran and in Gilan costing $500 million and 
$800 million respectively, were expected to be awarded in January 1988. 
This in addition to the power station in Fars province for which a contract of 
$175 million was awareded to Brown Boveri of West Germany. Also Kraftwerk 
Union of West Germany had been involved in supplying two generators for a 
gas turbine station at Rey near Tehran, under a contract confirmed in April 
1986. The new power stations are part of the long term solutions to Iran's 
power supply problem since they would not be in operation before the mid 
1990'S.35 
Table 4.4- Production of Electric Power fooo MW>0 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
Ministry of Energy 19,441 19,880 22,406 26,323 30,509 
Private Sector 2,468 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Total 21,909 22,380 24,906 28,823 33,000 
Source: EIU. Country Profile. Iran 1987-1988. p. 34 : Ministry of Engeroy 
As can be seen from the table above, private sector stations contribute a small 
proportion of the total production. The Increased production of the state 
managed stations has been due to expansion of the conventional steam plants. 
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In 1983/1984 steam plants contributed 49 per cent of the total electricity as 
against 21 per cent from gas, 19 per cent from hydro and a small residue from 
diesel sets. 
4.4.9 Housing and Construction 
The construction boom in Iran slowed down in 1977 and came to a total halt 
during the revolution, with contractors abandoning half finished projects. 
Despite a general pick up in economic conditions in 1983, construction 
remained in a recession. Construction starts were down by 21% in 1981/1982 
and 24% in 1982/1983 but rose sharply by 97 % in the boom year of 1983/1984 
which can be seen in the table below. 
Table 4.5 - Private Sector Construction Starts In Urban Areas fNo. of structures) 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81a 1981/82a 1982/83 1983/84 
Tehran 
Large cities 
Towns 
Total 
14.664 
36,725 
64,371 
115,750 
45,400 
51,514 
65,649 
33,788 
59,975 
91,310 
19,077 
43,298 
75,149 
10,256 
28,920 
65,549 
104,725 
15,468 
68,937 
121,833 
205,833 162,563 185,073 137,524 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, 'a' excludes data from some areas affected by the 
war 
Housing in Iran, like other sectors, suffered from the general disorder of the 
revolution. In June 1979 the Revolutionary Council nationalised virtually all 
'movaf (land in urban areas without a history of development). This was 
followed by an extension of the above measure in April 1982, whereby all 
categories of unutilised urban land, including 'bayer* (land if even currently 
unutilised, was at one time put to productive use) were nationliased. By early 
1983 these measures gave the government control over 20 million square 
metres of privately owned urban land and another 200 million square metres 
was earmarked for nationalisation. 
After the revolution, there were five years of conflicting, ill-considered and 
poorly administered housing policies resulting in a substantial amount of urban 
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land being transferred to the public sector. A large amount of housing was 
expropriated either by legislation or the action of the revolutionary 
organisations. Some of these were used to house lower income families, war 
refugees and some to meet the needs of state related organisations. 
Several attempts were made by the government to deal with the severe 
housing shortages. In 1983 the government eased control over housing 
transactions and started to distribute nationalised land to potential home 
owners generally at prevailing market prices. As a result, the unavailability of 
land as a major impediment was removed. This boosted construction starts, as 
can be seen from the above table. 
The government itself launched no major housing programmes and was 
unable to complete half finished projects inherited after the revolution, though 
recently a law has been passed giving the state the rights to complete any 
housing scheme abandoned by contractors. State inaugurated construction in 
recent years has been concerned largely with the war needs. However, private 
sector housing has been more buoyant under pressure from enormously 
increasing urban population. The Islamic government, like its predecessor, has 
been no more successful in stemming the flood of migrants from villages to 
towns or in meeting the demand for construction materials. As a result, housing 
costs are high and for the mass of people, housing remains inadequate and 
expensive.36 
4.4.10 The Handicraft Industry 
The handicraft industry, as one of Iran's ancient and cherished assets, 
continues to show remarkable resilience. Carpet production faltered slightly 
during the revolution but recovered later, only to face severe international 
competition from new or expanding traditional producers of hand woven rugs 
and carpets. However, Iran's high grade silk rugs and wollen carpets retain a 
strong market abroad. The Islamic government has been active in promoting 
the country's carpet production to support the export trade. Carpet exports 
were valued at $67 million in 1982/1983 accounting for 24% of non-oil exports, 
though exports normally run at higher levels. In 1981/1982 it was $149.4 
million predecing a peak of $425.1 million in 1980/1981. Metalware, 
ceramics, jewellery and other more prosaic crafts all survived, making the 
traditional sector a major employer within industry as a whole.37 
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4.4.11 Performance 
Steel, petrochemical and mining remain the three basic industries although the 
manufacture of machine tools, automobiles, construction materials, 
pharmaceuticals, textiles and food processing are also important. Since 1982 
growth has been achieved, though due to the Gulf war, it has been confined 
mainly to the strategic industries where an increase in output has been a top 
government priority. 
Table 4.6 - Industry and Mining /constant 1974/75 price) 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1282184 
Growrth Rates % -15.2 -9.2 1.6 2.7 10.5 15.6 
Shares in GDP % 15.7 14.8 20.2 20.2 19.4 20.0 
Source: EIU. Country Profile. 1987-88: Central Bank of Iran 
Production indices by output and by value for manufactured goods 
excluding oil refining were as below: 
Table 4.7 - Production Indices, bv Output H974/75 -1001 
Relative 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
Weight 
Food.Beverages 
andTobaco 21.5 117.2 105.4 105.7 110.8 123.8 
Textiles, Clothing 
and Leather 15.80 162.8 172.5 211.1 226.2 282.8 
Wood Products 0.54 219.9 210.2 249.1 328.8 398.2 
Paper and Cardboard 1.67 135.2 96.0 110.9 149.3 184.8 
Chemicals 15.32 118.8 98.3 104.4 122.9 152.5 
Non-Metal Mining Products 
(except oil and coal) 9.10 177.7 181.7 203.7 233.6 254.1 
Basic Metal 10.51 104.8 83.4 73.8 120.0 158.0 
Machinery 
and Equipment 24.81 118.8 113.4 143.5 161.5 222.2 
Other Manufacturing 
Industries 0.66 58.7 29.4 30.1 39.2 42.1 
General Index 100.00 129.7 121.5 137.5 157.1 195. 
Source: EIU. Country Profile. 1987-88: Central Bank of Iran 
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Tflhta A fl - Pmduftrton Indies, hv Value 11977/78-1001 
1977/78 1978/79 1979/8Q igjQffil 1981/82 188283 1983/84 
Agriculture 100.00 100.02 108.89 108.95 106.78 121.39 119.50 
Industry 100.00 84.82 76.80 68.39 66.38 86.85 89.00 
Oil 100.00 105.37 71.28 85.80 62.53 118.66 120.00 
Source: H. Gurdon. Iran: The Continuing Struggle far Power. Manas Press. 
1984: Central Bank of Iran 
The impact of political upheavals can be seen in a 15.2 per cent fall in 
growth rates in 1978/1979. Continuing uncertainty after the revolution followed 
by nationalisation and expropriation in industry compounded by the start of the 
war contributed to poor performance in 1979/1980,1980/1981 and 1981/1982. 
In the face of increased oil revenues in 1982 and renewed industrial activity, a 
modest recovery was achieved in 1982/1983. 
As for the industry's share in GDP (Table 4.6) its role bas been only 
enhanced due to the poor showing of oil. The share of oil and gas in GDP 
betwen 1978/1979 and 1983/1984 fell from 30.9 per cent to 15.5 per cent.38 
Though industry has made strides and in percentage terms the perfomance 
appears significant and encouraging, the base for which this is measured is 
extremely low and are misleading. 
A truer picture of the state of the Iranian economy is given by production 
indices rather than by industry shares In GDP or its growth rates. As can be 
seen from table 4.8, by 1983/1984 the industry was still only producing at 89 
per cent of its 1977/1978 level. The oil sector however, although growing by 20 
per cent'overall, had a staggering 100 per cent growth rate by value from 
1981/1982 to 1983/1984. This increased revenue was one of the contributing 
factors to resuscitate industry. 
4.4.12 Conclusion 
To sum up, since the nationalisation and seizures, the Industrial sector has 
suffered from the war, including the destruction of Iran's major ports. This has 
introduced bottlenecks to the nation's disrtibution network. Abadan and 
Khorramshahr have been destroyed and Bandar Khomeini, because of its 
close proximity to the war front, has been virtually unusable. 
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Most Iranian industries are over-manned. Some are still short of spare 
parts or semi-finished goods that they import to assemble, while others lack 
capital. Industrial ministries, especially the Ministry of Industries, which has 
most dealing with the private sector, have been trying to sell or give some of 
their plants back to the private sector. 39 The reasons are partly political, though 
since 1982 following the abatement of expropriation, the Islamic goverment has 
been showing a growing Islamic respect for private property. 
Despite the encouragement given to the private sector, there is not much 
confidence in the future of the economy while the country's acute shortage of 
foreign exchange, due to reduced oil income, continues. Investors in the 
private sector undertaking new projects, under present circumstances, must 
either provide the money from their own resources or prove to the appropriate 
ministry by one means or another, that their project will earn back its foreign 
investment when it is operational. 
Having rejected the Shah's industrial policy as unsoundly based, the 
leaders of the revolution in the early days demanded a self sufficient Iranian 
industry independent of the involvement of foreigners either as suppliers or 
investors. However, with the abatement of revolutionary fervour, it was soon 
realised that these ideas were neither pratical nor desirable. Although there is 
still no detailed or coherent industrial policies, the rhetoric of industrial self 
sufficiency continues by the fundamentalists. Foreign investments, without any 
great fuss being made officially, is encouraged in Iran, though it is seen as 
foreign involvement' in a sense of foreign companies being suppliers, 
contractors and sources of expertise in design and maintenance. In this 
respect Japan, Germany and Italy have responded well to these new openings. 
The government continues with the industrial structure inherited from the 
Shah. Old projects are being continued or restarted, often on a smaller scale 
than previously envisaged and the same intermediate goods are being 
imported to supply the old assembly plants. Even attempts are being made to 
reactivate the Shah's nuclear power plans, though under present financial 
circumstances, resuscitation of some projects seems beyond reach. In addition 
some proposals result in criticism from the more conservative elements in the 
regime. Parallel to this, some older industrial schemes have either closed 
down or ceased to produce at economic rates. Iraqi air attacks in some cases 
either demolished or damaged plants, having serious adverse effects. An 
example of this is the Bandar Khomeini petrochemical complex. Iraqi air 
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attacks and a dispute over payment with Mitsui, together with the changed 
international market for petrochemical goods, has meant that the plant has 
virtually been abandoned. 
The government has also moved rapidly towards funding new industries 
which offer prospects of foreign exchange savings (import substitution 
schemes) though in some cases at an enormous cost. There has been growing 
criticism in Iran for the allocation of funds from a very limited development 
budget to major showpiece industrial projects, in particular to the new 
petrochemical scheme in Arak. It is claimed in Terhran that the nine major 
industrial schemes undertaken for the 'first decade' of the revolutionary era will 
have absorbed some $ 2.2 billion by February 1989. 40 In general, the new 
element in the industrial policy is an emphasis on easier technology and 
construction which the Iranians can manage with their own resources and on 
building intermediate industries to supply the assembly plants. However, in 
present circumstances, Iran is short of foreign exchange and most new projects 
remain at the planning stage, despite a policy of pushing ahead with industrial 
development. The new industrial policies may however have a wide practical 
expression once the Islamic Republic decides on the direction of its economy in 
the post- war era. 
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4.5 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TRADE 
Iran's trade system still retains some of its traditional features, in particular the 
bazaar and the wide selection of independent small shops and vendors. The 
bazaar, for a long time, has been the main centre of urban life in Iran. Its 
strength comes from its unique combination of productive and commercial 
activity with religious and social functions. It provides a communal centre with a 
life of its own with its own values, norms and social relationships. The bazaar is 
a complex, inward looking and highly conservatie unity. 
The role of the bazaar, however, is firstly based on its financial strength as a 
commercial centre. During the 1970s before the success of the Islamic 
Revolution, it controlled over two thirds of domestic wholesale trade and 
accounted for one third of all imports. The bazaaris profited handsomely from 
the economic boom of the 1970s, yet they provided valuable support to the 
revolutionary movement in Iran. In the run-up to the revolution, some leading 
Tehran bazaaris contributed generously to the clerical cause, helped to 
organise protest marches and used their influence to keep the bazaar closed at 
the height of anti-Shah demonstrations. 
The bazaaris, as devout Moslems, always provided funds for the clerics and 
subsidised religious activities. The alliance between clerics and bazaaris had 
historical roots, but it was further reinforced in the 1970s as bazaaris, despite 
their new found wealth, harboured grievances against the economic policies of 
the Shah. These policies were seen as attempts to reduce the power of the 
bazaar through the creation of a modern banking system and a distribution 
system for essential raw materials and foodstuffs. The pace of implementation 
peaked in 1976. The bazaaris also resented the emergence of a new industrial 
and entrepreneurial elite who constituted the modern sector of the economy. 
Although some of the new industrial families emerged from the bazaar and 
there existed economic links between the industrialists and bazaaris, the two 
groups tended to drift apart. 
The government's attention and emphasis on industralisation and its 
association with the modern sector of the economy, relegated the bazaaris to 
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seconday status and added to their sense of exclusion. Furthermore, by the 
mid 1970s the major industrial families developed a powerful grip over the 
economy by combining interests in industry with those of banking, insurance 
and trade. As a result, the role of the traditional merchants was increasingly 
threatened by these powerful industrialists who developed trading companies 
alongside major industrial enterprises and even established their own retail 
network and outlets. 
The backing of the revolution by the bazaaris was mainly due to their loss of 
status, competition from domestic industries and the excessive concentration of 
economic power in the hands of a few. They attached little importance to the 
hostility of radical elements to wealth In the Islamic movement. They could not 
conceive that in the eyes of the poor, they too could appear as the privileged 
material beneficiaries of the Shah's economic policies. Rather, they believed 
that an Islamic government would respect private property, free them from 
government restrictions and controls, provide them with greater business 
opportunities and tax them more lightly. The bazaaris hardly foresaw that 
private commerce would be threatened by the revolutionary tide.4i 
4.5.1 Partial Nationalisation of Foreign Trade 
In the revolutionary coalition, despite the clerical and lay figures friendly to the 
bazaar, there were also elements who, though less hostile to trade than 
industry, were determined to bring foreign trade under government control. 
These elements propagated measures to regulate profit and pursued policies 
beneficial to the poorer classes. Also, they emphasised reliance on morality as 
a vehicle for economic prosperity. As a result, in May 1980, the Revolutionary 
Council under presssure from the radicals, approved a measure which partially 
nationalised foreign trade. The measure empowered the government to 
establish a government monopoly over several categories of goods including 
wood, paper, metals, machinery, essential foods, textiles and jute. In addition, 
twelve procurement and distribution centres were established to import these 
items, preferably from Muslim and Third World countries, and distribute them for 
domestic use.42 
The centres allowed private traders to import but only under licence. 
Importers were required to deliver 30 per cent of each consignment to the 
government and were permitted to sell their products at specified margins of 
profit. Within a short period nearly 40 per cent of import trade was passing 
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through these centres. The government distributed directly the goods over 
which it established a monopoly and to control prices, it expanded the network 
of state-operated co-operative stores, thereby involving itself extensively in the 
distribution of domestic goods. 
4.5.2 Reinforcing Factors 
The fate of private trade after the revolution reflects the shifting balance of 
forces between conservative and radical groups of the Islamic movement. 
However, external events compounded by Islamic radicalism, reinforced the 
trends of nationalisation. Iran's assets were frozen by the USA in November 
1979, which denied the country access to its valuable foreign exchange 
holdings. The war with Iraq also disrupted trade, interrupted oil exports, 
imposed heavy costs and helped deplete foreign exchange reserves. With the 
outbreak of the war, the government imposed rationing on essential items and 
by the end of 1981 foreign exchange reserves fell so severely that further trade 
restriction became necessary. By this time, several agencies were involved in 
the import, distribution and pricing of goods. The Foundation for Economic 
Mobilisation, a revolutionary body establishd following the outbeak of the war, 
proposed to create a network of wholesale and retail centres and to take over 
the distribution of almost all consumer goods.43 
In the meantime, pressure mounted in the Majlis from the radicals for a 
complete nationalisation of foreign trade. The failure of the government to 
check inflation led to a serious deficit In the budget and sharp price rises. 
These resulted in a sustained attack by the radicals on the merchant classes for 
undermining Islamic morality, believed to be essential for economic propserity. 
As stated in the Manifesto of Islamic Republic Party, the economy Is to 'draw 
and contribute to morality and morality must at no time be neglected'. The 
same Manifesto concluded: 'when the fight against profits is successful then 
internal inflation is likely to be eliminated, although external inflation in the West 
will always continue'.44 Furthermore, merchants were criticised by some radiate 
for having a stranglehold on the economy, conducting most of their trade with 
major capitalist countries and using trade as means of transferring national 
assets abroad.45 
4.5.3 Objections to Total Nationalisation 
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Against the background of the aforementioned reinforcing factors, radicals 
made attempts to totally control trade by the state, as enshrined in the new 
Islamic Constitution. In May 1982, the Council of Guardians vetoed the Foreign 
Trade Nationalisation Law as being in violation of Islamic law and the dictates 
of common sense. In April 1984, the Majlis approved a revised version of the 
said law, requiring the government, over a four year period, to take control of all 
essential goods, leaving some 80 per cent of import trade in the hands of the 
state. As the Council of Guardians raised objection to this formulation, the 
Majlis revised the billl, seeking to establish a state foreign trade monopoly 
through government control of foreign exchange.46 
As indicated above, the extension of state control over the economy met with 
resistance. Opposition developed mainly from the bazaaris, the religious 
community and the bureaucracy. The bazaaris and the middle classes saw the 
nationalisation law as a threat to their own property and business interests. 
Also pragmatic officials In the bureaucracy were persuaded that the 
government lacked the capacity to carry out the tasks of thousands of importers, 
wholesalers, shopkeepers, agents, entrepreneurs and industrailists. 
However, nationalisation of trade is not entirely a lost dream of the radicals 
and it is Inevitable that further attempts will be made to extend state control. 
The dispute over nationalisation of trade like other sectors, can partly be 
explained in terms of a struggle between the conservatives and the radicals in 
the Islamic regime. It is a complex dispute involving disagreement over Islamic 
doctrine, over the role of the government and over the capacity of the state as 
against a mixed economy to serve as the engine for economic development. 
4.5.4 Foreign Trade and the Private Sector 
Despite the unsuccessful attempts at nationalisation, external trade has been 
largely controlled by the state and many goods are bought through state 
agencies who check volumes and qualities of imports and implement 
government edicts on trade. State procurement agencies also exist mainly for 
industrial input procurement and much distribution, especially consumer goods, 
with ration books, is in the hands of the state. The result has been growing 
resentment among the bazaaris. 
Against this background In August 1984 Khomeini himself intervened in this 
vexing matter and supported the bazaaris demand for greater participation in 
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foreign trade. Though he emphasised a greater popular involvement in the 
running of the economy, he also argued that the state should supervise trade. 
Although Khomeini's wishes were unlikely to be ignored, but the state did not 
give a greater share to the private sector in trade as it ran against the provision 
of the constitution.47 
Table 4.9 - Current Account. 1977/78 - 1983/84 f$ million! 
Exports 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 198081 1981/8? 198P/B3 1983/84 
OB Sector 20,713.5 17,8672 19.315.7 11,6072 12,4555 20,0492 20,456.8 
Gas 1912 2485 705 2432 - - -
Goods 5232 417.1 44Z9 628.1 4142 285.1 290.6 
Sendees 4,161.6 4,204.8 2,829.3 . 1.7354 1.450.6 1.120.9 1,334.6 
25,590.1 22.737.6 22,658.4 142140 14,320.3 21,4552 22,082.0 
Private Sector 7.535.1 7511.7 7508.0 10,818.3 8,971.7 5,584.4 9541.7 
Public Sector 9.018.0 6,039.7 4.037.1 4,925.1 62725 72242 12,774.7 
Total (Incl Others) 24.496.0 21238.6 16548.7 18,813.4 17,0572 14.904.0 24,197.6 
Balance 1,094.1 1,499.0 6.109.7 -4599.4 -2,736.9 6551J -2,115.6 
Source: Central Bank of Iran: EIU. Country Profile. 1987-88 
Table 4.9 shows the role played in imports by the private sector and the fall 
in its importance after the partial nationalisation of the foreign trade by the 
government in May 1980. With the unstable and shifting balance of forces 
between conservatism and radicalism in the context of the Shia Islam as 
described above, and the subsequent attempt by the radical Majlis deputies for 
further nationalisation, the relative importance of the privat sector was reduced 
during 1981/1982 and 1982/1983. The table above also shows the importance 
of oil revenue in the current account compared with other components. Oil 
constituted the bulk of Iran's exports and foreign exchange revenues needed 
for imports - an importance which has dramatically increasd in recent years. 
After 1983/84 foreign trade has remained low. In spite of a 40% average 
annual increase in non-oil exports, total exports decreased as a result of 
declining oil prices. The figures were $18,500 million in 1984/85 and $17,000 
million in 1985/86. Exports reached an ebb in 1986/87 to a mere $7,500 million 
following the oil price collapse. In 1987/88 total exports increased to the 
$10,000 level. 
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Trade balance and current account registered surpluses in 1984/85 and 
1985/86. However, in 1986/87 they were both well the in red -$2,500 million 
and -$3,500 million respectively. In 1987/88 trade balance and current account 
both were expected to be positve. 48 
4.5.5 Composition of Exports 
As indicated above Iran's economy is based on oil revenues. Excluding oil 
and gas Iranain exports are basically made up of traditional commodities and 
new industrial products.49 Among traditional commodities carpets and 
agricultural produce are two key items of non-oil and non-gas exports by value. 
Table 4.10 - Non-Oil and Non-Gas Exports ($ milHonl 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
Traditional 
Commodities 379.8 745.4 621.2 326.3 262.4 330.6 
(% of Total) (70%) (92%) (96%) (96%) (92%) (93%) 
New Industrial 163.0 66.4 24.0 13.2 21.3 26.0 
Products 
Total 542.8 811.8 645.2 339,5 283.7 356.6 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran: Central Bank of Iran: E1U Country 
Profile 1986-1987.1987-1988 
Before the revolution the share of the traditional commodities in total 
non-oil and gas exports was on the decline while that of industrial products was 
increasing.5o As can be seen in table 4.10, after the revolution between 
1979/1980 and 1983/1984 the share of traditional commodities in total non-oil 
and non-gas exports has been over 90 per cent while the relatively minor 
role played by industrial exports has declined in absolute terms. The new 
ndustrial products which were gradually gaining a foothold in some foreign 
markets before the revolution have fallen back noticeably in recent years. 
However, following the government's effort to boost foreign exchange 
earnings, the total non-oil and non-gas exports increased gradually. They were 
$317.0 million in 1984/85, $420.0 million in 1985786, $682.3 million in 1986/87 
and $854.1 million in 1987/88. Carpet exports, following its revival in 1984 
have accounted for a major proportion of non-oil exports. It earned a record 
$500.0 million in 1987/88 constituting nearly 60% of total non-oil exports.51 
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4.5.6 Non-MIIItary Imports 
Iran's non-military imports before the revolution constituted mostly of 
intermediate goods, capital equipment and consumer items in that order. 
Between 1973 and 1977 an average per year of 57 per cent of Iran's total 
imports were intermediate goods, 26.2 per cent capital goods and 16.8 per cent 
consumer goods.52 
The revolution brought a major shift in the types of goods imported. In fact 
capital goods imports declined to15 per cent in 1982 compared with 28.0 per 
cent in 1978. Also, there was a sharp cut in consumer goods imports especially 
items considered to be luxury goods by the Islamic government. Food imports, 
as discussed earlier, rose rapidly throughout the early 1980's despite the 
government's emphasis on agricultural development. 
Table 4!11 Principle Non-MHltaiv Imports 1978779-1983/84 f$ million) 
1978/79 1979/80 12SQ/&1 1SSlffi2 19J2£2_ 12S2ZS4 
Food and 
Live Animals 1,031 1.518 1,541 2,161 2,164 2,368 
Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals 792 1,085 1,521 2,180 1,679 2,084 
Iron, Steel and 
Manufactures 2,974 2.908 3.335 3.986 3.507 5,326 
Road Vehicle 
and Machinery 4,534 2.989 3,055 3,527 3,331 6.317 
Total (Including oters) 10.372 9,696 10,844 13,515 11.845 18.103 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran: EIU Country Profile 1986-87.1987-88 
As indicated in the table above the money value of Iran's imports after the 
revolution has been subject to fluctuations. This is due to the fact that the value 
of imports are closely connected to the value of foreign exchange earnings. 
Thus the imbalance in oil revenues has resulted in an imbalance in the value of 
imports. However, since the significant rise in total non-military imports 
exceeding $18 million 1983/1984 as a result of sustained attacks on Iran's oil 
installations and tankers hauling crude oil, the value of total imports has fallen 
sharply because of decline in foreign exchange earnings. 
In 1984/1985 and 1985/86 total imports fell to $14,655 million and $11,519 
million respectively. By 1986/1987 it decreased even further to only $8,820 
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million. After three years of decrease in imports (-21.3% on average every year) 
In 1987/88, It took an upward swing and increased slightly to $9,769 million. 
This kind of imbalance in imports and the fact that Iran's industrialisation has 
been based on import substitution, has created significant problems in the 
economy. It should be noted that prior to the war, in the period of 1973/1977 
the total imports had increased by 41 per cent on average annually le from 
$3,659 million in 1973/1974 to $14,447 million in 1977/1978.53 
4.5.7 Major Trading Partners 
Before the revolution West Germany, the USA and the UK were traditionally the 
main suppliers/The USA lost its position after the revolution, being replaced by 
Japan. 
Table 4.12 - Main Non-Oil and Non-Gas Trading Partners f% of Total) 
Imports from 1981/82 1982/83 1983/Bd Q^pojl&ia 1981/821982/83 1983/84 
W. Germany 17 16 19 W.Germany 32 19 21 
Japan 12 11 17 UAE 1 6 14 
UK 6 6 6 USSR 12 20 11 
Turkey 2 7 5 Italy 14 13 9 
ttaJy 5 5 5 Switzerland 8 3 4 
South Korea 5 3 3 Kuwait 4 5 3 
Romania 2 4 2 Prance 3 4 2 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran: EIU. Country Profile 1986-87.1987-88 
In general all imports have to be authorised by ministries. Officially 
imports from Israel, South Africa and the USA are prohibited, though they often 
continue through intermediaries. As can be seen from the table above, West 
Germany and Japan have increased their commercial interest in Iran though 
Japan has recently been reluctant to prolong its dependence on Iran as a 
source of oil. Turkey, Iran's neighbour, has improved its position for supplying 
civil goods while North Korea's importance has grown since 1983 for providing 
military items. Also due to deterioration in Russian-Iranian relations as a result 
of the treatment of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party during 1983, exports to the 
USSR declined in 1983/1984, though since then relations have improved. 
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Table 4.13 - Direction of Trade including Gas and Oil (% of Total! 
Exports To 1983 1985 Imports From 1983. 1985 
Japan 19.5 15.9 West Germany 17.4 16.3 
Italy 12.1 9.4 Japan 16.3 13.4 
Turkey 5.6 8.8 UK 5.5 6.7 
Singapore 2.7 7.1 Italy 5.3 6.0 
Syria 5.5 6.5 Turkey 6.3 5.9 
Spain 8.4 5.6 USSR 3.7 4.5 
Netheriand 6.9 5.5 Singapore 2.2 3.9 
France 4.5 5.0 Spain 2.4 2.8 
USA 5.4 4.8 Argentina 2.3 2.8 
Romania 2.7 4.4 Netherland 2.4 2.7 
West Germany 2.8 4.0 Kuwait 1.1 2.0 
USSR 2.6 3.6 
Tota(( Including others) 100.00 100.00 Total( Including others) 100.00 100.00 
of which: OECD 72.4 64.6 of which: OECD 71.7 70.7 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book: EIU. Country Profile 
1986-87. 1987-88 
The table above implicitly shows the Islamic Republic's continuing 
dependence on the OECD economies despite its profound dislike of such 
links, particularly in the view of its official policy stressing trade with Islamic and 
Third World states, partially through barter deals. However, the need for hard 
currency persists and it is therefore the West that continues to dominate in 
trade. 
4.5.8 Conclusion 
Despite Khomeini's backing of the bazaaris and private sector trade, there still 
exists some uncertainties with regard to the status of the foreign trade sector. 
Within the revolutionary government there has been a continuing struggle over 
the economy and the alloction of control, with radicals in favour of a do facto 
nationalisation of all foreign trade and the conservatives eager to see 
traditional agencies in the bazzar persue their interest. 
Following the revolution and the reduced import levels in 1979, a slow 
recovery set in with 1983/1984 as the peak year when oil revenues were 
relatively high and commerical confidence returning. In 1985 and the 
subsequent years with difficulties due to the continuation of the Gulf war, falling 
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oil prices and consequent shortages of foreign exchange, imports have fallen 
sharply. 
Military requirments has become increasingly important and there has been 
a significant increase in arms imports as a result of the Iraqi invasion. The ratio 
of arms imports to toal imports on average per year was 27.8 per cent for the 
1979/1983 period. For 1985 it accounted for roughly 34 per cent of all imports 
and constituted a considerable foreign exchange burden. 54 
The major pre-revolution suppliers, West Germany and Japan remain the 
main suppliers of Iran imports. Overall, there has been some diversification of 
trading partners after the revolution but the changes have not been significant 
enough to reduce Iran's dependence on the OECD countries, despite West 
Germany and Japan's reduced depedence on Iranian oil. 
As for the Eastern bloc countries their exports to Iran increased due to 
'American hostage' crisis and the Western imposed sanctions. The share of 
Socialist countries export increased from 10.7 per cent in 1979 to 14.3 per cent 
in 1980, 15 per cent in 1981, 19.5 per cent in 1982. Then as a result of 
improvements in foreign exchange earnings and therefore less need for barter 
deals the share of Eastern bloc countries fell to 13 per cent of Iran's total 
imports in 1983. ss Although in absolute terms these countries have increased 
the money value of their exports to Iran since the revolution, nonetheless the 
changes have not been significant enough to change Iran's post-revolution 
trading patterns. 
The Third World countries with whom Iran is trading are mainly within the 
Western camp in principle and the emphasis is on trading with adjacent states 
such as Turkey and Pakistan, though these are problems in respect of the 
quality of industrial products imported from these countries. Iran apears to be 
used to higher quality products from the West. 
As for foreign trade policy, Iran does not seem to follow any specific 
approach. Depending on oil exports It may favour barter, cash or counter-trade, 
though the latter is much more common. Iran, in an attmept to reduce its current 
account deficit has been trying to limit imports from industrial countries to a 
proportion of the value of oil such countries buy from it. 
To try to match oil sales to import purchases seems certain to guarantee that 
the Islamic government will confine to trade primarily with the OECD member 
states. For it is only the industrialised countires that can absorb large quantities 
of crude oil. 
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4.6 PLANNING 
4.6.1 Introduction 
After the revolution, economic planning became a controversial issue. Within 
the PBO there was serious confusion with regard to the real purpose of the 
central planning machinery. This confusion and controversy was of two distinct 
types. Firstly, those arising from the chaos of the revolutionary period and 
secondly those related to such fundamental questions as the structure of the 
Islamic economic system and especially the status of private ownership. Added 
to these problems were the country's political rivalry and the impact that had on 
planning efforts. 
The confusion which impaired the effective operation of the PBO persisted 
up to 1982, until steps were made towards the development of some planning 
mechanism. As a result, while Iran was still suffering from the economic 
consequences of the revolution and the continuing war with Iraq, in 1983 the 
revised version of the First Islamic Republic Plan was submitted to the Majlis. 
The plan, prepared for the period 1983/1984 to 1987/1988 identifies the 
possible ways in which the Islamic government aims to control the evolution of 
the economy. 
It ouiines the goverment's long term socio-economic objectives and policies 
in detail at macro and sectoral level. Although the plan received the approval 
of the Majlis, it was not a favourite with the main power groups in the state and 
conflicted with the ambitions of powerful individuals who hoped to create 
economic empires of their own, uninhibited by the constraints of a planning 
frame work. The plan, despite its many virtues, was not given financial support 
and in the face of increasing demands of the military budget, rarely gained 
budgetary allocations in the years after 1984. 
Considering that Iran was operating a war economy the focus of this section 
will be: 
-A brief study of the abortive First Plan; 
-The appraisal of the plan by concentrating on its objectives and aspirations, 
considering whether they were realistic in the circumstances; 
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-The comparison of the projected targets with actual post revolutionary 
performance. 
4.6.2 Supreme Objective of the Plan 
The ultimate objective of the Islamic society is man's development and devotion 
towards freedom from anything but God and his movement towards 'Allah'. 
Economic and social development must constitute an effort to remove any 
obstacles impeding man's and the Islamic nation's development and elevation. 
General objectives and orientations of the economic and social development in 
the Islamic Republic must be drawn up on the basis of Islamic laws and 
principles. Establishment of Islamic relations in society which is the objective of 
Divine Instructions, must be considered as the principle and all objectives, 
policies and plans must be drawn up and accepted in its light.se 
4.6.3 Qualitative Objectives of the Plan 
The general objectives, in brief were as follows: 
a) Expansion of education and culture; 
b) Securing the interests of the Mostazafin (the Down Trodden People); 
c) Securing economic independence; 
d) Provision of food and clothing; 
e) Provision of housing; 
f) Elimination of unemployment.57 
4.6.4 Policies 
Major policies for attaining the general objectives were as follows: 
a) Prevension of consumerism and an emphasis on investment; 
b) Agriculture as the axis of development; 
c) Expansion of research in order to achieve economic independence and 
increase Iran's economic, political and military capacities; 
d) Expansion of secondary activities in order to raise the villagers and tribal 
people's income; 
e) Emphasising the expansion of intermediate and machine-tool industries; 
f) Transforming oil revenues into infrastructural and productive capacities, 
closely related to the domestic economy; 
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g) Increasing utilization of available capacities in industry, agriculture and 
education to increase productivity; 
h) Expansion of non-oil exports 
I) Preventing the expansion of large cities and implementing settlement 
poUcies.58 
In quantative terms, the plan envisaged that GDP will rise (in fixed prices of 
1982/1983) from $119.4 billion in 1983/1984 to $168.9 billion in 1987/1988 at 
an annual average rate of 8.9 per cent. During the same period, it was 
anticipated that non-oil GDP will increase by 6.9 per cent on average per year, 
from $95.2 billion to $125.1 billion. The projected sectoral growth rates were 
according to Table 4.14 (past performances also given for comparison). 
Table 4.14 - Average Annual Sectoral Growth Rates of First Plan 1983/84 -
1987/88 (%) 
Sectors Projected Target Actual Performance Actual Performance 
First Plan 1983/84- Fourth Plan Fifth Plan 
1987/B8 1968/72 1973/77 
1. Agriculture 7.0 3.9 4.6 
2.011 15.9 15.2 -0.7 
3 . Industries 
and Mines 14.4 13.0 15.5 
4. Services 3.6 14.2 15.3 
Source: First Plan. PBO. Islamic Republic of Iran 1982: EIU. Country Profile 
1987-flfl P gfl. 
Despite the poor performance of the oil industry during the Fifth Plan and the 
post revolutionary problems the First Plan put heavy emphasis on the growth in 
the oil sector.Ukewlse, the agricultural sector, with a history of poor 
pre-revolution performance was planned to increase its output by 7% annually. 
The projected shares of various sectors in GDP during the plan period were as 
below: 
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Table 4.15 - Projected Sectoral Share in GDP. 1983/84 - 1987/88 t%\ 
Sectors im&L imm mSffi. 1986/87 1987/88 
1. Agriculture 15.3 15.1 14.8 14.5 14.2 
2. Oil 20.3 21.6 22.9 24.4 25.9 
3. Industries 
and Mines 18.5 19.4 20.3 21.3 22.2 
4 . Services 45,9 43.9 42.0 39.8 37.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: First Plan 
As can be noted, the share of agriculture was expected to remain more or 
less the same while oil and industrial sectors planned to increase their 
contribution to GDP. Services' share was expected to decline. The plan 
proposed expenditure on investment (by public and private sectors) of $168.9 
billion (14,191.3 billion rials . $1 = 84 rials) of which the public and private 
sector would provide approximately 60 and 40 per cent respectively. 
Services, construction and agriculture were seen as the major areas of 
investment, with the private sector almost exclusively concerned with 
construction. After construction, agriculture was by far the most important area 
of planned investment by the private sector, followed by services. 
As the table 4.16 shows, 52.2 per cent of the total investment was to go to 
industry - admittedly to industries intended to serve agriculture. The plan, 
which had been revised to provide for more emphasis on agriculture than was 
the case in the original August 1982 draft, envisaged total investment of $26.2 
billion for agriculture with an average annual increase of 25.6 per cent. As a 
result, agriuciture was to receive 15.5 per cent of the total investment - up 3 per 
cent on the figure in the original plan. The purpose of this emphasis was to 
provide food for an expected population of 47.11 million by the end of the plan 
period.59 
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Table 4.16 - Projected Sectoral Investment bv Public and Private Sectors 
during First Plan 1983/84 - 19B7/B8 /hiMinn dollars at constant 1982/B3 prices! 
Total %of Investment Annual 
Sectors Investment Total Average Growth % 
1 . Agriculture 26.2 15.5 25.6 
2 .Oil 8.9 5.3 33.2 
3 . Industry and Mining 88.2 52.2 17.1 
Industry and Mining (23.5) (13.9) (22.9) 
Water, Power and Gas (22.4) (13.3) (20.2) 
Construction (42.3) (25.0) (12.5) 
4 .Services 45.6 27.0 17.7 
Education, Health 
and Social Services (8.6) (5.0) (17.8) 
Other Services (37.0) (22.0) (17.8) 
Total 168.9 100.0 19.6 
Source: First Plan 
4.6.5 Projected Government Receipts and Expenditures 
While the plan was an honest attempt to formulate policies for the 
reconstruction of the country, its heavy bias towards the use of oil revenues and 
dependence on state involvement in heavy industry and utilities was far too 
reminiscent of the former regime's orientation. During the First Plan period, the 
government revenue was estimated to be $34.7 billion in 1983/84 and was 
projected to rise to $59.8 billion in 1987/88. Therefore, the total revenue was 
programmed to rise at an annual real rate of 14.5 per cent. Oil was planned to 
contribute a constant 58 per cent to total government revenues during the plan. 
In calculating oil revenues It has been assumed that the average price of oil will 
be $33.25 per barrel during the plan period, in constant 1982/83 prices.eo 
Furthermore, it was envisaged that the oil exports would rise from 1.73 
million barrels per day in 1983/84 to 2.97 million barrels per day in 1987/88, an 
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increase of 71.7 per cent. This implies that oil revenues should have an 
average annual rise of 14.4 per cent, increasing from $20.3 billion In 1983/84 to 
$34.8 billion in 1987/88 in constant 1982/83 prices. 
Total government expenditure was planned to rise from $41.2 billion in 
1983/84 to $59.8 billion In 1987/88, an annual average growth rate of 9.7 per 
cent.61 
Appraisal of the Plan and the Actual Peformance 
Given the brief presentation of the First Five Year Plan, the plan was a genuine 
attempt at the resuscitation of the Iranian economy. The plan document 
represented a turning point in the politico-economic affairs of the country. Its 
importance lay not in outlining the government's long term objectives and 
policies, but in the change of approach and attitude. In the immediate years 
following the revolution, everything had to be tabled 'Islamic' in order to be 
descirbed or justified, as the PBO did not use the term 'Islamic' as a delineator. 
The subjects of Islamic economics and Islamic economic systems were left out 
and did not play a role in planning. The central planning machinery, regardless 
of ideology, produced a development plan, though not without shortcomings, 
based on Iran's resource endowment.62 
The policies of the development adopted by the plan was aimed towards 
'economic independence' and 'self sufficiency' with agriculture as the 'axis of 
development*. However, the planned average annual growth rate of 7 per cent 
for agricultural sector was quite high by historical standards. The actual growth 
during the Fourth and Fifth plans of the Shah's rule was 3.9 and 4.6 per cent 
respectively. Considering the war and its serious consequences, i.e. dislocation 
of labour and increased migration from rural areas to the towns, the 7% growth 
target was highly unrealistic. 
While the crucial status of agriculture had been recognised by the Islamic 
Republic, the projected investment in the agricultural sector left much to be 
desired. It was planned that this sector will receive $26.2 billion in total 
investment during the plan period. The breakdown of investment funds was 
unrealistic. It was forecast that non-government investment should be 71.3 per 
cent of the total.63 Considering the flight of capital, the bitter struggle and 
impasse over land reform after the revolution, it was very optimist! cto expect 
the private sector to contribute such a large share of total investment in 
agriculture. Contrary to the planners belief, the agricultural problems were not 
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the result of Insufficient investment in that setor; rather it was the backwardness 
of the agricultural sector as a whole. In fact in the late 1960s despite 
considerable amounts of investment for the creation of co-operatives and farm 
co-operation alongside massive agri-business, development did not succeed, 
causing urban drift of population and capital. Due to considerable confusion in 
the countryside, this tendency was accelerated by the revolution. Investment 
and absorptive capacity of the rural areas can only yield higher returns when a 
hospitable environment can be provided for it. Otherwise it would lead to waste 
and added inefficiencies. 
Despite the foregone problems it should be noted that between 1978/1979 
and 1983/1984 the actual growth rate of the agricultural sector was an average 
4.7 per cent per annum, which is a favourable growth rate by past standards.64 
However, despite this performance food imports since 1978/1979 have risen 
rapidly. Agricultural imports for 1987/88 were approximately $3.8 billiion, the 
highest level ever. City dwellers, only a third of the population in the 1950s, 
outnumbered the rural population by the early 1980s. In 1986 the absolute size 
of the rural population declined for the first time on record, making it harder for 
Iran to grow food while increasing the need for it. This problem has also been 
compounded by the war and the increase of the population by 3.7-3.9 per cent 
per year, one of the highest rates in the world.es 
As far as the policies of development and industrialisation were concerned, 
these were similar to those of previous plans based on Import substitution with 
the major emphasis on heavy industries, petrochemical and defence related 
industries. The ultimate objective again being 'economic independence' and 
'self sufficiency'. 
As far as the the projected growth rate of 14.4 per cent for industrial sector 
was concerned, it was slightly higher than achieved during the 1968 to 1972 
period and only 1 per cent less than the growth obtained during the Fifth Plan 
(1973-1978). However, it should be noted that between 1978/79 and 1983/84 
the industry and mining sector grew by an average annual rate of one per cent 
66 Therefore a recovery from an extremely low base has been achieved. 
However, because of the continuation of the war, the flight of managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills, the expropriation and nationalisation of private industry 
and the political rivalry, the growth figure projected was unrealistic. As long as 
the said problems exist it is unlikely that a rapid recovery can be achieved. 
Out of total planned investment of $168.9 billion the industrial sector was to 
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receive $88.2 billion or 52.2 per cent of the total. Considering the projected 
investment and the policies, it appears that the planners as in previous periods, 
went for spending oil revenues with no serious attention to the problems of 
absorptive capacity. Though the oil revenues in the plan was unlikely to 
materialise on anything like the scale envisaged, the main problem in Iran, 
since the 1973 oil boom, has been to absorb investment efficiently, not lack of 
funds. However, considering the consequences of the revolution and 
subsequent events that reduced Iran's absolute absorptive capacity, 
expenditure to the level envisaged in the plan would have been wasteful. 
Nonetheless, the revolutionary regime has attempted to resurrect the pre-1979 
industrial ventures including the Shah's nuclear power plans, despite the very 
considerable cost, most likely beyond Iran's means at the present time and 
contrary to the aspiration of the plan. 
In general, since the abatement of nationalisation, the revolutionary regime 
has continued with the industrial structure Inherited from the Shah, with the 
added rhetoric of establishing an Islamic society. 
As for the oil sector, the planned growth rate of 15.9 per cent was quite high, 
considering the low probability of a rapid expansion of the world economy, the 
persistent oil glut and the pressure on OPEC members to reduce their oil 
production. The projected oil price was also extremely optimistic. At the time 
when the plan was being formulated, the Gulf war had created a sense of 
insecurity and instability in the oil markets. Furthermore, the oil price rises of 
the 1970s had led to energy saving technologies in the West. All these factors, 
as well as the serious recession in the industrialised economies, should have 
served as a warning to the planners that the oil price might not increase to the 
expected level. 
In fact the drastic decline in the oil prices during the recent years, 
demonstrates the miscalculation of the planners. As oil was expected to 
provide aroud 60 per cent of government revenue during the plan, the fall in the 
oil price completely undermined budget and investment plans. 
The projected oil exports was also very optimistic and did not seriously 
take the world situation into account. Considering the aforementioned factors, 
the proximity of Kharg oil exporting terminal to the war front and Iraq's air 
superiority In disrupting the oil flow, all made it seem an Impossible task to 
increase Iran's exports by nearly 72 per cent during the plan period. The 
projected oil exports of 2.97 million barrels per day in 1987/88 meant a total 
123 
dairy production of over 3.6 million barrels which, in the face of the current 
economic situation and the continuance of war, has not been achieved. 
In fact Iran's oil production on average since 1980 never reached 3 million 
barrels per day. Oil output, because of the war, has been subject to great 
fluctuations. In 1987 after a very low ebb in February at 1.65 million barrels, 
output steadily increased to 2.5 billion barrels per day in mid year and peaked 
at 2.8 million barrels per day in August. The improvemet in output came as a 
result of a slackening of Iraqi air raids on oil facilities and tankers.67 
In the services sector, the planners appeared to promulgate two 
contradictory objectives. On the one hand services were regarded as 
'unproductive' and can therefore be dispensed with, and on the other hand, the 
main objectives of the plan were to raise the educational and cultural standards 
and to provide health and social welfare for the masses.es 
The planned target of 3.6 per cent growth per year for the services is low in 
absolute terms and by historical standards. Actual growth rate during the 
Fourth and Fifth Plan were 14.2 and 15.3 respectively. 
However, it should be noted that the actual average growth rate for the 
services sector, between 1978/79 and 1983/84 was 2.9 per cent, despite its 
erratic growth trends.69 
In general the plan as a whole was highly ambitious and heavily biased 
towards the use of oil revenues. It emphasised the expansion of oil industry in 
line with its increased and now chronic dependence on oil revenues. In this 
respect, the plan ran directly opposite to the proposals for the oil industry made 
directly after revolution, when the aim was conservation. The main differences 
between the Islamic Republic's first plan and those of the Shah's period, are 
that the former contain the goals of establishing an Islamic society making 
agriculture the 'axis of the economy' and securing 'economic independence'. 
The Islamic plan is similar to those of the fomer regime in its over ambitious 
targeting and its lack of serious attention to absorptive capacity. Serious 
doubts must have remained over its successful completion. Even if the cost of 
the war was ignored, the government would not have been in a position to fund 
such high level development spending in tandem with a growing import bill for 
basic commodities and the need to make good the very considerable war 
damage. 
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8. QaL&RflQ© IFDIMAIM©! 
5.1 ISLAMIC BANKING 
While prohibiting interest, Islam permits profit sharing. The central requirement 
of an Islamic banking system is the, replacement of interest with profit on real 
activities as a means of allocating financial resources. 
Following the revolution, the Iranian authorities chose to convert their 
banking system to an interest free system by passing the comprehensive Law 
for Riba-Free Banking. In this section an attempt will be made to study and 
analyse certain salient features and the implementation of the new system in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
5.1.1 Nationalisation 
On 8th June 1979, the Revolutionary Council nationalised the banking 
system. It was the first step in a series of measures of desperation taken due 
to immediate economic and political necessity. As a result, twenty seven 
privately owned banks, thirteen of them joint ventures with minority foreign 
share holdings, were affected. Prime Minister Bazargan stated that "we 
respect private property but in view of undesirable and unprofitable 
conditions in the banks, to protect national rights and wealth and get the 
wheels of the economy moving, we deemed it necessary to nationalise the 
banks."i The head of the Plan and Budget Organisation added that "many of 
the owners of private banks did not have a good record and did not play their 
fundamental role in preserving the national wealth and rights.'? 
Hence, the banks takeover seemed inevitable. Politically the regime aimed 
to satisfy the high revolutionary expectation of the people after the revolution, 
Bank Markazi (the Central Bank) was under considerable pressure to keep 
an estimated half of the local banks from bankruptcy mainly because of the 
banks' history of over borrowing and involvement in risky ventures. Most of 
the board members of the banks had fled abroad and as stated by the head 
of the PBO, takeover was necessary in view of huge foreign and domestic 
indebtedness of some of the banks, and in order to guard against bankruptcy, 
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secure private deposits and protect the 'national interest'. The latter being a 
reference made by both Bazargan and the head of the PBO, to fears that the 
private banks would be used to siphon off more money to accounts abroad. 3 
As a result of nationalisation and amalgamation of private banks with those 
already government owned, five commercial banks and four specialist banks 
emeged.4 However, this regrouping bought little change to the mode of 
operations. The banks were not functioning as fully fledged Islamic banks. 
5.1.2 Islamisation 
Following the nationalisation, the revolutionary authorities in Iran took certain 
administrative steps to bring the banking system's operations into compliance 
with the requirements of the Islamic law . The government of Bani Sadr 
replaced interest with a system of service charges in 1981. As a result the 
banks levied a fixed 4% service charge on loans rather than interest. 
Depositors were also rewarded with a 'guaranteed minimum profit.' As can 
be noted, the praxis of interest were not eliminated at this stage of 
Islamisation, the transition came slowly. A comprehensive bill of Islamisation, 
prepared by a high level commission including bankers, academics, 
businessmen and religious figures was submitted to the Majlis in March 1982 
and was approved in August 1983 as the Law for Rlba - Free Banking. This 
law required the banks to convert their deposit accounts in line with the 
Sharia within one year, and their entire operations within three years from the 
date of the approval of the law. 
The new system began to come into effect on the Iranian New Year, 21st 
March 1984. From this date no customer was allowed to open a new interest 
earning account or make a new interest bearing deposit. Nor were the banks 
allowed to make interest bearing loans. As from March 1985, interest had 
been abolished and transactions were on an Islamic basis. 5 ( 
The implementation of the Islamisation policy had been piecemeal and 
took six years to be fully introduced. More than 20,000 staff had to be put 
through courses on Islamic banking. The lengthy process of Islamisation was 
constrained by various economic developments associated with 
nationalisation of the banking system, political upheavals, the freezing of 
Iranian assets held abroad, acute economic recession and the Gulf war. It is 
important to note that at the time of revolution, the banking system in Iran was 
near collapse. A large number of newly established banks were burdened 
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with high levels of non-performing assets and debts to both Bank Markazi (the 
Central Bank) and foreign creditors. The position of these banks was in 
particular due to the lack of banking and management experience 
compounded by inadequate regulatory controls. 6 
Under the circumstances, if there was no nationalisation, imposition of 
mergers on many weaker banks would have been expected. 7 All these 
inherent weaknesses, leading to lower overall performance of banks, 
hampered the transformation of the banking system. 
5.1.3 Bank Accounts 
Under the Law for Riba-Free Banking, liabilities acquired by the banks must 
be based on two types of transactions; Qarz al-hasaneh deposits and term 
investment deposits. Qarz al-hasaneh whether current or saving accounts, 
yield no income at all, but are praised by the authorities as highly desirable 
on religious grounds. To encourage the placing of Qarz al-hasaneh deposits 
the banks may, at their discretion, offer to depositors one or more of the 
following: non-fixed prizes or bonuses in cash of in kind, such as air tickets 
to holy shrines, carpets, gold coins, even cars; an exemption or reduction 
from payment of commission for banking services; and priority In the use of 
banking facilities. The banks are to consider their deposits both current and 
saving as their own resources in respect of utilisation but no profits are to be 
passed to depositors. Full payment of the nominal value of Qarz al-hasaneh 
deposits are guaranteed by the banks. From the customers point of view, 
these accounts are to serve as a means of transaction, payment and liquidity. 
In accordance with the rules adopted by the Money and Credit Council the 
banks are to set aside 10% of their rescources (providing it dose not exceed 
the total amount of the total Qarz al-hasaneh deposits) to provide loans in Jlhe 
form of Qarz al-hasaneh. Money lent out must be used for one of the following 
purposes:-
(a) to provide equipment, tools and other necessary resources to co-
operative bodies in order to generate employment 
(b) to enable expansion in production, with particular emphasis on 
agriculture, live-stock and industrial products 
(c) to meet essential personal needs such as wedding expenses, dowries, 
medical expenses, home repairs and loans for education. 
Maximum loan for categories (a) and (b) are 5,000,000 rials and in 
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respect of (c) it is 500,000 rials, repayable within five and three years 
respectively. Banks are permitted to charge a minimum service fee to cover 
the cost of administering these loans. 8 
Term investment deposits are used to fund the whole range of the banks' 
activities but mainly medium and long term investment. Investment deposits 
are comprised of two kinds, short and long term. The former is for a period of 
at least three months (20,000 rials or more) and the latter for one year or more 
(50,000 rials at least.) Depositors are given a surety of return of their money 
deposited. In other words, depositors do not run the risk of losing their money 
should the bank's investment operations prove bad. 
The banks in their capacity as 'depositors attorneys' utilise the investment 
deposits in compliance with financing and credit policies, and profits derived 
are divided between the bank and the depositors according to a 
pre-determined agreement. Although the banks can use their own resources 
that is, their capital and Qarz al-hasaneh deposits, the priority must be given 
to the utilisation of investment deposits meaning 'depositors' resources'. The 
banks can also use a combination of 'depositors' resources' and their own, in 
which case the bank and depositors share the resulting profits. Alternatively, 
the bank can act as a trustee and place the depositors' funds in an investment 
project in which case all resulting profits plus any capital gains are returned to 
the depositors. In this case the bank charges only a commission to cover the 
cost of administering the accounts. In all cases the banks undertake or insure 
at their own expense the repayment of the principals of the investment 
deposits. 
On occasions when combined resources of the depositors and the bank 
are invested, the return to depositors is calculated to the total amount of 
investment deposits (net of statutory reserve requirements). The banks must 
declare their profits at the end of each six months of their operation (end of 
Shahrivar and Esfand correponding to about 21st March and 21st September 
) and pay the share of the depositors' profits into each account. Depositors 
who withdraw their money before the minimum time required or reduce it 
below the set minimum amount, do not earn profits. 9 
5.1.4 Modes of Financing Operations 
The methods of investment, provision of trade credit and leasing contracts are 
in accordance with Islamic banking principles similar to those adopted by 
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some countries in the Middle East, though the operational procedures may 
differ slightly. 
The Law for Riba-Free Banking provides regulations governing various 
modes of operation. Term investment deposits, for which the bank has the 
power of attorney for its utilization must be used in Mosharakat (partnership 
between bank and client), direct investment, Mazaraba (profit sharing 
between bank and client), Aqsat transactions (installment), Ijarah be shart-e 
tamlik (hire purchase), Salaf transactions (forward purchasing), Mozara'a 
(similar to Mazaraba but crop-sharing), Mosaqat (similar to Mazara'a but in 
irrigation) and Ja'alah (unilateral contract for doing a job). 10 A brief 
description of these modes from the point of view of the law and its related 
regulations and procedures is as follows: 
5.1.4.1 Mosharakat 
The law recognises two kinds of partnership. They are civil annd legal. Civil 
partnership is based on the contribution of cash or non-cash capital by 
several or legal persons to a common pool on a contractual basis for the 
purpose of making profit. It is a project based partnership of short duration 
and shall disolve and liquidate on accomplishing the objectives of the 
partnership. The bank undertakes participation in order to provide the 
necessary facilities for productive, commercial and service activities. The life 
of the partnership can vary from one to a maximum of three years, though in 
exceptional cases the Central Bank could extend its duration. The banks' 
share in the civil partnership cannot exceed 80 per cent of the total capital. 11 
The second form of partnership is concerned with firms in which the bank 
provides a part of the capital of new joint stock company or buys part of the 
shares of an existing joint stock company. The banks, prior to their engaging 
in partnership, are obliged to assess and evaluate the technical, economic 
and financial viability of the firms. The participation is permissible only if the 
result of such appraisal indicates minimum expected rates of return. 
The Money and Credit Council determines the least expected rate of 
return. The maximum amount of equity participation by the bank or banks in a 
new, joint stock company should not exceed 49% while the limit of 
participation in an existing joint stock company is 20% or less. The banks 
are allowed to sell shares that they have thus purchased whenever they find it 
appropriate.12 
133 
5.1.4.2 Direct Investment 
Banks can directly invest in any profit making project. The projects should be 
of developmental or productive nature. Banks cannot invest in the production 
of luxury or non-essential goods, The Law specifies that the ratio of the initial 
capital of these projects to total financial resources needed should not be less 
than 40%. The total fixed capital required for the implementation of such 
projects must be provided in the form of long term financial resources. Prior 
to undertakings of direct investment the banks must evaluate the proposed 
projects from the economic, technical and financial points of view. Use of the 
banks' own resources and investment deposits are allowed only if the result 
of assessment and evalution of any project is financialy viable and minimum 
profitability, designated by the Money and Credit Council, is expected. In 
conformity with the law the banks are required to report to the Central Bank 
their plans for the allocation of funds for direct investment at least six months 
before the end of each year (20th March) in order to be submitted together 
with the State Annual Budget Bill to the Majlis, 
Once the projects in which the banks have directly invested have begun 
their productive activity, banks can sell the shares to the public. If as a result 
of this the banks share in the project falls to 49% or less of the total equity, the 
investment would be considered as a 'legal partnership' and the appropriate 
rules and regulations would apply. The Central Bank has the authority to 
investigate and audit direct investment projects in which the banks have 
participated.13 
5.1.4.3 Mozaraba 
This transaction is a short term contractual partnership of up to one year. In 
special cases only with the consent of the Central Bank, the duration may be 
extended. In Mozaraba the banks, as owners, place the required financial 
capital at the disposal of the agent-enterepreneur (i.e. either a real or legal 
person) for the purpose of providing the facilities necessary for the expansion 
of commerce. Like the aforementioned modes of operation, the banks are to 
assess the transaction for the safe return of the principal capital plus the 
expected profit. Banks are required to give preference to co-operatives in 
their Mozaraba activities. Furthermore, the banks are not permitted by law to 
enter Mozaraba with the private sector for imports.u 
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5.1.4.4 Installment Transactions 
Banks are authorised to buy machinery, tools and equipment, raw materials 
and spare parts for firms and resell the same to them on installments. The 
pupose of sale by installment is to provide the necessary facilities to raise 
working capital for the productive units. The installment price is determined 
by taking into consideration the cost price of good as well as the bank's 
profit. The recovery period in respect of raw materials, tools and spare parts 
must not exceed the duration of one production cycle or one year at the most, 
extended in exceptional cases only with the consent of the Central Bank. As 
for repayment of loans for machinery and equipment, the period cannot 
exceed their useful life which is considered to begin on the date of their 
utilisation in the production process and its duration will be determined by the 
Central Bank. 
For existing productive units in the agricultural sector, the banks are even 
permitted to buy and resell live animals on installments with a repayment 
period of up to two years. Where the sale is by installment and it is tended to 
provide working capital for a new project, industrial or agricultural, the 
respective bank can decide, on an individual case basis to extend the 
payment period over one year. Moreover the banks may sell by installment 
their own low cost housing units built for the purpose of expansion in the area 
of housing.is 
5.1.4.5 Hire Purchase 
According to the law, the purpose of hire purchase transactions is to provide 
the necesssary facilities for the expansion of services, agricultural, industrial 
and mining activities. As a result, the banks can purchase the needed 
machinery, equipment and other movable or immovable property and lease 
them to firms. At the end of hire purchase periods and after the last payment 
of the rental, the ownership of property will be transferred to the leaseholder, 
providing the leaseholder has fulfilled the conditions specified in the contract. 
The period of hire purchase must not exceed the duration of the effective life 
of the properties. Banks however, cannot engage In transactions in which the 
useful life of the property is less than two years. Furthermore banks are 
required to obtain as 'payment on account' at least 20% of the total cost as 
part of the rental over the period of the hire purchasers 
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5.1.4.6 Salaf Transactions 
These transactions are to provide the firms with needed working capital. 
Banks can purchase the firm's products in advance at a fixed price not 
exceeding the market price of the product at the time of the transation. 
However, the banks are not allowed to sell the products so bought in advance 
before their date of delivery unless the purchased products have been 
delivered before the date of delivery. The date cannot exceed one production 
cycle from the time of contract and in no circumstances can it be more than 
one year. 
The forward purchasing of products by the banks is permitted only if such 
products are produced by the applicants productive units; are not rapidly 
perishable unless some measures can be taken against spoilage during the 
period between delivery and sale; and are readily sellable. The latter means 
that the bank at the time of forward purchase should satisfy themselves that 
the products in question would be readily sellable at the date of delivery.17 
5.1.4.7 Other Transactions 
In Mozara'a the banks can provide agricultural lands that they own or in their 
possession as a trust to farmers for a specific period with a pre-determined 
share of each party in the harvest. In addition to land, the bank may provide 
other necessary elements such as water, seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, 
implements and means of production and transportation and even if deemed 
necessary, pay a certain amount of cash to farmers during the production 
cycle. 18 
As for Mosaqat, similarly the purpose of it is to increase productivity and 
the production of agricultural products. The banks may provide orchards or 
trees that they own or are in their possession to farmers for a specific period 
and a specified amount of common share in the produce. Produce includes 
fruit, leaves, flowers and the like.19 
In Ja'alah which is for the expansion of productive, commercial and 
services activities, the banks may provide or acquire services whenever they 
are needed and charge or pay commission or fees for such services.20 
Discounting in Its specific form, i.e. purchase of debt, is permitted as one 
type of credit facility. Banks can discount documents and commercial papers 
of production, commercial and services units in order to create the necessary 
financing facilities. In doing so they are bound to make sure of the reality of 
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the debt and the credibility of the undertakers prior to the discount of 
documents. 
Finally, another form of financing is Qarz al-hasaneh which was discussed 
earlier. A summary of modes of permissible transations corresponding to the 
types of economic activity are as below: 
Table 5.1 - Modes of Financing Operations 
Types of Activity Permissible Modes of Transactions 
Production (Industrial, Mosharakat, hire purchase.Salaf 
Mining and Agriculture) transactions, installment transactions, 
direct investment, Mozaraba, Mosaqat, 
Ja'alah, Qarz al-hasaneh, sales on credit 
Commercial (Imports, Exports Mozaraba, Mosharakat, Ja'alah 
and Domestic). 
Service Hire purchase, installment.Mosharakat 
Ja'alah 
Housing (Construction and Hire purchase, installment, Ja'alah 
Repairs) Qarz aWiasanah, Mosharakat (civil) 
direct investment 
Persona! needs Qarz al-hasaneh 
source: al-Tawhid (Quarterly Journal). Vol III. No 4. Julv^September 1986. 
Sazman-eTablighat-e Islaml.Tehran. Iran pp. 65-66. 
5.1.5 The Role of Bank Markazi 
The Law for Riba-Free Banking has empowered Bank Markazi (the Central Bank) 
to intervene in and supervise the monetary and banking activities through the 
following instruments: 
- Designation of various fields for investment and partnership within the 
framework of the approved economic policies. 
- Determination of the least expected rate of profit for various investment 
137 
partnerships according to the branches of activity. 
- Fixing a minimum and maximum ratio of profit for banks in their Mozaraba and 
Mosharakat activites corresponding to the different fields of activity. 
- Determination of the lowest and highest margin of profit for banks, as a 
proportion to the cost price of the goods transacted, in installment and hire 
purchase transactions. 
- Establishment of guidelines for advertisements by banks in respect of 
mobilizing and attracting deposits including determination of the types, 
amounts, minimum and maximum bonuses to depositors. 
- Fixing maximum rates of commission the banks are to charge for their services. 
- Determination of the lowest and highest ratios in all permissible financing and 
credit operation of the banks; also fixing the maximum amount of credit facility 
granted by banks to each applicant. 
Bank Markazi is also required to determine legal reserve requirements for 
various types of bank deposits of the banks; bank-by-bank credit ceilings on 
aggregate and sectoral credit; the minimum ratio of liquid assets to short-term 
liabilities; and the ratio of credit facilities granted by each bank to that bank's 
capital. Furthermore, Bank Marakazi is authorised to inspect and audit banks 
accounts and documents. It has also been placed with further responsiblity to 
devise additional regulations to enhance its supervisory role, whenever required, 
in order to safeguard banks from insolvency. 
Foreign Banks are prohibited from operating in Iran. However, they are 
allowed to establish 'representative offices' providing advisory services for 
Iranian clients mainly importers and banks. As a result, supervision of these 
banks by Bank Markazi is limited to ensuring that they comply with the 
regulations.21 
5.1.6 Assets and Liabilities 
It is too early to evaluate the full impact of the implementation of the Law for 
Riba-Free Banking. However, the availability of certain data permits the analysis 
of some aspects of Islamic Banking in Iran. 
On the liability side of the banking sytem, as can be noted in table 5.2, 
private sector deposits have grown since the enforcement of the law. Their 
growth during 1984/85 was limited to 5.7% but by March 1986 they grew rapidly 
by as much as 13.3%. These increases were due to the influence of surplus in 
the foreign exchange balance, the increased debts of the public sector to the 
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banking system and the rise in the balance of credit facilities awarded to the 
private sector. These expansionary effect were caused by the public sector's 
financial operations in spite of the goverment cuts in the budget. In 1986/87 as a 
result of the growth of liquidity, the deposits of the private sector with the banks 
rose by 20.5% to 8,080.0 billion rials in March 1987. 
Qarz al-hasaneh savings in March 1985 amounted to 3433.4 billiong rials 
which showed the enthusiasm of the public for Qarz al-hasaneh charity account. 
However, this account by March 1986 was reduced to 903.3 billion rials showing 
a decrease fo 39.6%. As for term deposits, between March 1985 and 1986 short 
term deposits almost doubled, while during the same period long term deposits 
inceased by 19.3%. 
The study of private sectors deposits in table 5.2 implies that three years after 
the implementation of the law, the banking system has been able to expand while 
converting its liabilities into Islamic forms and increasing Its absorption of 
deposits by 13% annually on average. This trend is still in effect and In the first 
five months following 21 March 1987, the volume of deposits inceased by 24.7% 
compared with the same period in the preceding years. This encouraging picture, 
however, tails to take account of the rising inflation. According to IMF figures, 
inflation for the year ended September 1984 was approximately 13% to 14% on 
an annualized basis.22 Inflation having gone down in 1984/85 and 1985/86 
picked up again in 1986/87. The growth of the consumer good and services 
price index for the above mentioned three years were 10.5, 4.1 and 20.8% 
(annual average growth 12.4%) respecitvely, while those of wholesale wre 7.6, 
5.5 and 23.5% (annual average growth 14.5%).23 In fact the rate of inflation was 
distorted by the reduced price indices of housing, clothes and heavy subsidising 
of food is believed to be much higher than the official figures. 
As can be noted, despite the nominal expansion of the private sector deposits, 
in real term it was depressed as a result of considerable inflationary effects on the 
national economy. 
On the asset side, the banking system was slower in converting its assets into 
Islamic forms. In 1985, from a total sum of 4,500.7 billion rials credits extended to 
the private sector, only 754.7 billion rials was in new banking faciltiies (table 5.3 
and chart 1). From this sum 591.3 billion rials were allocated from term 
investment deposits and the rest, 163.4 billion rials, from Qarz al-hasaneh 
deposits. Moreover, the share of commercial banks in granting new facilities was 
77.3% of the total while that of the specialised banks was 22.7%. This indicates 
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Table 5.2-Private Sector Deposits 1984-1987 (billion rials) 
Mm March 1984 
rivate sector deposits 5,600.0 
Sight (2,013.5) 
Nonsight (3,586.5) 
Old accounts 3,586.6 
Time deposits (849.3) 
Savings (2,737.3) 
Islamic accounts 
Qarz al-hasaneh savings 
Short term deposits 
Long term deposits 
March 1985 
5,918.3 
(2,509.0) 
(3,409.3) 
3,433.4 
(1,496.7) 
(938.3) 
(998.4) 
March 1996 
6,705.8 
(2,747.3) 
. (3,958.5) 
3,958.4 
(903.5) 
(1,863.4) 
(1,191.5) 
March 1987 
8,080.0 a 
Source :AI-Towhid (Quarterly Journal! Vol. III. No. 4. Julv-Sept 1986. 
Sazman-e Tabliahat-e Islami Tehran .Iran .p. 77. 
a Iran Year Book 88. p.208. 
I s ble 5.3-Credits To The Private Sector 1984-1987fbillion rials) 
March 1985 
4500.7 
(3746.0) 
(754.7) 
March 1986 
5081.2 a 
Mm March 1984 
Tc tal credits 4256.6 
Did credits and loans (4256.6) 
Commercial and specialised 
>anks) 
Islamic credits 
Commercial and specialised 
)anks) 
Source: Z.lqbal & A.Mirakhor. Islamic Banking^ In Iran & Pakistan. 
I.M.F Occasional Paper.No 49. Washington. 1987. p.13. a&b Iran 
- Year Book 88. p.2Q8. 
March 1987 
5823.0 b 
I - 1985; Hist year of Islamic Banking, Total allocation -754.7 billion rials (Commercial Banks 583.5 bDUon rials & Spedlised Banks 1712 billion rials) 
Allocation from 
Qarz al^ hasaneh Deposits 
163.4 billion rials 
1 1.3* 
17.8% 
10.4% 
32.8% 
Allocation from Term 
Investment Deposits 
3.5% 
3.7% 
1.1% 
19.4% 
• Mozaraba 
H Salaf transaction 
B Hire purchase 
El see Insert 
• Mosharakat 
B Instalment sale 
ID Qarz al-hasaneh 
Si Debt purchase 
0.3% Ja'alah 
0.6% Direct Investment 
02% Other 
591.3 billion rials 
fiwirftar 7 Ighal A A Mlrakhor. Islamic Banking tin Iran 
& Pakhtan) I M F. Occasional Panar. No.49. Washington. 1987.0.13 
1*H 
that the banking system in its first year of Islamic operation was able to use only 
30.5% of the available short and long term investment deposits (see table 5.2). In 
addition it demonstrates that a major proportion of the credit allocations to the 
private sector has been concentrated in short term facilities i.e. commercial and 
trade transactions. 
During 198571986 the pace of conversion from the old system to Islamic forms 
gathered momentum. The number of Islamic transactions in this year increased 
by 136% in comparison with the preceding year.24 The granting of the banking 
facilities to the private sector grew rapidly by 12.8% and 14.6% by March 1986 
and March 1987 respectively. Overall, since 1984 the scope of credit facilities to 
the private sector has increased by 11% annually on average as against 13% for 
the absorption of deposits. 
5.1.7 Conclusions and Implications 
Unlike many Islamic countires, Iran attempted to introduce full Islamic banking 
with a complete and once and for all transformation of its old system. Though it is 
too soon to discern fully the impact of adopting the new system, Iran has been 
able to replace the interest rate mechanism with non-interest based modes of 
financial transactions. 
So far there has been general acceptance of the new modes of finacing and 
depositing. Private sector deopsits have continued to rise by 13% annually on 
average, despite the shift from fixed interest returns to variable rates of return on 
deposit. However, this nominal growth contrasts with the rising inflation, 
estimated to be 13-14% on an annualized basis. In real terms it seems private 
sector deposits have decreased. Progress on the development of non-interest 
based modes of financing has been slower mainly due to the need for changes in 
the banks' procedures and delay in acquiring the new skills necessary for 
applying such modes. Since 1984, the credits awareded to the private sector 
have grown 11% annually on average. The private sector liquidity has grown to 
an unprecedented level during the recent years, contributing to the rising rate of 
lnflation.25 
Currently, the rate of profit paid on the term investment accounts is calculated 
by the Central Bank on the basis of the overall profits made by the banking 
system. As a result all depositors receive equal rates of profit according to their 
investment regardless of which bank they held on account with. In 1986/1987 
the rates of profit for short and long term investment accounts were 6% and 8.5% 
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respectively.26 
Iran, in the effective implementation of the new systems, has encountered 
difficulties and bottlenecks. The most important is the lack of trained personnel. 
This is partly a problem inherited from the old system where the rapid growth of 
the banking system in the years immediately before the revolution, did not allow 
orderly recruitment and training of bank personnel.27 Due to the principle of 
partnership and profit sharing, commercial banks are obliged to turn themselves 
into development banks, thereby becoming involved in the borrower's business 
and required a wider range of specialist expertise to evaluate and monitor 
projects progress, even more carefully than before. This means commerical 
banks with traditional specialisations in short term financing and credit facllties, 
attempt to attract trained personnel with expertise in terms of project evaluation 
and monitoring away from specialised banks. This exacerbates the personnel 
bottleneck problems. 
Another problem is the lack of legal framework that clearly specifies the 
domain and limitation of private property rights and of contract in accordance with 
Islamic banking. Despite the comprehensive law for banking, lack of a proper 
definition of property rights has strengthened the environment of uncertainty and 
limited long term investment in agricultural and industrial sectors. This had 
forced the banking system to concentrate its assets in short term transactions.28 
Government deficit financing also presents another problem. Financial 
transactions between and among elements of the public sector, including Bank 
Markazi and other banks can take place on the basis of a fixed rate of return. 
This fixed return is not viewed as interest. According to authorities in Iran, from 
the Sharia view point, the Central Bank and other organisations which are totally 
owned by the government, are all considered to be the government as a whole, 
therefore payment or receipt of any amount on deposits, loan or credits granted 
by the Central Bank to such organisations does not involve riba and are 
permissible. The reason being that such amounts are ultimately posted to 
government revenues on the one hand and to its expenditures on the other hand 
and consequently has no bearing whatsoever on the government resources.29 
In general, the banks in Iran virtually monopolise the country's economy. 
The Law for Riba-Free Banking does not apply to the operations of the banks 
outside Iran. In respect of foreign assets and liabilities, the banks continue to 
receive and pay interest as usual though in practice due to the existence of rigid 
exchange controls, the banks have few transactions abroad. As a result, they 
143 
cannot earn a steady interest by keeping their liquidity abroad. In fact the lack of 
access to any type of money market means no earnings for the banks' liquid 
assets. 
By being Islamic, the banks through Mozaraba, Mosharakat and forming their 
own companies are moving in the direction of becoming conglomerates. The 
Central Bank, unlike in the pre-revolutionary period, cannot control the money 
supply and therefore to some extent the growth of the economy by changing 
interest rates. With the elimination of the interest rates, one of the most basic 
instruments of the monetary policy has been wrested out of the Central Bank's 
hand, while the rest of the classical tools have been retained in the current laws 
and regulations. In place of interest rates as a tool, the Central Bank has been 
vested with mechanisms (see the role of Bank Markazi) to achieve the intended 
goals of monetary or credit policies. In addition, the Central Bank can engage in 
discounting in a specific form, i.e. redemption of debt, though not much 
experience has been gained by using utilisation of this mechanism. The Central 
Bank by using this mechanism can discount certificate of indebtedness relating to 
the credits granted by the banks and play the role of rediscount rate as seen in 
traditional banking.3o Moreover the Central Bank can also conduct open market 
operation in order to influence the market liquidity and ultimately the volume of 
banking credit. In the absence of an interest rate, by fixing the values of 
commercial papers for buying or selling from the market, the same result as the 
interest rate can be expected. 
Overall the primary instrument of control In Iran before and after the revolution 
has been credit allocation, through which monetary policy and development 
policy objectives are co-ordinated. There has been no substantial change in the 
general objective and function of the Central Bank, but controls have become 
stronger since the introduction of the new law. 
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5.2 PUBLIC FINANCE AND BUDGET 
In pre-revolutionary Iran, the public sector was large and grew larger each year, 
more rapidly than the private sector. In 1970/71 government outlays made up 
27% of GNP and by 1975/76 it surpassed 48%. Likewise, during the same 
period, the public sector share in gross domestic fixed capital investment rose 
fron 60% to nearly 66%.si On the whole, the private sector did not have a 
significant effect on productive capital formation. One reason was perhaps that 
a large proportion of private investment was concentrated in private housing 
which only indirectly raised the productive capacity of the country. 
The private sector was either excluded or not sufficiently attracted to sectors 
such as agriculture, transport, energy and fuel. This in turn was partly linked 
to the shortcomings of the public sector itself in not building up a solid public 
infrastructure which could have facilitated and encouraged large scale private 
investment in those sectors.32 However, in the revised Fifth Plan in an effort to 
enlarge the country's productive capacity and in the light of 'big-push' strategy, 
certain strides were made. Inevitably, the private sector was given the 
opportunity for increased fixed capital investment, particularly in housing and 
industry, though Its total planned share represented 33.6% of the whole 
investment.33 In general the authorities relied heavily on the public sector to 
accelerate the rate of growth for the fulfilment of many social goals and the 
overall development of the country. 
5.2.1 The Public Sector after the Revolution 
The 1979 revolution brought about an enormous growth in the size and role of 
the public sector. The revolutionary government, by taking over large sectors of 
the economy through nationalisation and expropriation, has greatly diminished 
the economic role of the private sector. However, since 1979, policies 
regarding the relative functions of private and public sectors have regained 
some ground, yet the significance of the private sector, particularly in the face of 
the Gulf war, remained unchanged. Any future change in the functions of the 
public sector dependes as much on the political philosophy of the ruling clerics 
as their view of Islamic economic principles. 
Nonetheless, the Constitution of the islamic Republic recognises three 
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ectors in its economic system, public , co-operative and private. The public 
sector includes " all large scale and major industries, foreign trade, major 
mineral resources, banking, insurance, energy, dams and large scale 
Irrigation networks, radio and television, port, telegraphic and telephone 
services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like".34 All these are to 
be owned and administered by the state. The co-operative sector only 
concerns co-operative enterprises engaged In production and distribution. 
The private sector activities are limited to agriculture, industry, trade and 
services to supplement the economic activities of the public and co-operative 
sectors. 
5.2.1 The First Post Revolutionary Budget 
The first budget for the Iranian year March 1979 to march 1980 took several 
months to be drawn up and was repeatedly amended. In practice, the budget 
was formulated on a monthly basis and the projected figure for the whole year 
was set at around $34 billion, just half the target set the previous year by the 
government under the Shah. 
In the fall of 1978, in a futile attempt to win support among civil servants and 
others, the Shah's government increased salaries and benefits worth $3 billion 
a year.35 These promised increases constituted one of the major items in the 
new government's expenditure; as were payments for projects and equipment 
ordered by the Shah, but cancelled by the new regime. 
Despite the economic and financial disruption under the revolution, foreign 
exchange reserves appeared healthy. When the revolutionaries came to 
power, Iran's reserves stood at $12,839 billion in February 1979.36 This figure 
increased to $14,561 billion at the end of the same year by obstructing the flight 
of capital and relative improved levels of oil exports immediately after the 
revolution. The government continued with the foreign exchange restrictions 
which had been introduced during the last few months of the Shah's rule.37 A 
ceiling of $3000 was imposed on each person leaving the country. Despite 
these measures, the country's reserves were expected to drop as payments 
resumed for imports halted during the months of turmoil. As a result of the U.S. 
embassy hostages, all Iranian assets held in the U.S.A. were frozen by 
President Carter in November 1979.38 Early in 1980, as a precautionary 
measure, Iran moved its assets in Western Europe to banks in Switzerland and 
to banks belonging to Libya and Algeria. 
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5.2.3 The Budget for 1980/81 
The budget for the above year, announced in May, was set at $40.0 billion 
Including a $6.5 billion deficit. The main revenues from oil and taxes were 
projected to $24.5 billion and $8.0 billion respectively. Development spending 
was anticipated at $14 billion and current spenring at over $26.0 billion. 
Various other expenditure made up the balance.39 
In general, the post revolutionary period in Iran witnessed a rapid increase 
in current government expenditure. This was in part due to the expansion of 
the bureaucracy in mushrooming revolutionary orginisations such as the 
Revolutionary Guards, Revolutionary Committees, the Revolutionary Tribunals 
the Foundation for the Oppressed, the Martyr Foundation, the Reconstruction 
Crusade and the like. At the same time, the government was allocating large 
sums to sustain failing industries, subsidise food imports, reduce 
unemployment and provide various services. For instance, the government was 
paying 2500 workers at Sarchesmeh copper works and 12000 workers at 
Ahvaz Pipe and Rolling Mills, even though both projects were idle.4o 
The worsening situation was compounded by the outbreak of war in 
September 1980, adding further strains on the country's economy and raising 
the level of current expenditure even more. In practice, the deficit came to 
$12.0 billion mainly because of the drop in oil revenues by 50% (see tables 5.4 
and 5.5 for comparison). 
Tabla 5.4- Government Budget (Actual Rariapts And Eypanriltura) 
(billion rials, years ending 20 March) 
Reeiepts: 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Taxes 368.3 340.4 554.1 613.9 796.5 898.7 
Oil and Gas 1.219.9 888.8 1,056.4 1,689.5 1,779.4 1,373.2 
Other 111.6 96.7 159.6 198.5 197.8 442.9 
Total Receipts 1.699.6 1,325.9 1,770.1 2,501.9 2,773.7 2.714.B 
Expenditure; 
Current payments 1,552.0 1,727.8 2,032.4 2,293.9 2,549.3 2,475.6 
Others a 675.9 570.6 674.7 943.5 1,163.5 878.0 
Total expenditure 2,227.9 2,298.4 2,707.1 3,237.4 3,712.8 3353.6 
Surplus or Deficit • 528.3 -972.5 -937.0 -735.0 -939.1 -638.8 
Source : Central Bank of Iran: E1U Country Profile 1988-89 
a Includes Special Payments 
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Tabel 5.5 - Govarmant Budget Estimates 
(billoins rials; years ending 20 March) 
fifijfflDJjfi: 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Taxes 418.2 544.4 666.3 720.7 
Oil and Gas 1,754.0 1.533.0 1,489.2 1,996.0 
Government Enter 
-prise 
36.1 135.7 234.0 69.0 
Sales of Goods 
and Services 
30.8 30.2 79.4 190.7 
Miscellaneous 150.7 157.8 167.3 240.1 ... 
Foreign and Domestic 
Borrowings 
37.1 61.0 37.6 25.0 
Interest on Loans to 
Foreign Countries 
55.6 
4 
Other 240.0 702.3 430.8 485.5 ... 
Total 2,722.5 3.164.4 3,10*6 3,727.0 
* 
3.623.1 
Expenditure: 
Public Services 264.0 ••• 392.7 393.4 ... 
Defence Affairs 365.1 351.2 355.7 ... 
Social Affairs 521.2 ... 1,028.9 1,272.1 ... 
Economic Affairs 967.8 919.0 957.0 
... 
Miscellaneous ••• ... 612.1 624.2 ... 
Interest and Service 
Charges on Loans 
••• 23.9 18.0 ... 
Repayment of Loans & 
Debts 
* •* ••• 111.1 97.5 
Investment 
Abroad,Loans & Aids mmm 5.0 10.0 ... 
Total 2.118.1 3,165.9 3.443.9 3,727.9 3,893.1 
Social Affairs: Education, Health, Welfare and Housing, 
Economic Affairs:lndustry, Electricity and Agriculture 
Source: The Middle East and North Africa. Europe 
Publications I td.. London. Various Years 
Tabta S B - Gnvammant Rurioet Estimates 
(billion rials, years ending 20 March) 
Revenue: 1985/86 1986/871 1987/88] Expenditure: 1985/861 1986/87] 1987/88 
Taxes 1,138.2 1,169.8 1,139.4 War Expenditure 400,0 430.0 700.0 
Oil 1,867.0 1,600.0 857.4 War Reconstruction 50.0 35.0 ... 
Sales of Foreign 119.0 111.0 Fixed Investment 1,085.8 949.2 704.0 
Exchange 
Repayment of Foreign Loans 33.8 24.5 
Other 396.3 424.2 629.9 
Current Expenditure 2,305.3 2.341.3 2.267.0 
Special Income 259.9 269.7 299.8 
FromSpeciai Income 259.9 269.7 299.8 
Deficit Finance 354.4 475.0 974.3 
Last Year's Return - - 70.0 
i 
Total 4,134.8 4,049.7 3,970.8 
I 
4,134.8 4,049.7 3,970.8 
Source : The Middle East and North Africa. Europe Publication Ltd.. London.1987: Iran Year Book 88 
5.2.4 Erosion of the Reserves 
As noted earlier, Iran's foreign exchange reserves in 1980 were relatively 
healthy. However, in 1981, the combination of three factors eroded the 
country's foreign exchange position. They were, the settlement of the hostage 
crisis, the Gulf war and the growing oil glut on the world market. 
The hostages held since November 1979 were finally released in January 
1981, but ultimately, the financial settlement came to dominate the agreement 
between Iran and the U.S.A. The American government unblocked a total of 
$11.1 billion assets held by the banks in the U.S.A. and U.S. banks abroad. 
However, of the total assets, $ 3.7 billion was used by cover syndicated loans to 
Iran by American and other banks. Another $ 1.4 billion was set aside to cover 
the repayment of unsyndicated loans and $3.2 billion was earmarked for 
possible claims against Iranian assets by U.S. companies and other entities. 
As a result, $ 2.8 billion immediately was transferred to Iran and the country 
gave up at one stroke, $ 8.3 billion of its foreign exchange assets.4i 
In addition to the damage and destruction, the Gulf war imposed a heavy 
financial burden on the country. According to the government estimates, the 
149 
cost of the war for the first six months was $ 2.6 billion. These difficulties were 
exacerbated, particularly in the second half of 1981, by the growing oversupply 
of oil in world markets and a lowering of prices. Iranian crude prices ($37 for 
light In early January 1981) was unrealistic under those conditions.42 
As a result of these factors, Iran's foreign exchange at the end of 1981 
dipped seriously to $1,102 billion - three months before the official submission 
of the budget for 1981/82. Within a year however, the recovery of oil revenues 
in 1982 introduced confidence as foreign exchange rose to $5,287 billion.43 
5.2.5 Debate on the Budget for 1981/82 
In April 1981, one month into the new calendar year, Prime Minister Rajai 
proposed a $44.0 billion budget.44 Besides covering the costs of the war, 
meeting current expenditure and paying the social services, the budget 
reflected the government's hopes of stimulating the weak economy. The budget 
was balanced on several unreal assumptions.Oil exports were to be boosted to 
twice the current 1.3 million barrels per day. 
Military expenditure was expected to drop to an average of $610 million per 
month from $1.1 billion per month of the interim budget announced in early 
March; and the non-oil revenue from taxes and state-owned firms were 
envisioned to rise.45 Moreover, substantial sums were allocated to 
revolutionary organisations, such as the Reconstruction Crusade, which was 
given a budget of $1 billion, and the new budget for the Revolutionary Guards 
was almost fifty percent more than the previous year's level. All these 
organisations were not subject to the government audit or other financial 
checks.46 
These features of the budget were criticised by President Bani Sadr, many 
members of the Majlis and the governor of the Central Bank. The focus of 
criticism was on proposed oil exports and oil revenues. Increasing oil 
production was seen as a reversion to the policies of the Shah and of providing 
cheap oil for the industrial states of the West. Bani Sadr stated that this action 
would "pose a real danger to the independence of the country and intensifies 
the vicious circle of poverty and dependence"^ He also described the budget 
as inflationary, whereby the government would be forced to expand the money 
supply and aggravate the existing serious inflation - officially 27% but estimated 
by independent economists at over 40%. 
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Due to unrealistic assumptions, there appeared no simple way to finance 
the budget without borrowing, contrary to the Prime Minister's claim that it 
would be a non-deficit budget. The usual recourse of third world 
governments, loans from large Western banks, was not a possibility for 
revolutionary Iran under the circumstances. The $12.0 billion deficit of 1980/81 
was financed largely by reducing foreign exchange reserves and in part 
covered by expanding the money supply. The latter was expanded by some 
$5.4 billion (over 25%) between September 1980 and March 1981. The 
Central Bank also lent to public sector banks and firms over $1 billion with 
much the same effect. Faced with difficulties, the government talked about a 
sale of bonds to the public but this was dropped, partly due to the 
government's lack of credibility, but also because of ideological objections 
against payment of interest. As indicated by Bani Sadr, in September 1980 
some $2.8 billion had been withdrawn from Iranian banks over the previous 
three months.48 A devaluation of the rial as an alternative was also discussed. 
However, it was realised that devaluation raised government oil revenues in 
rials but has no effect on the dollar cost of purchases abroard. Moreover, it 
would have added to inflation and rasied the cost of the government's domestic 
purchases. Therefore, a devaluation was precluded as it was thought that K 
would contribute only marginally and temporarily to solving the budget crisis. 
In practice, allocations to government organisations were made on the basis 
of a temporary budget of 200 billion rials (over $2.5 billion) per month. In fact 
the government did not follow any precise plan for expenditure. Instead the 
money was spent in a random fashion in order to meet the immediate crises. 
An increasing amount of finance was channelled into the war. In May 1981, 
according to government officials, it was costing in excess of 600 million rials 
(about $7.5 million) per day in cash outlay alone. In mid June, earnings from 
oil fell short of the target and there appeared little prospect for Implementation 
of any long term plans. In July 1981, the Majlis reduced total allocation from 
$44.0 billion to $37 billion. Some $2 billion (about 1/3) was cut from defence 
expenditure and $3.1 billion(about 1/4) from the development plan. An overall 
5% cut in the expenditure of government departments was also demanded. 
Even so, a deficit of $8.5 billion was anticipated^ In fact the deficit came to 
about $11.5 billion. 
Though actual oil and tax revenue, compared with 1980/81 increased but oil 
receipts fell short of Its target for 1981/82 by 31% (tables 5.4& 5.5). The 
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persisting heavy war expenditure and poor performance in oil exports were the 
chief causes of the deficit. 
5.2.6 Budget Trends from 1982/83 to 1987/88 
For the year 1982/83, the government proposed a $39.0 billion budget to the 
Majlis. Revenues were estimated at $31.9 billion leaving a deficit of $7.1 
billion. As in the past, oil income anticipated $19.0 billion was to finance the 
major part of the budget. In this budget, reconstruction of war damage was 
given priority and much emphasis was placed on restoring the agricultural and 
industrial base in order to Increase employment, limit imports and reduce 
dependency on oil. The budget also assumed a high level of recovery in the oil 
sector from the serious fall in oil revenues in 1980 and 1981. 
The government was anxious to play down the overall cost of the war. 
However, it was widely believed that the cost had risen substantially. In 
October 1982, a supplementary budget of $4.8 billion was approved and 
increases were to the war and war reconstruction ($1.8 billion), current 
government expenditure ($1.2 billion ), and the remainder for infrastructure 
projects.so Despite increased oil and tax revenue, the actual deficit surpassed 
its anticipated sum by about $2.0 billion (table 5.4) 
5.2.6.1 1983/84 
The budget for 1983/84 totalled an estimated $42.4 billion. Some 30% of that 
was to be spent on the war effort. A component of this budget was the First Five 
Year Development Plan of Islamic Republic covering the period 1983/84 -
1987/88. This plan foresaw the development of the Iranian economy, even 
under war conditions, providing oil revenues continued to flow (for details see 
chapter 4 - Planning). However, the confidence that the government showed 
in the plan was misplaced. The plan was criticised by the Majlis and returned 
to the government for revision. The actual deficit for this year came to about 
$11.7 billion. 
5.2.6.2 1984/85 
The budget for 1984/85 which was presented to the Majlis in November 1983, 
proposed total expenditure of $48.3 billion with the development budget at the 
same levels in 1983/84 but current and defence expenditure increased by 18% 
at current prices. The revenues were projected at $44.6 billion of which oil and 
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gas were to provide $23.3 billion, 7% more than in the previous year. The war 
related allocations totalled some 31% of the entire budget expenditure. 
Imports were to be held at $20 billion against $22 billion the previous year. 
The government allowed for a deficit of $3.6 billion. 
The budget proposals ran into opposition in the Majlis. It was realised that 
many of the detailed proposals were unrealistic and clearly the result of the 
relative strength of various minlsteries competing for scarce resources rather 
than rational plan. The Majlis also considered that the growing dependence on 
imports to be an important factor contributing to inflation. At the end of 1984, 
the Prime Minister announced that inflation had dropped to 12.8% as against 
16% at the end of 1983. According to IMF figures, inflation for the year ended 
September 1984 was approximately 13% -14% on an annualised basis.si 
Although there existed a considerable variation between town and country 
and between different towns in respect of inflation, it was said that official 
Iranian statistics, distorted by subsidies and based on an unrepresentative 
basket of goods, underestimate Inflation by a factor of at least 100% when real 
rents and free market purchases are taken into account. Moreover, inflation in 
Iran was highly vulnerable to accelerated growth as a result of an intensification 
of the war effort. Overall as a result of the Majlis opposition the budget proposal 
was cut by 15 percent. 
5.2.6.3 1985/86 
A budget of $42.0 billion for the year 1985/86 envisaged a 25% fall In the 
deficit, compared with the previous year's projected level. Again one third of the 
budget was devoted to the war effort and war related costs (see table 5.6 ). 
Education received the next largest sectoral allocation. The budget was cut by 
the Majlis to $38.3 billion, almost the entire reduction being made in the current 
expenditure. The cut was due to the expected fall in oil revenues.52 
In fact, in 1985/86, the production of Iranian crude oil went up by about 2.5 
million barrels per day. In spite of the rise in the production, exports of crude oil 
and Its products fell to 1.5 million barrels per day on average. This was 
because the consumption of oil products rose rapidly by 10%, most of which 
was provided by the output of domestic refineries. 
The lower volume of oil exports and price had a notable impact on the 
government revenue. As a result only 80% of projected revenue was realised. 
With the share of oil falling, the share of tax revenue rose about 6% compared 
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with 1984/85 (see table 5.8). The growth in tax revenue mainly resulted from 
increased corporate taxes and taxes on consumption and sales of goods.53 
Despite the depredations suffered as a result of the Gulf war, Iran succeeded 
in increasing its foreign reserves In 1984/85. However, in 1985/86 in spite of 
reduced foreign exchange allocations for importing goods, the effect of a sharp 
decline in oil revenue reduced foreign bank deposits by some $2.6 billion. 
Figures released by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) showed that 
Iran's foreign bank deposits at the end of 1986 amounted to $4.9 billion 
compared with $7.5 billion in 1985 and $6.4 billion In 1984. In fact, since the 
U.S.A/S seizure of Iran's assets, the country has suffered from relative financial 
isolation, which has reduced its options for investment diversifications. At the 
same time, the country needed to keep liquidity high in order to finance heavy 
war expenditures 
In 1985/86 the private sector liquidity grew rapidly by 13% as a result of 
increased banking credits to the private sector and the rise In the debts of the 
public sector to the banking system.55 The growth in the volume of liquidity has 
been a contributory factor in the rising rate of the inflation in the last few years. 
5.2.6.4 1986/87 
Against this background, the budget for 1986/87, with total spending of $50.6 
billion was presented to the Majlis. It provided a 12.5% increase for defence 
and strengthening of the defence industry, while allocations to other sections 
were to be lower than those for 1985 /86. In a debate, the budget was criticised 
for not fully taking into account the rapid fall in oil prices.se Apart from the 
government's optimistic view of oil revenues, there was also the additional 
problem of accumulated deficits on foreign exchange receipts. 
As predicted by the Majlis in 1986/87 the rapid fall in oil price, combined with 
reduced value of exports, left a strong impact on the government revenues. 
Consequent^, only half the projected revenues were realised, a fall of 36% in 
comparison with 1985/86. The government paid special attention to raise the 
exports of goods other than oil but the increase in those exports was small in 
comparison with the shortfalls caused by the lower oil revenues. Moreover the 
total tax revenue had a slight fall 0.8%, compared with 1985/86.57 
In 1986/87 the Iranian economy was facing an unprecedented foreign 
exchange crisis. This caused a considerable fall in foreign assets, an increased 
rate of inflation and unemployment. The damages to economic installations 
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caused by floods in some parts of the country were among the other economic 
problems.. 
Iran's policy as proclaimed after the revolution has been not to increase its 
indebtedness to foreign banks. Its debts to BIS has been reduced from $2.7 
billion In 1981 to $1.4 billion in 1986. As long as this policy continues - though 
political factors limits the chance to raise funds in any case - Iran's room for 
manoeuvering will become increasingly limited by a lack of foreign exchange. 
Providing Iran uses Its foreign exchange at the same rate as in 1986, $220 
million per month, Its net foreign bank deposits were expected to be as tow as 
$1.0 billion at end of 1987, which is a dangerous level.58 
In spite of the fall in foreign exchange assets, owing to the massive deficits in 
general budget and the government's borrowing from the banking system, the 
growth of liquidity was 19.1%, as against 11% which was fixed at the begining 
of the Iranian year, 21 March 1986. This rapid rise in liquidity together with the 
stagnation in production caused considerable inflationary effects on the 
economy. The inflation rate which had come down in 1985/86 began to rise 
again in 1986/87.59 
It is noteworthy that against many predictable problems and contrary to 
expectations, the Majlis in March 1986 increased the planned expenditure of 
the 1986/87 budget to $51.3 billion with a projected oil revenue of $18.6 billion. 
Most of the spending increase was allocated to defence, and the steel and 
nuclear industries.eo 
5.2.6.5 1987/88 
The general budget for this year, passed by the Majlis in March 1987, 
amounted to $49.6 billion ($1 =80 rials) with oil revenue accounting for 21.6% 
of the total projected receipts. Taxation and domestic borrowing constituted 
28.7% and 24.5% of income for the general budget of the government. 
Due to the drastic drop in oil revenue in 1986/87, the government made 
efforts to reduce the dependence of budget revenues on oil to some extent, but 
the reduced oil revenue has raised the borrowing from the banking system. 
Even though the ratio of borrowings in 1987/88 is less than 1986/87, it is still 
high in comparison with the ratios for 1984/85 and 1985/86. 
In contrast to 1986/87 the government financial state improved during the 
first three months of 1987/88 as a result of increased oil revenue and the slight 
reduction in the government's payments. In all the government's revenue 
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increased by 29% in the first half of the Iranian year (21 March - 21 September 
1987), compared with the corresponding period in 1986. 
However the government efforts to check this current expenditure was not 
successful with the continuation of the Gulf war. Current expenditure absorbed 
nearly 75% of the total expenditure. The government's proposed figure for the 
war current expenditure, (excluding war development expenditure) was raised 
to $8.75 billion as against $5.4 billion in 1985/86. As a result the ratio of total 
war expenditure to the total government expenditure rose from 32% in 1986/87 
to more than 34% in 1987/88.61 
5.2.7. Taxation 
The revenue of government in Iran has been dependent upon income earned 
from the operations of the oil industry. Although this dependency has been 
exacerbated by the Gulf war, the Islamic government aims to reduce its reliance 
on oil income. For the attainment of this long term objective, the government 
has placed more emphasis on tax earnings. 
In the past, tax collection was a haphazard process, which usually meant 
that employees on fixed incomes absorbed an outsized proportion of the 
burden. At present, the Islamic government is seeking to spread the burden to 
the private sector in order to boost revenue and secure taxation justice in the 
country. 
The Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance stated in 1985" the ratio on tax 
payment of employers to employees is 30 to 100 and unless employers pay 
30% of employees share, justice will not be achieved in society and people 
with low incomes will be paying social expenditure of the affluents".62 
The bazaaris, numbering 2.5 million people, are classed as self employed, 
and account for only 2.8% of all tax revenues. This compares with 7% from 
employees on fixed incomes. Taxation is a religious issue in Iran and many 
bazaaris prefer to pay Khoms - a tax of 1/5th to the clerics of their own 
choosing. Many conservatives in parliament, especially supporters of the 
bazaaris, argue that taxation apart from religiously required taxes are against 
Sharia and can only be applied in case of emergency for a specified period. 63 
In essence, the taxation policy in Iran is to raise non-oil based tax and 
ensure fairer distribution of income. But the whole issue has been bound up 
with the government's attitude towards the private sector and its role in the 
economy. The authorities are still vague about its freedom of investment though 
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Table S.7 . Taxation Ravanua 1973/74 - 1982/83 
(billion rials years ending 20 March) 
Average Growth 
1973/74 1977/78 1978/79 1982/83 73/74-77/78 78/79-82/82 
Direct Tax 52.9 230.2 269.5 295.5 44.4 2.3 
Taxes on Companies (28.8) (160.2) (200.1) (173.9) 53.6 -3.4 
Income Tax (18.6) (57.4) (58.4) (96.8) 32.5 13.3 
Tax on Capital (5.5) (12.6) (11.0) (24.8) 23.0 32.5 
Indirect Taxes 78.2 213.4 196.4 318.4 28.5 12.8 
Tax on Imports (60.6) (169.3) (143.7) (217.5) 29.2 10.9 
Tax on Consumption 
and Sales 
(17.6) (44.1) (52.7) (100.9) 27.3 17.6 
Totals 131.1 443.6 465.9 613.9 35.6 7.1 
Source : Iran Almanac 1987 
Table 5.8 - Ratio of Tax Ftovftrme 
Year 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 
4 Ratio of Tax 
Revenue to 
Total Revenue 
21.7 25.7 31.3 24.5 28.7 33.1 39.0 58.0 
Ratio of Tax 
Revenue to 
Total Expenditure 
16.5 14.8 20.5 18.9 21.4 26.8 30.8 32.4 
Sources: E.I.U.. Country Profile 1988.89 ; Iran Year Book 88 
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in general, the current government policies appear to be pro private enterprise. 
Table 5.7 shows the comparison of tax revenue and its growth In the years 
before and immediately after the revolution. However, it should be noted that 
the total tax revenue after the revolution, dipped from 465.9 billion rials in 
1978/79 to 368.3 and 340.4 billion rials in 1979/80 and 1980/81 respectively 
before rising to 554.1 billion rials in 1981/82 ( see table 5.4). The trend of 
increased taxation (except for 1986/87) has continued since. 
The amount of tax collected for 1985/86 was 1033 billion rials which showed 
an increase of 14.9% compared with 1984/85.64 In the year 1986/87 the tax 
revenue amounted to a total of 1024.5 billion rials showing a slight fall in 
comparison with the preceding year.es This was due to the reduced oil revenue 
which influenced the government's income from other sources, including tax 
revenue. For example, customs revenue fell considerably owing to reduced 
imports and the halting of many productive and service activities. During 
1986/87, of the total amount stated above, 579.6 billion rials was direct taxes 
and 444.9 billion rials in indirect taxes. This was a departure from the usual 
composition of taxes levied. Traditionally indirect taxation had been the main 
source of fiscal revenue in Iran. In fact during 1986/87 the government 
managed to increase collection of direct taxes by 11% and reduced the share 
of indirect taxes, including taxes on imports, consumption and sale of goods by 
the same percentage. In this year, the highest rise in tax income came from 
income tax and the lowest from import tax. The rapid rise of tax on business by 
50% influenced the process substantially. 
The latest figure for 1987/88 show that tax revenue has been rising and the 
figures for the first three months showed a 12% increase over the 
corresponding period in the previous year. The rise was mainly due to the 
increase in direct tax collection again.66 Overall, between 1983/84 and 
1986/87 the country's tax revenue grew by 9% annually on average. 
As can be noted from table 5.8 due to the government's efforts to raise tax 
collections, the ratio of the tax revenue to the total income increased for two 
years following the revolution. With higher oil revenue in 1982/83 the ratio fell 
to 24.5% and 28.7% respectively. The subsequent lower oil receipts changed 
the composition of the government's revenue, raising the share of tax revenue 
from 33.1% in 1984/85 to a drastic growth of 58% in 1986/87. However, the 
ratio Is estimated to fall to 28% in 1987/88. The oil revenue has picked up in the 
first three months of the Iranian year -21 March to 21 June 1987-in strong 
158 
contrast to the same period in the preceding year, Increasing by 100% over that 
period.67 • 
It is evident from table 5.8 that the ratio of tax revenue to the government's 
expenditure after fluctuations immediately after the revolution, has increased 
steadily since 1982/83, though the total expenditure itself increased at a faster 
rate. Needless to say, the Iran - Iraq war's expenditure was an important factor 
contributing to the increased expenditure. 
As mentioned earlier, an abnormality in Iran's taxation system is the high 
ratio of the salary tax compared with that of bazaaris and businesses. In an 
effort to amend this situation, the government in 1987/88 has lowered the 
salary tax in order to compensate for the reduced purchasing power of the 
salaried groups. At the same time, measures were taken to increase collection 
of business tax. It is noteworthy that due to the growth in the rate of inflation, the 
real wage and salary index of industrial workers has been lowered to less than 
50, taking 1979/80 as the index year of 100.68 
5.2.8 Summary and Conclusion 
Budgets are prepared by the Plan and Budget Organisation in association with 
various ministeries but ratified only by the Majlis, whose aquiesance in budget 
arragements is not to be taken for granted. The Majlis traditionally considers 
government spending to be excessive and inflationary. Iran was operating a 
war economy and as a result, its entire financial system had been geared to the 
needs and demand of the war. 
Since the revolution, there has been growing discrepancies between 
government budget estimates, approved estimates and actual expenditure, 
(see budget tables). 
The deficit has grown alarmingly since 1980 despite efforts to control it. The 
Majlis has expressed concerns about the continuing high level of budget 
deficits, and the heavy borrowing from the Central Bank to finance these 
deficits. The government total debt, including borrowing from state 
organisations was estimated to be about 3,000 billion rials ($38 billion) In 
1985.69 
The excessive growth rate of liquidity has been an acute problem for the 
Iranaian economy since the Revolution. The volume of the private sector 
liquidity has grown 102 times between 1977/1978 and 1987/1988 from 100 
billion rials to 10,200 billion rials. Efforts to fix the growth rate has not been 
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successful as a result of the deficits in the general budgets of the government 
and its reliance on the banking system for meeting the deficits. The ratio of 
borrowings to total receipts of the government was 17.6% in 1983/1984. 
During 1984/1985 and 1985/1986 it came under some control and was 
reduced to 9% and 9.8% respectively. However in 1986/1987 as a result of a 
drastic fall in oil revenue it shot up to 34.5%. Although the ratio fell to 24.5% in 
1987/1988, it is still comparatively high.7o 
. In addition to high ratios of borrowing, the growth in the amount of credits 
awarded to the private sector by the banks has exacerbated the liquidity 
problem. All these factors plus the costs of the war, the reduced oil revenue in 
1985/1986 and 198671987, the fallen exchange rate of the dollar and the world 
inflation rate - which has left its impact on domestic inflation through imports -
have contributed to rising inflation rates. 
The war budget is understated in budget estimates. As can be noted from 
the tables, it varies between 10% to 17% for various years. In fact, over 30% of 
state finances are entirely devoted to the war and military expenditures. There 
has also been an increase in government current expenditure, partly due to the 
war and because of mushrooming revolutionary organisations, often parallel to 
those inherited from the Shah's era, e.g. Revolutionary Guards and Armed 
Forces, Reconstruction Crusade and the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, 
financing failing industries and subsidisation of growing food imports has 
added another dimension to the increasing current expenditure. 
The ratios of current expenditure to total government outlays during the 
period 1983/1984 - 1987/1988 were 64.8%; 65.7%; 70.5%; 64%; and 74.7% 
respectively. The rise in the current expenditure automatically reduced the 
development expenditure. Hence investment for employment of the potential 
labour force and the posssibility of increasing the economic-productive 
potential have diminished. 
The ratios of development expenditure to the total expenditure on the whole 
has fallen after the Revolution. In the period 1983/1984 -1987/1988 they were 
29.5%; 29%£1.2%; 29.6%; and 17.7% respectively.?! 
Iran is an oil based economy, oil revenue being the main source of income. 
In the last few years the government has made efforts to reduce dependence of 
budget revenue on oil to some extent. The reduced oil prices and the lower oil 
exports have also helped the objective. During 1979/1980 - 1982/1983 the 
actual receipts from oil constituted an average 66.5% of the government total 
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revenue (see table 5.4). 
However, this ratio was reduced to 48,2% in the period 198371984 -
1985/1986 and to 21% in 1986/1987. It should be noted that the oil revenue 
during 1983/1984 - 1986/1987 were $24 billion; $19 billion; $15.5 billion and 
$6.6 billion respectively, a considerable fall in a four year period.72 
Because of Iran's policy of non-borrowing policy from foreign countries, its 
financial manoeuvrability is very much dependent on its reserves. Due to the 
combination of various factors, including the war and the sharp decline in oil 
prices, foreign exchange dipped to a dangerously low level, $1,102 billion in 
1981. After a relatively healthy period the trough was anticipated to repeat itself 
in 1987. Since the revolution, there has been an accumulation of the deficit on 
foreign exchange receipts. Because of a mounting budget deficit carried over 
from year to year, the government tends to sustain expenditure by means of 
various short term devices including advance drawing on reserves. In following 
this practice, the defence and current expenditure budgets have virtually taken 
all available foreign exchange resources of the country. 
The actual tax revenue, following an initial dip after the revolution, has risen 
steadily with the exception of 1986/1987 when the revenue decreased slightly. 
Taxation policy under the Islamic government aims at increasing the non-oil tax 
base in order to reduce the government's reliance on oil income. The tax 
burden in Iran is still tilted against the salaried people and consumers as a 
whole. However, In 1987 the government took measures to amend the 
situation by reducing the salary tax. This measure plus distribution of staple 
commodities through rationing system and placing strong checks on prices are 
aimed to reduce the pressure of inflation on the lower and middle classes. 
The government has been trying to extend the tax burden to the private 
sector but the attitude of the radical clerics towards the role of this sector is 
questionable. Nevertheless, the Islamic government emphasizes taxation 
justice. This implies taxation on affluent groups of society, including the 
bazaaris. Increasing taxes has been a political minefield. Supporters of the 
bazaaris in the Majlis have raised religious objections to many of the new 
proposed taxes since the revolution. To amend this situation, recently a 
parliamentary resolution has required the guild unions to cooperate with the 
government for working out the tax rates to be levied on various businesses. 
Moreover, the authorities have recently been working on a new scheme to levy 
value added tax. 
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To sum up, the reduced oil revenues in the last four years has raised the 
government borrowing from the banking systems. The impact of the budget 
deficit so compensated for by borrowing is clear on the rising rate of inflation. In 
respect of deficit finance the government increased taxation steadily. Due to 
the strong linkage between foreign exchange reserve and oil reports, the 
government expenditure in respect of imports depended on the fluctuation in 
the amount of oil revenues. 
Finally, oil revenues and budget policies of the government determine the 
monetary base in the Iranian economy. As noted before, since the revolution 
the budget has increasingly relied on the Central Bank financing. In 1973 the 
three components of the monetary base (net foreign assets, the Central Bank 
claims against the government and the Central Bank claims agains the banking 
system) were respectively 54.6%, 28.3% and 17.2% of the total. Since then 
there has been a major shift in the composition of the monetary base. In 1984 
the same components were 19.5%, 68.1% and 12.4%. Also the monetary 
multiplier, which can be used to influence monetary policy, remained stable. All 
these, lead to the conclusion that fiscal policy In Iran dominated the conduct of 
monetary policy in recent years.73 
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6.1 THE OIL SECTOR 
Before the revolution, Iran ranked as the world's fourth largest oil producer and 
second largest exporter. In mid 1978, Iran's oil production was over 5.5 million 
barrels of crude per day, but It plummeted as the political unrest peaked in late 
1978. Oil production was even halted for two months at the end of 1978 owing 
to the strikes by oil workers. Sudenly Iranian oil became a non existent factor in 
international oil supply. , 
With the establishment of Khomeini's regime in February 1979, the strikes 
ended and oil exports were resumed in early March at about one million barrels 
a day. The immediate effect of the revolution on Iran's oil industry was a 
temporary disruption of its production and the resumption of oil exports at a 
much lower level imposed by the revolutionary government. 
The focus of this section is to discuss the evolution of Iran's oil policy and 
practices since the revolution. It also examines the country's production, 
consumption, exports and the likely prospects of the oil sector. 
6.1.1 The Oil Price Shock of 1979/80 
The effects of the revolution on the international oil market resulted in a sharp 
increase in oil prices. A little more than a year after the revolution, oil prices 
almost tripled, resulting in the 'second oil price shock'. The price increases 
however, were not as a result of shortages that had existed during the first oil 
price shock' in 1973. Rather, it was largely due to the anxiety caused by the 
Iranian revolution. The political uncertainties in the Middle East arising out of 
the revolution, put the reliability of future Middle East oil production and 
supplies into question. 
According to the US Congressional Research Services in November 1979, 
"the Iranian Revolution's principle implication for global oil and energy supplies 
is that it marks a point of no return for the world's major oil importing countries. 
No longer are they assured of ample, reliable, cheap supplies of oil. Now they 
are entering into a new, troublesome era of scarce, expensive and uncertain oil 
supplies at increasing prices and further subject to political conditions and 
166 
risks".i 
However, in 1979 oil was plentiful in comparison to the 1973 oil price shock. 
As Iran's oil production fell, the difference was made up by other major oil 
exporting countries, in particular Saudi Arabia. In other words, the oil market 
was not tight. The OPEC's daily production into 1979 almost equalled that of 
1978, but this was not enough to bring supply in line with demand largely 
because of panic buying by anxious consumers and the hoarding of oil by 
some speculators in order to profit from escalating prices. The Japanese in 
particular, contributed to the sharp price increase as their major suppliers such 
as BP, Shell and Exxon, most affected by the Iranian supply loss, reduced 
shipments In favour of their own home markets. 
This had a major impact on the volatile spot market as Japan acquired 
20-25% of the total available oil.2 Owing to the continuing biding up on the spot 
market and the accompanying disorder, the official price of oil jumped from 
$13.34 per barrel, trippling after the Shah's departure from Iran in January 
1979. By mid 1979, Saudi Arabian light crude was above $30 per barrel on the 
spot market and around $40 at the end of the year.a The oil market was 
disoriented and the overwhelming reason was uncertainty in supply. 
6.1.2 Ideological Baggage and Oil 
The dramatic drop in Iran's oil production, particularly during the first three 
years of Khomeini's regime had its roots in revolutionary ideology, in domestic 
political rivalry, in misreading of international oil markets and in the Gulf war. 
The revolutionaries who seized power considered that the oil production 
during the Shah's rule was at levels far beyond Iran's revenue requirement. 
They believed oil revenues were being squandered and the counrty's main 
natural resource was being needlessly exhausted. Bani Sadr, for example, 
believed that the Shah's regime deliberately used oil to subjugate the entire 
underdeveloped Iranian economy to the dominant economy of the Western 
industrialised world, particularly the United States. He stated in his book 
entitled 'Oil and Domination* (Naft va Solteh) that under the Shah "oil became 
the instrument of the destruction of the foundation of Iran's independent 
economy".4 Khomeni also expressed similar radical views and regularly 
referred to the plunder of Iran's oil resources by the United States and the West 
in his sermons and declarations during his exile abroad and even the day after 
his return to Iran. 
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However, statements and radical views of this type, which culminated before 
the revolution, were part of the growing opposition to all aspects of the Shah's 
government, in particular to his oil policy. 
The oil factor was the most important instrument for the seizure of power by 
the revolutionary forces. Having used oil strikes to topple the Shah. Khomeini's 
regime then used oil revenues to consolidate its power base inside Iran. 
Khomeini, who previously considered the oil industry to be a tool of foreign 
domination in Iran, told the industry's employees after the revolution that "the 
industry is the lifeline of the nation". Speaker Rafsanjani spoke of oil as a 
"divine blessing" and "the foundation of the Iranian revolution.".s 
Against this ideological backdrop, and the fact that, since the overthrow of 
Mosadegh, nationalists and opposition groups in Iran, continued to suspect the 
Shah's oil policies and his dealing with the majors, Khomeini's regime 
unilaterally cancelled the agreement with the Iranian Oil Participants (the 
former Consortium), that purchased the bulk of Iranian oil. Further measures 
were taken to limit foreign involvement by taking over the functions of the 
consortium-controlled Oil Service Company. Unlike the Shah's government, 
the Islamic Republic displayed little interest in downstream operations of oil 
related enterprises outside Iran. Decisions were also taken on a broader front 
regarding engergy. As a result, the Shah's nuclear energy programme was 
virtually abandoned and Iran divested itself of its joint venture refineries with 
South Africa, France and South Korea. In addition, deliveries of gas to USSR 
was cut in 1980 due to a price dispute, with prices considered to be law by Iran. 
6.1.3 Marketing Patterns 
After the revolution, Iran's crude oil marketing patterns underwent a change. 
The participating oil companies eventually signed new purchasing contracts 
with the Islamic Republic, leaving their claims for losses of cancelled 
agreements between Iran and the former Consortium, for later negotiation. As 
a result of the new contracts, the majors were not the bulk buyers of Iranian oil 
and under the circumstances, the Islamic government could not revert to the 
pre-revolutlon marketing patterns, which the revolutionaries considered 
as exploitative. In addition, following the oil price shock of 1979-80, there were 
many ready customers for Iranian oil. Iran sold oil directly to independents, and 
the Japanese and other governments on a sale, barter or joint venture basis. 
Furthermore, these buyers were paying premium prices on short term contracts, 
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The marketing strategy, with short term commitments, then seemed to suit the 
Islamic government which was eager to retain flexibility until basic oil policy 
could be determined.8 
As a result, by mid 1979, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) with an 
average production of 3.1 million barrels per day was selling oil under thirty five 
contracts to the eight majors, twenty one independents and six governments. 
Later, during the same year, the number of customers rose to fifty two.7 
In general, the marketing pattern in immediate years following the revolution 
was sale of oil to a large number of customers on short term contracts. Though 
the NIOC recognised the long term advantages of dealing with bulk buyers and 
majors, the political development militated against such views. Large scale 
purchasing contracts with the majors, remained suspect in the eyes of radical 
clerics. In fact the NIOC had to justify continued sales to the majors in the face 
of widespread criticism. With a favourable oil market, the desire to maximise 
revenues from every barrel exported, encouraged sales on short term contracts 
to smaller customers. 
Nevertheless, trade sanctions imposed by the USA and the E E C in 1980 
due to the hostage crisis in Tehran, brought about changes in trade patterns. 
As a result, Iran sold more oil to countries like Turkey, Sri Lanka, India, Brazil, 
South Korea, North Korea and the East European states. The Soviet Union, 
itself a major oil producer and exporter, purchased oil from Iran in 1981. 
Eastern bloc countries received 16.4% of Iran's total oil exports In 1981 as 
against 11,4% in 1980 and 3.1% in 1979. In 1982 and 1983 the percentages 
were 9.7 and 11.3 respectively.e 
The revolutionary government also sold oil on the spot market which 
became a regular feature of post-revolution marketing policy, as long as spot 
prices remained highly attractive. The large amounts of uncommitted crude oil 
available to NIOC and the prevailing high prices, clearly exerted a strong 
attraction. In fact there was a growing temptation to regard spot prices as the 
benchmark for determining official prices and negotiating new contracts with 
buyers. 
As a result of these new sales strategies, the majors' share of Iranian crude 
declined. Short contracts for nine to twelve months, a wide variety of customers 
and a tendency to bargain for short-term gain became the characteristic of 
Iran's marketing practice. Iran, as far as the importers were concerned, was not 
a reliable supplier and its relations with large customers were disrupted. 
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However, this became a factor of importance when work) demand began to 
fall and prices weakened in late 1981 and early 1982.9 
6.1.4 Pricing Strategy 
Internal factional struggles for power that followed the revolution were largely 
focussed on the country's oil industry and its oil policy. Despite this ideological 
onslaught of the revolutionaries against Iran's oil exports, Bazargan's 
government followed a relatively moderate line of policy. However, the 
resignation of Bazargan in November 1979 as a result of the hostage crisis was 
the end of moderation. Iran began to pursue an aggressive pricing strategy. 
The NIOC added premiums in addition to the official prices and imposed 
surcharges on customers purchasing oil in excess of contracted amounts. 
Various formulas were devised to maximise revenues, such as shares for Iran 
in the refinery margins of major customers. Iran also demanded from its 
customers a higher price for present purchases as a pre-requisite for 
guaranteed future supply. Although other OPEC members adopted similar 
measures, Iran was usually the initiator of such practices for higher price 
increases. Iran's crude prices were clearly the highest in the region. 10 
In OPEC Iran tended to stand with the oil-price hawks. Iranian delegates 
began to show more inflexibility. At the OPEC conference in Caracas in 
December 1979 Iran proposed that OPEC adopted prices equivalent to the cost 
of producing other forms of energy. This proposal, first suggested in an OPEC 
study, meant the price of oil ought to vary between $35 and $60 per barrel.n 
On the OPEC long-term strategy committee which convened to work out 
measures for regular and orderly modifiction of oil prices, Iran agreed for faster 
and larger price increases. At this point it should be noted, the prices were 
changing so rapidly in 1979 and 1980 that Iran like other oil producers, based 
its prices on information revealed by the spot market, which was then reacting 
to changes in the market condition much faster than OPEC. During this period 
important price decisions were effectively made by members outside the OPEC 
framework.12 Nevertheless, when prices began to fall after 1981, Iran argued 
strongly that OPEC members should adhere to production limitation for market 
stabilisation and the maintenance of high prices. 
Iran's militancy and aggressive pricing strategy, in part stemmed from 
its experience of confused market circumstances that followed the revolution. 
The price of Iranian light rose from about $13.45 per barrel in January 1979 to 
170 
$32.87 per barrel in February 1980.13 These sharp increases were owing to 
the coincidence of a number of complex market factors triggered by political 
upheaval in Iran. But the authorities in Iran appeared to believe that the attitude 
of revolutionary militancy had much to do with these price rises. This belief and 
the experience of a run away price had an impact on Iran's oil policy and its 
inflexibility that followed until the end of 1981. Furthermore, the election of Bani 
Sadr as president and his position on oil policy - limiting oil exports and 
creating, in the long run, an oil free economy - reinforced the sentiment of low 
production and high prices. It is noteworthy that in 1979/80, under the 
circumstances Iran could afford a sharp drop in production due to the country's 
balance of payments. When the revolutionary seized power, Iran's reserves 
stood over $10 billion. 
With favourable oil prices in excess of $30 per barrel the country's reserves 
was expected to rise and Iran's oil minister was predicting an oil price of $40 
per barrel by the first quarter of 1981. 
As a result of all these consideration, Iran continued with an aggressive 
pricing policy. In fact its prices were higher than the comparable crudes. At the 
beginning of April 1980, Iranian crude was then the most expensive in the 
Persian Gulf, between $6 and $8 higher than other regional crudes. Though 
this gap narrowed later in the same year as a result of production cut backs, but 
Iran's prices remained high. Japanese and other companies refused to 
continue liftings at previous levels and an atmosphere of resistance developed 
by all buyers. Therefore, Iran's export dropped percipitously, apparently due to 
price inflexibility, but in reality it was the product of political, ideological and 
economic forces acting on oil industry in Iran. 
By September 1980, when the outbreak of the Gulf war disrupted Iranian oil 
exports, Iran was exporting about 0.7 million barrels per day, compared with an 
average daily production of 3.1 million barrels for the preceding twelve 
months.u 
6.1.5 Deteriorating Economic Condition 
In 1980 despite a 4% decline in world demand for oil, Iran continued to insist on 
high prices for oil, resulting in a decline in output and earnings. 15 As the 
country's foreign reserves were strong, reduced oil revenue was not a source of 
worry for the regime. In 1981, however, there was a collapse of oil revenues, 
both as a result of destruction through war and because of an oversupply 
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situation on the world market. Iran began to move towards a crisis, as the 
reserves dipped seriously. In addition after releasing the American hostages 
in January 1981, the government had to set aside over £6 billion of its foreign 
exchange assets as security to cover the financial claims made against Iran by 
American citizens and entities.16 
The War initially disrupted crude oil exports but liftings from the Kharg 
terminal were resumed within weeks of the outbreak of hostilities. Discounts 
had to be given to customers to cover the cost of high insurance premiums on 
tankers entering the war zone. 
The war continued to act as a deferent to large scale lifting from Iranian 
terminals. At this stage the damage caused by the war to Iran's oil industry was 
not significant. Though the Abadan refinery was virtually destroyed, this did not 
affect crude oil exports, because Shah's government had redirected export 
lines from Abadan to Kharg and Bandar Mah Shahr. 
Nevertheless, with reduced refining capacity Iran had to import additional oil 
products and the capture of Korramshahr by Iraq meant higher costs as 
shipments of goods to Iran were rerouted to other ports. Initial Iraqi attacks on 
oil installations were ineffective, but the added cost of prosecuting the war on 
Iran's deteriorating economic condition in the immediate post revolution period 
was considerable (see the chapter on the post revolutionary economy). 
These difficulties were exacerbated especially towards the end of 1981 by a 
weakening of oil prices and as noted before, the growing surplus of oil on the 
world market. World energy consumption continued to fall and oil consumption 
dropped a further 3.3% in 1981. 
Under these conditions, Iran's high prices for crude, $37 for light, in early 
January appeared increasingly unrealistic for the customers. Iran had troubles 
in marketing its oil. 
Some major customers e.g. Japanese companies suspended liftings for a 
short period and subsequently chose to stretch out their nine-to-twelve 
month contracts to twelve-to-fifteen months. Iran's exports in the second half 
of 1981 was between 0.5 and 0.7 million barrels per day as against 1.0 to 1.1 
million barrels per day in the first half of the same year.17 During this year, the 
Iranian daily average exports was 0.85 million barrels. Foreign exchange 
earnings at this level were below foreign exchange expenditure, resulting in 
heavy reliance of the government on reserves. Iran's collapse of the oil 
revenues compounded by the erosion of the foreign exchange reserves and 
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the war at a time when the economy was only operating at half its 
productive capacity, forced the government to take austerity measures 
including a severe curtailment of imports. Iran, a mega-hawk in terms of price, 
failed to read market warnings. 
6.1.6 Rationalisation of Oil Policy 
Because of the aforementioned problems, Iran was forced to revert to a more 
pragmatic oil policy. For the first time after the revolution, officials began to 
speak to the need to increase exports and to recapture traditional Iranian 
markets. The budget for 1981/82, submitted to the Majlis, reflected the 
government's intended policy to stimulate the flagging economy by increased 
oil exports. Nevertheless, oil exports at high levels, was severely criticised by 
opposition groups and in particular by Bani Sadr and his followers. They 
considered the reduction of oil exports as a step towards ending foreign 
exploitation of Iran's resources and the country's dependence on oil. 
In June 1981 the impeachment of Bani Sadr followed by suppression of 
opposition groups facilitated the way for a flexible oil policy. In addition, the 
OPEC members at their conference In Geneva in October 1981 agreed to 
reduce the differential of light grades of crude and set a new market price of 
$34 per barrel for Arabian light. These decisions by OPEC indicated that 
unrealistic high prices could not be maintained in a soft market. In fact this 
collective decision, provided an opportunity for the Iranian authority to justify 
and reduce Iran's inflated prices. 18 
As Iran attempted to re-enter the market, in order to recover its revenue base, 
it encountered severe difficulties in selling its oil. With a supply glut in the 
market, non-OPEC countries were cutting prices and OPEC states, hard 
pressed for cash, were seeking to increase crude exports. With the continuing 
perception of Iran as an unstable and insecure trading partner and the risks of 
tankers entering the war zone, buyers resistance remained strong. Moreover 
Saudi Arabia in keeping its production deliberately high (e.g. 9.9 and 9.8 
million barrels per day in 1980 and 1981 respectively) was attempting to 
deprive Iran of an oil market. 19 This overproduction during the above 
mentioned years when world oil consumption was dropping about 4% each 
year, was in part to pressure Iran to end the war and cease encouraging 
subversive activities In the Persian Gulf region. 
In spite of an unfavourable market, Iran, however pushed an aggressive 
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marketing policy. It cut prices in three steps, by $4 during February 1982, 
offered large discounts unofficially and on the spot market.20 Also Iran signed 
basic agreements to exchange oil for food and other goods, and added to Its 
efforts, to sell oil to Iran's potential customers still uncertain of buying Iranian 
oil. Furthermore Iran ignored the production quotas adopted by OPEC in March 
1982 as a means of boosting oil prices. 
Iran's quota was set at 1.2 million barrels per day but during 1982 it was 
producing an average daily output of 2.39 million barrels, an increase of one 
million compared with preceding years. It should be noted that neither Iran nor 
Saudi Arabia adhered to their production quota. Nevertheless, Iran rested its 
claim for increasing production on the size of its population, the war and its 
historical share of total OPEC production. 
6.1.7 Iran and OPEC since 1982 
By cutting prices and raising production in the spring and summer of 1982, Iran 
switched to a policy of volume maximisation, at any price, to recapture its 
traditional market and satisfy its own revenue requirements. At the same time 
Iran displayed some appreciation for the value of OPEC as an instrument 
through which the producers could co-ordinate policy and through which the 
country could secure its own needs. Iran, for example, intensified its oil rivalry 
with Saudi Arabia and sought support among some members to challenge 
Saudi's predominant role in the OPEC as a result of the ideological, political 
and strategic conflict between the two countries. As stated by Prime Minister 
Mosavi "With an increase in our country's activities in the international scene, 
including the oil market, using oil as a political weapon weakens Arabia's 
role".2i 
However, a further reduction in world oil demand in 1982 and the failure of 
OPEC's production quota plan due to considerable discounting of some major 
producers led to a further price reduction, In 1983, OPEC considering the 
market realities reduced its official prices to $29 from a high of $34 per barrel 
with a total daily output of 17.5 million barrels. These decisions apparently were 
confirmed at the OPEC meeting in Vienna in 1984 as a means of defending the 
price and stabilising the demand for oil. 
Iran's quota was set at 2.4 million barrels and that of Saudi Arabia's up to 5 
million barrels, with the latter acting as the swing producers to fill in the gap 
between the rest of OPEC's production and the overall 17.5 million barrels 
174 
Graph 2- O P F C ftmrta Oil Prioag 1Q7fl.1QR7 
40 
30 
CO 
CD 
20 
10 I i i i • • i • » i ' 1 i 1 1 I ' 1 I 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 
Year 
Source: S.Holly.Conflict In the Gulf, Lloyds of London Press, 1988, p.34. 
Notes: Based on average official sales prfce(F.O.B) weighted by 
the volume of production of indivitual members. 
175 
production level set by the organisation. Iran persistently complained about 
Saudi Arabia's quota and demanded an increase to its own quota from 2.4 
million to 3.2 million barrels per day.22 
Saudi Arabia, in 1985 was producing 3.1 million barrels per day about one 
million barrels more than Iran. The fact that the Saudi quota was larger than 
Iran's was inconsequential. In reality the implications of declining demand for 
oil were grave for ail OPEC members and they were all fighting for larger 
pieces of a diminishing pie.23 
In December 1985, OPEC took the decision to hold onto its share of world 
market. Consequently the oil price collapsed in 1986 from $27.50 to less than 
$10 after discounts. In fact for most of the world, 1986 has been the year of the 
third oil price shock with oil prices diving almost as dramatically as they rose in 
the two big upheavals of the 1970s. 
The dismissal of Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister led to a reversal of 
OPEC's policy. In December 1986 in a deal between the Saudis and the 
Iranians, a production sharing agreement was patched together to reverse the 
damaging decline in oil prices rather than stretch the share of the market. The 
new price of OPEC marker crude was set at $18 per barrel, which to Western 
observers appeared to be impossible to maintain. Nevertheless, as a result of 
Western buyers precautionary puohases and inevitably the reduction of existing 
stocks in the West, the price rose to $20 per barrel. 
In June 1987, OPEC set its production levels at 16.6 million barrels, 
anticipating overproduction from some members. Prices rose temporarily 
during July 1987 as a result of increased tension in the Persian Gulf and open 
hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia over rioting in Mecca. As tension 
decreased and the convoying operations of the tankers by the UK and USA in 
the Persian Gulf were seen to be successful, prices again fell below $20 per 
barrel. Contrary to the expected rise again in preparation for the winter 
stockpile, prices fell in August to $17.30 per barrel. By January 1988 due to 
OPEC's serious overproduction and aggressive discounting, oil prices fell to 
$16.65 per barrels 
Iraq's refusal since 1986 to accept a quota under Iran's was blamed for 
increasing indiscipline in the OPEC. However, in November 1988, at OPEC 
meeting in Vienna a production ceiling of 18.5 million barrels with a price target 
of $15 to $18 per barrel was agreed by all members. Iran accepted quota parity 
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with Iraq but gained an 11% rise in its production. This meant that, Iraq had to 
reduce its real output to parity with Iran. In fact with the continuation of the 
Iran-Iraq ceasefire, OPEC had to accommodate its quotas to the fact of Iraq's 
rapidly rising export capacity and the desparate need of both Iran and Iraq for 
increased revenues for post war reconstruction. Fortunately the rise in the 
world demand for OPEC crude since its nadir in 1985 (13.2 million barrels per 
day) has allowed the overall production level to rise enough to make a 
settlement possible. Evidence is now growing that weaker oil prices since 
1986 have stimulated the demand for crude oil partly as a result of faster 
economic growth in the West and partly because of reduced effort to conserve 
oil or find substitutes.25 
6.1.8 Production 
In 1973 the NIOC assumed operational control of the oil industry. Before the 
revolution in 1978, oil production in Iran was handled by three entities: 
- By foreign service contractors who carried out exploration, development and 
production activities on behalf of NIOC In return for fees. The most important 
of these contractors was the Oil Service Company (OSCO) controlled by 
Iranian Oil Particpants (the former Consortium). OSCO produced 88.5% of 
all Irania noil. 
- By joint ventures between NIOC and foreign oil interests in accordance with a 
predetermined profit sharing formula. The five, which operated offsshore oil 
fields produced about 11.3% of the total production. 
- By NIOC Itself , producing the rest; less than 1/2% of the total. 
As already discussed, after the revolution, the Iranian government took 
over all the assets and functions of OSCO and the share holdings of the joint 
offshore ventures.26 The revolution and the subsequent oil policy in the early 
stages caused a profound change in the oil sector. The production level after 
Its ebb during 1980-81 was increased but has remained below 2.5 million 
barrels per day (See table 6.1). Causes for the tow level output, discussed in 
detail before, had more to do with external events than domestic policies. 
The war with Iraq especially after 1983, disrupted production and export 
patterns mainly by the Iraqi policy of trying to dissuade tanker traffic from using 
Kharg loading terminals. 
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Table 6.1- Iran's Pit Production and Consumption (m b/d) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 JS82 JS£Q Jfifl4 JSfi JSfit 
Crude Oil Production 5.88 5.66 5.24 3.16 1.46 1.31 2.39 2.44 Z03 2.19 2.03 
% d OPEC 19.1 iai 17.5 102 5.4 5:8 12.6 143 124 14.2 11.1 
Domestic Consumption 
of Refined Products 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.62 0.72 037 0.72 0.73 0.72 
Source: MEES 31 & 9 November 1987 
Iran's collapse of productive capacity from a pre-revolution period of 
nearly six million barrels per day to just over two million barrels per day, has 
brought general decay in the oil industry. This had developed from the 
shutdown of fields due to lack of maintenance. Wells have not been 
maintained since 1979 and corrosion of well heads and shafts has set in. In 
some cases, the damage has been irreversible. At the same time, offshore 
fields have sufferred from neglect or from severe war damage.27 
6.1.9 Domestic Consumption 
Iran's oil consumption has been the highest among the OPEC members. With 
the growth of population and increased industrial and economic activities in the 
1970s, domestic consumption grew from 0.18 million barrels per day in 1970 to 
over 0.5 million barrels per day before the revolution. After 1979, despite the 
disruption in economic activities and rationing of oil products for the most part of 
the war, consumption apart from minor fluctuations, has continued to grow, 
(see table 6.1). This in part can be accounted for by the continuing population 
growth, the highest in the third world, and the size of Iranian forces fighting a 
war. Historically, oil has been the single most important source of primary 
energy in Iran and four products (kerosene, fuel oil, gas oil and gasoline) 
accounted for 93.9% and 90.9% of all oil products consumed in 1982/83 and 
1983/84 respectively. Use of liquid petroleum gas and other oil products were 
minimal.28 
Considering the growing domestic demand for oil products, the Shah's 
government increased its internal refining capacity from 0.68 million barrels in 
1972 to 1.2 million barrels per day in 1978. Abadan refinery, large by any 
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standards, before the revolution, had a total capacity of 630,000 barrels per 
day. After the destruction of this unit during the war, Tehran refineries (250,000 
barrels per day) have played a major role in domestic supply. Refineries at 
Shiraz (45,000 barrels per day), Tabriz (80,000 barrels per day) are augmented 
by topping plants at Kermanshah (18,500 barrels per day) and Lavan (20,000 
barrels per day). Although Iran's refineries have a capacity in excess of 
domestic consumption, the demand for middle distillates I.e. kerosene and gas 
oil has been rising steadily. It is disproportionately high and accounts for more 
than half of all oil products used In the country.29 
Before and after the revolution, Iran has had to import middle distillates to 
meet increasing demands. Furthermore, air raids by Iraq have affected 
production at Esfahan and Tabriz, though the extent of damage is not known. 
As a result of the loss of the domestic capacity, the refineries are less able to 
cope and therefore a higher proportion of crude exports are returned to Iran as 
refined products. The major beneficiary in this respect has been Aden, where 
the refinery has been expanded to make good Iran's shortfalls. Iran has also 
continuing arrangements with other international refineries in Singapore, 
Japan and South Korea for refined imports. In all, Iran was importing about 
200,000 barrels per day of oil products in 1987.30 
6.1.10 Exports 
As can be noted from table 6.2, in the three years preceding the revolution Iran 
was exporting 4.5 to 5.3 million barrels per day, a rate second to that of Saudi 
Arabia. After the revolution, Iran's oil export dropped substantially but the 
direction of exports remained more or less the same. Japan remained a major 
importer followed by West Germany. In 1982 and 1983 Japan received 14.2% 
and 23.0% of Iran's oil exports and the shares of West Germany were 2.8% and 
13.8% respectively. As noted earlier, the revolution brought changes in Iran's 
marketing pattern but the country's dependency on West European countries 
and Japan as its major buyers of oil, has increased. For example, in 1979, 
Western Europe and Japan together accounted for about 52% of Iran's total oil 
exports. This share was increased to about 69% in 1983 following Iran's 
reversion to a more pragmatic oil policy and increased production. In contrast, 
oil exports to USA has been reduced from 22.8% to 3.2% rising to 5.8% in 1983 
- contrary to USA's embargo and the Iranian government's vows not to sell oil 
to the so called Great Satan.31 
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Table 6.2 - Volumes and Values of Oil Exports 
Yaar 197B 1977 1978 1979 lgg 1881 Iflffi 1S£ 19fi4 12S5 JfiBS 
Gross Export of Crude 5.33 4.98 457 2.84 0.93 0.85 1.80 1.77 157 1.60 1.46 
Oil and Refined Products 
(mb/d) 
% of OPEC 18.1 16.9 16.3 9.1 3.7 4.1 10.9 122 11.0 12.1 93 
Values of Petroleum 
Exports ($biUion) 22.92 23.59 21.68 19.18 1328 12.05 19.23 1922 12.25 13.11 6.60 
Source: MEES 31:5 9. November 1987 
Iran since its change of policy has been able, to a certain extent to regain 
its share in the OPEC's export market. Table 6.2 shows that, Iran since 1982 on 
average retained 11% of the said market. As for the value of exports, the 
recovery of oil revenues during 1982 and 1983 introduced a note of confidence 
into the Iranian economy. However, with declining crude oil prices (see graph 
6.1) the revenue dropped by one third in 1984. In 1985 it rose slightly due to 
increased export but dipped to $6.6 billion in 1986 with the collapse of oil 
prices, causing great difficulties for the Iranian economy. 
6.1.11 Summary and Prospects 
For three years following the revolution, Iran's oil policy was closely based on 
ideological considerations and internal political rivalries. The revolutionary 
government misread the state of the oil market and systematically decimated 
the ranks of its own managerial staff in the oil industry. The Islamic Republic 
from the start decided to eliminate national dependence on the international oil 
market and as a result cut production during 1980 and 1981. With the second 
oil price shock of 1979/80, resulting in oil prices being trippled, Iran was in a 
favourable economic position to sustain low production and pay its way. 
Disaster came, however, in the form of the collapse of oil revenues as a result 
of the war and because of the oil glut in the world market. Erosion of foreign 
exchange compounded by a general deterioration in economic conditions took 
the Islamic government on a course diametrically opposed to its proclaimed 
path. Consequently Iran silenced the internal opposition and then reverted to a 
more pragmatic policy. Since then the revolutionary rhetoric concerning the 
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desirability of an oil free economy has subsided and the oil policy of the Islamic 
regime has come to significantly resemble the Shah's. 
In the spring of 1982, Iran reduced its oil prices and raised production by 
undermining the OPEC price policy in order to satisfy its own revenue needs. It 
also stepped up its efforts to repair its relations with its major traditional 
customers in order to re-establish a reputation for reliability and consistency as 
an oil supplier. However, the Iranian marketing pattern has remained mixed 
with large shares of its total exports being sold to Japan and West European 
countries. Also, Iran has sold oil to Eastern bloc states and to non-traditional 
buyers such as Brazil and Spain. 
Despite Iran's aggresive marketing policy, the production level has remained 
below 2.5 million barrels per day as a result of a host of political, economic, 
technical and market factors: "Given Iran's present difficulties, the production 
level will probably remain below four million barrels per day for the next five 
years. 
According to Iran's oil ministry's ten year plan, outlining the crude oil and 
natural gas production and supply porjects, overall crude oil production 
capacity is forecast to rise from 3.3 million barrels per day in 1989 to 4.1 million 
barrels per day in 1993.32 To reach this capacity, production might be slowed 
down due to labour shortages, foreign exchange problems and technological 
shortcomings. Since the revolution an increasing number of oil wells have 
been shut off due to falling reservoir pressure, exccessive salt contamination 
and poor maintenance. 
Iran's oil authorities have also announced exploration and drilling 
programmes in various areas onshore and offshore. In addition, expansion 
and reconstruction of oil fields and of oil production units are in the programme. 
The rise in crude oil production is also attributed to gas injection projects in oil 
fields. The projected foreign exchange requirements for these projects in five 
years, 1989 -1993, are $2,650 million. 
However, these operations may be hindered by several problems. Iran so 
far has been reluctant to open up new areas to foreign oil companies which will 
attract foreign expertise and capital. On its own, Iran would require the return of 
a large number of skilled foreign technicians. Under present circumstances 
with continuing political and administrative disorder, no major decisions have 
been made by key figures in these respects. 
Major expansion is also planned for refining capacity which is projected to 
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rise from 7.43 million barrels per day In 1989 to over 1.3 million barrels per day, 
or an average annual growth of 15%. Refineries are to be built, completed, 
re-constructed (e.g. Abadan) and repaired in anticipation of an increasing 
domestic energy consumption. 
Iran's domestic energy consumption is the largest in the OPEC and 
traditionally a substantial part of it has been oil products. However, even with 
NIOC refineries in full production availability of energy in Iran will continue to be 
restricted. Considering the significant export value of oil for Iran's economy and 
allowing for extensive substitution of natural gas for oil products, a growth rate 
of less than 5% in energy is forecast for the next five years. 
Iran's priority remains increased oil production capacity. As long as this is 
not achieved, the amount of oil it can export will not significantly differ from its 
present level unless natural gas is used extensively as an alternative source of 
energy. 
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6.2 THE OIL WAR 
The Gulf war has re-emphasised Iran's far reaching economic interests in the 
Persian Gulf. The most important of these interests is oil. It accounts for 90% of 
the country's foreign exchange. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities between 
Iran and Iraq, oil became an instalment of war. Since more than 80% of Iran's 
oil was exported through Kharg Island, it became the most attractive strategic 
target for Iraq and remained so until the cease-fire. Intensification of air-raids 
on Kharg, obliged the Islamic government to shuttle crude oil by tankers, down 
the Persian Gulf to a relatively safer area for export. With the escalation of the 
tanker war, the conflict became more than just a regional problem, with 
non-regional countries involved and motivated by gaining strategic advantages 
or long-term economic interest. 
This section is concerned with the military-economic trends of the oil war and 
in the process will address the following questions. What were the goals of the 
oil war? Did it effectively disrupt Iran's oil exports? How did Iran respond in the 
way of transporting its oil? What was the cost of the shuttle service? Finally this 
section concludes with an examination of the maritime tolls and the cost of the 
Iran-Iraq war followed by a summary of the oil war. 
6.2.1 Introduction 
There can be few industries more vulnerable, both at sea and on land, than the 
oil industry. During the Gulf war, this fact was emphasised right from the start, 
as both belligerents attacked each other's oil installations. With the continuation 
of the war, impairment and destruction of oil industries became part of the war 
strategy. 
The day after the outbreak of the war, Iraq attacked Iran's huge oil refinery in 
Abadan. As a result of aerial raids and daily shelling, within a month the 
refinery was shattered. 
In the course of its advance into Iran, Iraq's main axis of attack, was in the 
oil-rich province of Khuzestan. The Iraqi forces targeted the important cities of 
Khorramshahr, Abadan, Ahvaz and Dezful. Ahvaz is a vital oil supply centre by 
virtue of being the intersection of several pipelines connecting the oil fields in 
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Khuzestan to the north and south east of Iran. 
Dezful, which was repeatedly attacked by Iraq, has several strategic 
importances attached to it. As well as being a military stronghold, it is also the 
site of a pumping station which feeds oil from the Abadan complex to the 
central and northern parts of Iran. Had the Iraqis achieved all of their military 
objectives in Khuzestan by capturing Dezful and Ahvaz, the whole country 
would have run out of oil in a few weeks and the Iranian resistance might have 
subsided. 
For its part, Iran attached strategic targets inside Iraq. As early as 24th 
September 1980, Iran attacked Basra, the location of huge industrial projects 
including a petrochemical plant, a natural gas processing unit and an oil 
refinery. In a series of attackes, Iranian warships and jet-fighters inflicted 
severe damage to al-Amaya and al-Bakr oil terminals at the mouth of the Shaft 
al-Arab, both capable of receiving Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). The 
Iranian attacks on these two* deep water terminals and on the Faw terminals, 
practically stopped Iraq's oil exports through the Persian Gulf, thereby severely 
reducing its oil exporting capacity. 
The Iranian airforce also struck at a variety of oil targets in Kirkuk, Mosul, Irbil 
and the petrochemical plant near Basra and Zubair. Iraq, having been 
subjected to air-raids, responded with a number of strikes against Iranian 
targets, such as the oil and petrochemical installations in Bandar Khomeini, 
Bandar Mahshahr and Kharg Island. As a result of these attacks both sides, 
right from the early stages of the war, were involved in strategic exchanges, 
especially on oil targets. Soon oil became an instrument of the Gulf war.33 
6.2.2 Early Attacks on Shipping 
The outbreak of hostilities stopped merchant ships plying the Shatt al-Arab and 
some seventy stranded vessels blocked the waterway. With Khorramshahr 
captured by the Iraqi forces, and Bandar Abbas overstretched as a result of 
rerouted shipments of goods, Iran inevitably, had to utilise its two major 
commercial ports in the northern zone of the Persian Gulf, i.e. Bandar Khomeini 
and Bandar Mahshahr. In addition, the destruction of the Abadan oil refinery, 
necessitated the import of additional oil products. 
As a result, under the protection of the Iranian Navy, with close support from 
the airforce, convoys of ships sailed to and from these ports at irregular 
intervals. However, with its Super Frelon helicopters armed with exocet 
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missiles, Iraq attacked these-conyoys at every possible opportunity. Although 
Iran conducted its first anti-shipping attack as early as 7th October 1980, the 
first merchant ship casualty did not occur until 21st May 1981, when a 
Panamanian-flagged bulk carrier, Louise One, was hit and sunk by an Iraqi 
air-strike along the Khor Musa inlet, heading for Bandar Khomeini.34 
On 14th January 1982, Iraq warned international shipping to keep clear of 
the western waters of the Persian Gulf, after it had claimed to have sunk three 
ships leaving Bandar Khomeini. From May 1982 onwards, Iraq made further 
attacks on merchant ships and also on Kharg lsland.3sThe first tanker attacked 
at this island, was on 30th May 1982, a Turkish-flagged ship called Atlas One, 
which was hit by Iraqi aircraft during loading operations.36 
In mid-August 1982, Iraq declared an exclusive zone extending up to 35 
miles from Kharg Island, in which ships were liable to attack.37 From 
November of the same year, "maritime hostility spread beyond the northern 
waters of the Persian Gulf, with an Iraqi air-strike on an Iranian tanker Shirvan, 
while en-route from Sirri Island to Bandar Mahshahr (see map 1 and 2}.38 
On the other hand, Iran pledged itself to safeguard tankers plying Kharg 
Island, by providing armed protection. At the same time, it continued with the 
naval blockade or Iraq and made intermittent surveillance of merchant ships on 
suspicion of carrying military equipment to Iraq via Kuwait. Nevertheless, Iran 
did attack merchant ships on various grounds. Between the outbreak of the war 
and February 1984, before the initiation of what came to be known as the 
Tanker War, twenty-three Iraqi and five Iranian attacks on merchant ships were 
recorded.39 
6.2.3 Reversal of War Alms and Strategies 
After the fall of Korramshahr, the war changed from a limited dynamic war to a 
general static one. Iraq aimed at retaining the captured territories and went into 
an operational defensive. Apart from some minor deviations, the two armies, 
more or less remained locked in a static war until 1981. During this period, Iraq 
made an abortive thrust into Ahvas and the Iranian Airforce, in a series of 
attacks, closed down the oil facilities at Kirkuk for several weeks.4o 
In 1981, Iran made significant attempts to break the stalemate and its major 
breakthrough occurred in September, when the seige of Abadan was lifted. 
This momentum culminated in May 1982, when Korramshahr was recaptured. 
By June, almost all of the occupied territories, were liberated. During this 
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period, Iraq signalled its willingness to end the war, While Khomeini's regime 
dismissed the proposal and declared its new goals to include not only the 
overthrow of Saddam Hossein, but also compensation for damages 
In the summer and winter months of 1982, Iran launched three limited 
offensives in the direction of Basra, Mandali and Amara, and managed to 
secure pockets of territory inside Iraq, but failed to break through the Iraqi 
defences, thus, by the end of 1982, the war aims and strategies of Iran and 
Iraq, underwent a complete reversal. Iran's war aims progressively changed 
from liberation of its lost territory, to occupation of Iraqi territory. Consequently, 
it launched dynamic operations and took the initiative, while Iraq remained in 
static defence. Iran limited the fighting to the battlefields and largely ignored 
economic targets, while Iraq extended the theatre of war to the rear, focusing on 
its countervalue attacks. With the change in the nature of Iran's war aims, the 
army renewed its opposition to invade Iraq, and many experienced men who 
had volunteered to defend Iranian soil, returned to civilian life. Meanwhile, the 
purge process in the armed forces, though to a lesser extent, continued.42 
As a consequence, the Revolutionary Guards and the Baseej, became the 
main part of the Iranian forces and the army's participation was significantly 
reduced. Contrary to the army's viewpoint, the Revolutionary Guards continued 
with human-wave tactics, which later dominated the battlefields. 
Meanwhile, the balance of air-power, due to a host of problems, gradually 
slipped from Iranian hands. Iraq took advantage of this diminishing strength -
Iran could keep no more than eighty five aircraft operational in the summer of 
1982 - and made a series of attacks in 1982, on Dezful, Abadan and as stated 
earlier, on Kharg Island and ships plying Iranian ports.43 
In 1983, Iran launched four offensives and opened new fronts in the north, 
making minor advances into Iraq, but without being able to break the Iraqi 
defence lines. The pattern of offensive became routine. In early 1984, the 
Iranian authorities advocated the need for a final blow against Iraq's regime. In 
an attempt to forestall the impending offensive Iraq carried out aerial attacks on 
eleven cities in Iran. In turn, Iran retaliated, thus both sides were involved in 
what came to be know as the 'first War of Cities'. 
Nevertheless, Iran launched its two-stage offensive in February, the largest 
until then, involving some 500,000 men on both sides. The more important 
stage of the offensive was to the north of Basra. The only notable Iranian 
success, though with heavy losses, was the capture of Majnoon Islands oil 
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fields containing fifty oil wells with a proven oil reserve of nearly eight billion 
barrels.44 • 
6.2.4 The Tanker War 
From April 1984, Iraq shifted its countervalue strategy to a higher level and 
started the tanker war. The delivery of five Super Etendard planes in late 1983, 
equipped Iraq to carry out the war of maritine denial around Kharg Island, 
which it had prematurely declared in August 1982. 
Iraq launched its first attack on 25th April 1984, against the Saudi Arabian 
tanker, Safina al-Arab. The Iranians retaliated three weeks later, by striking at 
Kuwaiti tanker, Umm Casbah.45 During 1984, the Iraqis launched twenty one 
attacks and damaged nineteen tankers in the process. The Iranians countered 
with seventeen attacks, all of them against tankers. Iraq escalated the tanker 
war, launching thirty attacks and damaging twenty three tankers in 1985, while 
the Iranians were responsible for twelve strikes, damaging six tankers (see 
table 6.3). 
Intensification of Iraqi air-attacks on Iranian tankers, or tankers carrying 
Iranian oil, was geared to two objectives. The first, was to force Khomeini's 
regime to negotiate, an end to the war by crippling its economy. The second, 
was the aim of drawing in other states, especially the Western powers, with the 
threat which the war represented to their own interest in the region. The hope 
was, that these powers would add their weight to that of Iraq, in order to bring 
about a peaceful settlement.46 
Despite the numerous attacks on ships by both sides, the tanker war had a 
negiigible effect on the oil market. Although the tanker war heightened anxiety 
among some observers, there were no shortages or permanent price increases 
on the international market. The continuing oil glut negated any cause for 
concern in the short term. 
As for Iran, the effect of the tanker war began to surface four months after its 
launch. By the end of May and in early June 1984, Iran's export from Kharg 
Island, which was around 1.6 million barrels per day, dropped to about 600,000 
barrels per day, costing Iran about $25 million daily. However, the overall cost 
to Iran was bearable. Iran continued to export 200,000 barrels per day from its 
offshore wells, through Sirri and Lavan ports, It also very quickly, recovered 
much of its Kharg Island terminal oil customers, by offering them a discount of 
$3.00 per barrel, which more than compensated for the $2.33 per barrel 
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increase in cargo insurance.47 
In fact, Iran's average daily export during 1984 and 1985, remained more or 
less the same, though marginally less in comparison with 1983. Iran's exports 
were 1.77 million barrels per day in 1983, and 1.57 million barrels per day in 
1984. In 1985, despite the intensity of air-raids on Kharg Island, the export 
volume was 1.6 million barrels per day (see table 6.2). Iraq made seventy 
seven air-raids agasinst Kharg Island between mid-August and late December 
1985, rising to one hundred and twenty in a full year.48 
In 1985, the ground war was comparatively static, despite an offensive from 
Iraq, the first since 1980. However, with increased confidence, due to its air 
superiority and Iran's inability to mount a decisive offensive, Iraq initiatied the 
'second War of Cities' in mid-March, by launching large scale, aerial bombing 
campaigns against thirty Iranian towns and cities. Iran responded in kind, and 
within ten days, the 'second War of Cities' was over. 
6.2.5 Aerial Bombing of Economic Infrastructure 
Throughout 1986, Iraq systematically picked off economic targets in Iran. 
However, the scope of attacks was too wide to be devastating. The targets 
included communication networks, railways, industrial plants, power generation 
facilities, garrison towns, hydroelectric schemes and oil installations. After 
May, the most damaging attacks were focused on oil refineries. The Tabriz, 
Isfahan and Tehran refineries, were severely damaged. Emergency repairs at 
Tehran did not restore the refinery's output of 225,000 barrels per day capacity. 
With the tanker war continuing, shortage of oil products became acute in 
mid-1986. Thus, Iran was forced to triple its imports of refined products to some 
300,000 barrels per day, and finally imposed petrol rationing in October. The 
country was probably saved from the full effects of Iraqi attack, by the seasonal 
factor. The aerial raids were in March and May, and heating oil was not in great 
demand in the Spring, Nevertheless, the fuel shortages affected the military 
and civilians adversely.49 
6.2.6 Escalation of the Tanker War 
Developments In the land war during 1986, were accompanied by the 
intensified attacks on ships. Once again, Iraq made a deliberate bid to choke 
off Iran's oil exports. 
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In February 1986, an Iranian amphibious force crossed the Shaft al-Arab 
and captured the Iraqi port of Faw. This move, which was more of a 
psychological victory for Iran, increased the confidence of the Khomeini regime. 
Indeed, this regime once again, re-emphasised the need for a final offensive'. 
These threats and the growing indications of an impending, large-scale 
offensive, drove Iraq to launch a wide aerial campaign on Kharg Island, on 
shuttle tankers that ran oil from this Island or from adjacent loading points to 
Sirri in the lower part of the Persian Gulf, and on product tankers hauling 
processed Iranian crude back from the Aden refinery. 
In January 1986, Iraq acquired some two hundred new AS30 missiles from 
France. These missiles, more effective and with a longer range than Exocets, 
allowed the Iraqi airfares to expand its operational zone.so In August of the 
same year, Iraqi aircraft mounted a successful attack on the Iranian oil terminal 
of Sirri Island, 120 miles south west of the Strait of Hormuz. In November 1986, 
Iraq attacked Sassan oilfield - west of Sirri - and the new, Iranian oil-terminal at 
Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz, about 750 miles from the nearest airport in 
Iraq (see map 1 and 2). 
As Iraq increased its offensive capabilities in the Persian Gulf, the Iranians 
stepped up their retaliation, from an irregular surveillance of shipping, to a 
full-scale programme of intercepting, boarding and searching vessels 
suspected of carrying arms and other supplies for Iraq. In addition, it repeated 
its warning to the Gulf States, to restrain Iraq and in the process, attacked 
tankers. As Iraq itself, was invulnerable in the sense that it no longer used the 
Persian Gulf for shipping, its allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were 
prime targets. 
Against this background of escalation, the Gulf States began to seek 
additional assistance and the British, followed by French and Americans, 
responded to this need by increasing their naval presence in the Persian Gulf 
and Oman Sea.si The major concern of the Western powers, was the ferocity 
of the intensified tanker war. 
During 1986, Iran and Iraq together, launched ninety three attacks (Iran thirty 
eight and Iraq fifty five), eighty of them on tankers. The situation was clearly 
becoming more dangerous for all concerned. 
6.2.7 Re-Flagging and Acceleration of Internatlonallsation 
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Early In 1987, Iran launched other offensives and intense fighting continued, 
mainly in the vicinity of Fish Lake, a twenty-mile long man-made moat, east of 
Basra. Western analysts invented the dictum that, 'Iraq cannot win and Iran 
cannot lose'.52 In the end, Iran made little progress on land. 
At that point, the super-powers became deeply involved. In April 1987, the 
Soviets stepped up their support for Iraq and its allies. The Kuwaitis were 
allowed to charter three Soviet tankers to lift their oil. In May of the same year, 
the United States matched that, by re-flagging eleven of Kuwait's twenty one oil 
and gas carriers, and escorting them through the Persian Gulf. On 7th May, a 
Soviet freighter was fired on by Iranian gunboats. Ten days later, a Soviet 
tanker on Kuwaiti charter, hit a floating mine. The crisis intensified when, on 
that same day, an Iraqi aircraft fired a missile into USS Stark.53 Iran's response 
to the US re-flagging was mining operations. On 29th July, Bridgeton, the first 
re-flagged Kuwaiti tanker to sail under an American escort, hit a mine. Britain, 
France, Italy, Holland and Belgium, all sent warships to the Persian Gulf in 
America's wake, as escort or minesweepers.54 
Against this backgrond, the level of tension reached breaking point. The 
increased naval presence of the West in the region, accelerated the 
intemationalisation of the Gulf war. The West's reaction was clearly in response 
to the perceived threat from Iran alone. In fact, it became a confrontation 
between the US and the Khomeini regime. 
For the Iranians, attacks on ships was a clear-cut issue. Their attacks were 
in response to Iraqi attacks, and directed at the economic targets of Iraq's allies 
and partners, regardless of what flag. 
6.2.8 Respite and Resumption 
During 1987, there was a month-long lull in Iraqi attacks, after the USS Stark 
incident. Another lull coincided with peace moves by the United Nations in 
July. This lasted over six weeks, until Iraq's patience ran out at what it saw as 
deliberate stalling by Iran on a cease-fire resolution passed by the United 
Nations. However, during this period, Iran boosted oil exports, ferrying more 
than two million barrels per day, earning hard currency, about $25 million daily, 
to replenish its war coffers. 
From August onwards, Iraqi war planes hit a string of Iranian offshore oil 
installations, tankers, oil-fields, factories, offshore oil terminals at Genaveh, 
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Sirri, Kharg, Farsi and Lavan Islands. As the atmosphere worsened, Iran 
rejected the UN cease-fire demand and responded by attacks on shipping. 
Once again, the tanker war reached flash-point, as Iran and Iraq traded attacks. 
After the capture of Iran Ajr, the mine-laying vessel, by the US navy, tension 
between America and Iran grew. On 8th October, US naval helicopters sank 
three Iranian boats near Farsi Island. On 16th October, from the captured Faw 
peninsular Iran launched a Silkworm missile at a Kuwaiti re-flagged ship, as it 
prepared to join an American convoy. In the end, the US retaliated by an attack 
on the oil platforms of Rostam (Resalat) and Rakhsh (Reshadat).ss 
r 
As a result, concern mounted about a serious threat to world trade in the Gulf 
area. However, despite the flurry of air and sea attacks, thirty vessels a day still 
entered or left the Persian Gulf, the same rate as before. Owners continued to 
send their vessels to the region, as they were reluctant to turn down scarce 
orders in an over-supplied market. By September 1987, according to Lloyd's 
casualty reporting unit, three hundred and fifty three ships had been attacked or 
damaged in the Persian Gulf since the tanker war started in 1984, including 
eighty five during the current year.se Total attacks by both belligerents on 
tankers and other ships wereas below :-
Table 6.3 - Attacks on Merchant Vessels during Tanker War 
period 1984-1988 
Attacks 1984 1985 1986 1282 1988 Total 
By Iran 17 12 38 83 47 197 
Tankers (17) (6) (35) (65) (37) (160) 
Other Vessels — (6) (3) (18) (10) (37) 
By Iraq 21 30 55 78 34 218 
Tankers (19) (23) (45) (66) (30) (183) 
Other Vessels (2) (7) (10) (12) (4) (35) 
Total Attacks by 
Iran and Iraq 38 42 93 161 81 415 
Source: Iran and Iraq Conflict 1984-1988 -The Tanker War- No End?. 
INTERTANKO. Oslo'/Norway 3rri Edition. June 1988 
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Despite the intensified raids, about one-sixth of the non-communist world's 
oil, was shipped through the Persian Gulf, and Iran managed to export on 
average, 2.27 million barrels per day.57 As for the rest of 1987 and into 1988, 
though the contact between the Iranians and Americans was minimal, the 
tanker war continued as usual. Iraqi attacks, as before, came from the air, while 
Iran used speedboats with similar effect. 
On land, during the winter of 1987-88, Iran launched a number of limited 
offensives in Iraqi Kurdestan, around the town of Halabcheh. This was the 
highlight of Iranian success, though Iraq's use of chemical weapons, caused 
heavy civilian and military losses. During February and March 1988, the War 
of Cities' once again, was pursued with ferocity, with Iraq launching more 
missiles on urban areas in Iran than vice versa. This caused a lull in the tanker 
war as from 18th February, lasting for twenty three days. However, it was 
resumed again once the "War of the Cities' subsided. 
The situation at sea, became more complex as the US in particular, became 
militarily committed to the conflict. On 14th April 1988, the USS Samuel 
B. Roberts, returning alone from a convoy trip to Kuwait, struck a mine and 
sustained damage. Four days later, the US responded by blowing up Sassan 
(Salman) and Sirri oil-platforms and sunk an approaching Iranian patrol boat. 
The escalation led to raids on a Sharjeh oil rig and on a British-flagged tanker, 
by Iran. The raids were answered by the US, seriously damaging two Iranian 
destroyers. This naval confrontation coincided with the Iraqi success in 
recapturing Faw with a well planned offensive.58 Between April and the end of 
June 1988, Iraq reclaimed virtually all of its territory in Iranian hands, including 
the area east of Basra and the Majnoon Islands. 
6.2.9 The Shuttle Service 
With the escalation of the war, and its spread further south in the Persian Gulf, 
radical changes surfaced In the methods of oil transportation. The Iranians 
created a shuttle service in 1985, between the Kharg Island oil terminal and 
Sirri Island. Later on, with inceased operational range of the Iraqi Airforce, the 
trans-shipment centre was moved to Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz, 
requiring large stationary tankers to serve as storage vessels. 
The shuttle run was an incentive for shipowners, as it allowed them to avoid 
the immediate danger zone in the north of the Persian Gulf. In effect, the shuttle 
service subsidised oil liftings, by saving the charters the difference in freight 
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rates between Kharg Island and the southern trans-shipment centres, as well 
as the additional war risks insurance premiums. 
The size of Iran's shuttle fleet, despite many Iraqi hits, had grown from 
eighteen ships in October 1987, to twenty five in January 1988. Out of this total, 
fifteen vessels (2.96 million tonnes deadweight) were chartered, and ten (2.69 
million tonnes deadweight) were under Iranian flag, managed and operated by 
the state-owned, National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC). In addition, Iran 
had seven storage tankers at Larak Island, with a total tonnage of 2.97 million 
deadweight.59 Most of these vessels, with tonnage in excess of 230,000 
deadweight, known as VLCCs and ULCCs, were among the largest tankers 
available. They were relatively old, and some among the worst-equipped 
tonnage still in the world, for not meeting international standards in respect of 
vessel safety and pollution prevention. Because of these shortcomings, very 
few traders would have used these vessels and the shuttle service was one of 
the rare opportunities open to them. 
With the escalation of attacks on the tankers in 1988, Iran apparently 
boosted its tanker fleet through purchases and chartering. Around thirty four 
tankers (seventeen chartered and seventeen owned by NITC), were used for 
short haul shuttles, and long haul trading trips, and twelve vessels for crude oil 
and product storage at Larak, with a total tonnage of 12.67 million deadweight. 
While most of these vessels were operating on short haul shuttle voyages and 
storage, around six or seven were used to transport homeless crude to the 
European oil market, and to import petroleum products, due to domestic 
shortages. During the first six months of 1988, ten of these tankers were 
attacked by Iraqi aircraft and around six were, at any time, under repair at either 
the Dubai or Singapore dry docks.6o 
Considering the number of vessels on long voyages and under repair, in 
reality the tonnage of the shuttle service during the last eighteen months of the 
war, remained more or less the same. Increased employment of ships were in 
anticipation of Iraqi attacks, and preparedness in replacing damaged ships with 
those in operational condition. At the same time, Iran deployed electronic 
counter-measures and decoys to misguide or spoof the Exocet.ei The head of 
NITC had admitted that the company was under constant pressure during the 
war, and it had survived only due to defensive measures, salvage 
arrangements and vigorous repair programmes. For shuttle operation, NITC 
"chartered twice as many ships as were needed and when one was hit, we had 
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another ready in Its place". Overall, one hundred and ninety two tankers, 
owned and chartered by NITC, were hit during the war and more than one 
hundred and fifty seamen had died.62 
6.2.10 Kharg and OH Exports 
During the war, Kharg remained the most attractive strategic target for Iraq. Its 
airforce attacked this island over two hundred and fifty times. These attacks 
had all but closed the oil export terminal at Kharg. As early as August 1985, the 
Iraqi government claimed that the bombers' crushing blows to the island, had 
changed it into ashes. Iraq's failure to put Kharg out of action, can be attributed 
to a host of considerations discussed below. 
When the war started, Kharg had a good deal of surplus capacity. The Shah 
forsaw exports of over six million barrels per day, much of which was to pass 
through the island with fourteen tanker berths, four on the west and ten on the 
east side of it. 
Iran's oil exports, after the revolution, decreased substantially and after 
1982, Its average daily export, hardly exceeded 1.9 million barrels. Out of this, 
about 200,00 barrels were exported directly from Lavan and Sirri Islands farther 
south in the Persian Gulf (this offshore output was reduced to just over 50,000 
barrels per day, due to US and Iraqi attacks before the cease-fire).63 This 
meant that only 1.7 million barrels per day, needed to flow out from Kharg, 
which is the average volume of crude carried by a tanker.64 Therefore, for the 
Iranians to reach their export target, they only needed to get one tanker to the 
Larak trans-shipment centre every day. 
Since the eight hundred and fourty mile round trip from Larak to Kharg, took 
ten days, including three or four days at each end for loading and unloading, 
only ten tankers in the shuttle fleet, would have been sufficient - if there were no 
Iraqi air raids - to maintain the export level. 
As discussed earlier, the size of Iran's shuttle-fleet, in particular during the 
last two years of the war, far exceeded the minimum number. In addition, Iran 
kept large stocks of oil at Larak in storage tankers, with a capacity of about 
twenty one million barrels of, crude (though some tankers stored refined 
products for domestic use). If the crude carriers contained say, fifteen million 
barrels, Iran would have been able to continue daily exports of 1.7 million 
barrels per day for over a week, without any top-up from Kharg.es 
Militarily, Iraqi attacks on Kharg, were infrequent and often limited in scope, 
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intensity and duration, though their cumulative effects, in particular for the last 
three years of the war, were considerable. Iraqi pilots often attacked the berths 
and the tankers alongside them. But Iranians, by practice, became skillful 
patchers. Often they put the berths back into action within days. Considering 
the volume of exports, Iran needed to keep only about five out of the fourteen 
berths in operation. In . addition, as an emergency measure, single bouy 
loading points were brought into use to supplement the loading berths. 
Kharg and the vital pumping stations in Genaveh, which feeds oil into it, had 
a formidable air-defence and Iraqi attacks on the island, were usually from a 
high altitude. In fact, the Iraqis lacked aircraft which could make accurate 
attacks on land from extremely low altitudes. Iraq did not exploit its air 
superiority to the full. It did not try to mount mass air-raids on Kharg, i.e. a lot of 
aircraft approaching the island simultaneously from different directions in order 
to swamp the defences. While Iran's air defence should not be overstated, Iraq 
in general, appeared to be reluctant to hazard its airforce, perhaps serious 
losses could diminish its most effective reserve of military force.ee Instead, the 
Iraqis concentrated on tankers at sea, with missiles such as Exocet fired from 
twenty miles or so. Tankers, as slow-moving ships with no defences, travelling 
between Kharg and Larak, known as, 'Exocet Alley', were easy targets. 
6.2.11 The Cost of the Shuttle Service 
It is difficult to gauge the cost of the shuttle service, because most of the ships' 
purchase and charter price, secured by Iran for extra tonnage, have been 
confidential. When the tanker war started, a general depression existed in the 
tanker markets, especially for the largest sizes. This meant that tankers similar 
to most of those used in the shuttle service, could be obtained at very low cost, 
either by purchasing or charter agreement. However, with the intensification 
of the tanker war, a stronger market emerged and as a result, the prices of ships 
were strengthened. During the first quarter of 1986, the average price of an 
eight years old VLCC, was about $5 million. In 1988, the price rose to $17 
million. In contrast, during the same period, the average price of oil fell by about 
35%, thus making the running of the shuttle service even more expensive.67 
This economic reality led Iran to seek transportation alternatives, such as 
projects to build pipelines to Jask on the Oman sea coast. Overall, the shuttle 
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service from Kharg to Larak, reduced Iran's income by thirty cents per barrel, 
taking into account, damages to tankers. Ending of the service will save Iran 
about $300 million per year as a result of reduced charter, crew, insurance and 
other, related costs.68 
6.2.12 Maritime Tolls 
The tanker war has been one of the most damaging conflicts for the 
international maritime community. Tolls on shipping were on a constant 
upswing since its initiation in 1984. It peaked in 1987, with one hundred and 
sixty one ships being attacked by both belligerents in a single year. 
In 1988, except for a brief lull, the tanker war did not subside until the 
acceptance of the UN's Resolution 598 by Iran, on 18th July. The biggest, 
single casualty of the tanker war occurred on 19th March 1988 when Iraq hit 
two Iranian shuttle tankers, Avaj and Sanandaj, at a waiting platform at Kharg 
Island, in which fifty one were killed.69 
The total merchant ships which have been attacked by both Iran and Iraq 
since 1984, was four hundred and fifteen, over 82% tankers. Considering the 
number of recorded attacks before the tanker war, and some seventy ships 
stranded in the Shaft al-Arab since 1988, and undoubtedly damaged, around 
five hundred and thirteen merchant vessels in total have been subjected to 
various degrees of attack. 
Throughout the tanker war, attacks on maritime targets, had damaged 69.91 
million tonnes deadweight of shipping. A total of sixty three tankers, amounting 
to 10,91 million tonnes deadweight, were declared constructive total losses. 
Very few flag nations escaped the attack. In total, two hundred and fifty seamen 
have died during the tanker war.7o 
6.2.13 The Cost of the Iran - Iraq War 
Estimates of the costs of the-war to Iran are at best educated guesses as the 
defence budget was heavily supplemented by arms purchases abroad which 
was not registered within the budget clearly. On the surface, between 10% to 
17% of the budget every year was allocated to the war but in reality this figure 
exceeded 30% of the entire state finances. In addition, a substantial amount of 
the government's current expenditure was devoted to the war effort. Foreign 
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exchange expenditure to support the war was in several categories e.g. direct 
costs for arms purchases, financial grants to Syria and payments to various 
organisations opposed to Iraq, e.g. Iraqi Kurds, and other covert and overt 
operations in the region. 
The cost of the war to the economy has also been substantial. Iraqi strategic 
attacks on econmic targets, expecially oil installations, intensified after 1985, 
caused considerable damage to the physical infrastructure of the coutnry. 
Table 6.4 - The Cost of the War f US S billion! 
Iran 1 Iraq 
Weapons purchases 7-10 30-35 
Foregone oil revenues 4-8 40-45 
Foregone non-oil Income 15-20 35-45 
Compensation to victims' families 8-10 7-8 
Pipeline construction - 3-4 
War risk insurance 1-2 
Imports of petroleum products 4-6 
Total 39-56 115-137 
Source: Petroleum Finance Company: MEED 2 September 1988 
The accumulated costs of physical destruction and social strains are 
incalculable for both Iran and Iraq. However, regardless of social costs even 
the lowest estimates suggest that the wealth of the two nations is at least $150 
billion lower than it would have been, had the war not occurred. According to 
Petroleum Finance Company (PFC) the total cost incurred by Iran and Iraq is 
almost $200 billion, more than two thirds of it borne by Iraq due to Its heavier 
spending on arms and the loss of oil exports earnings. But this figure excludes 
the cost of damage done to the physical Infrastructure of both countries. 
An estimate by the Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economics (JIME) 
puts the cost of the Gulf war at more than twice this level for 1980-1985 alone. 
The burden on Iran is estimated to be substantially higher than the table above. 
The cost in absolute terms is $188.7 billion, equal to 46% of the total. 
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Table 6.5 - The Host of tha War fUS $ 
Iran Iraq 
Revenue/expenditure losses 
Loss of oil revenue 23.4 * 65.1 * 
Extra military expenditure 24.3 33.0 
GPP tosses 
GDP loss (oil sector) 108.2 120.8 
GDP loss (non-oil sector) 30.2 64.0 
Fixed capital losses 
Unrealised fixed capital formation 76.5 ** 43.4 
Loss from destruction (oil sector) na na 
Loss from destruction (non-oil sector) 25.9 8.2 
** 
Total 188.7 226.0 
Notes: * Included in GDP losses, do not add in calculating 
** Constant prices at 1980 (in case of fixed capital losses) 
Source: Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economics f J1MB. 
According to JIME "since war losses are small both in Iran and Iraq, in the 
first stage of reconstruction, the existing production facilities will speedily 
recover from war damage... In the second stage of recovery, it can be expected 
that active investment will be stepped up. This will include the re-opening of 
projects which were abandoned in the planning stages... The largest problems 
expected at the second stage of recovery are the problems of securing 
sufficient funds to carry out development projects".7i 
While JIME is quite optimistic about the reconstruction prospects, the 
financing so far remains as one of the main obstacles for Iran's reconstruction. 
Months after the ceasefire, financing and the overall reconstruction programme 
has yet to be worked out. Iran's officials have been unable to find a unified 
approach. Various bodies such as the cabinet, Majlis, the Council of Policy 
Making for Reconstruction are all drawing up their own separate plans with no 
overall and unified answer to the financing problem. However, this cannot be 
solved without improved relations externally and more unity and central control 
internally.Financing to some extent is a political as much as an economic 
problem. 
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6.2.14 Summary and Implications 
Militarily, the oil war and indeed the entire Iran - Iraq conflict has achieved very 
little. In many respects it had two losers - Iran and Iraq. This war is "unlikley to 
go down in history, either for its direct strategic lessons, or for its military 
accomplishment ".72 
The tanker war which was initiated by Iraq, primarily to choke off Iran's oil 
exports, failed to live up to its expectations. Iraq's military aim in respect of the 
oil war In the Persian Gulf mismatched its capabilities. 
In pursuing the oil war at sea Iraq used its air power. Iran retaliated mainly 
with high speed boats, ships and pre-First World War mines, which caused 
havoc in the Persian Gulf. Yet, in spite of the mounting threats, tankers 
undertook the perilous voyage and ship owners took up charters. The 
depressed state of shipping, especially tankers on the international scene, did 
not leave the ship owners and the seamen with many alternatives but to go 
through the missiles and flames in the Persian Gulf. 
The effect of the oil war on the international market was minimal. It failed to 
cause an oil price shook. From 1984, accurate and aggressive attacks by Iraq 
reduced Iran's oil exports marginally but it did not affect the market 
considerably. Iran's oil income which varied markedly during the war, has its 
roots in an unstable international market, currency fluctuations and in changes 
in national oil policy. 
Nonetheless, the damage during the oil war at sea and on land has been 
significant both to Iran and Iraq, and to the international maitime community. 
According to Iran's Minister of Economy up to November 1987, the cumulative 
damage sustained by the country's oil sector is estimated to be $150 billion.73 
This figure compared with those estimated for the cost of the entire war appears 
high. Whatever the material losses, they pale into insignificance before the 
social costs and the human tragedy for both Iran and Iraq. 
The Gulf war was a source of tension and instability in the region, and will 
continue to be so for a long period. Even a true peace settlement would leave 
garve uncertainties' in the region. Militarily, re-arming and concentration on 
building combat ready forces will continue. As for Iran, the war has 
demonstrated that ideological fervour can not be a substitute for military reality. 
It has become clear to the religious leaders that fighting forces can not succeed 
without better training, leadership and combat equipment. The war has also 
indicated that, air power can hardly be used as substitute for victory on the 
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ground. Iraq's initiation of the tanker war and raids against refineries and power 
plants produced initial panic and disruption but such attacks had no great 
military effect. 
And finally, the entire Iran - Iraq war In many ways was a mistake from start 
to finish. It was a foolish war. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
With its tenth anniversary behind it, the Islamic Republic of Iran is facing 
staggering economic and social problems. The country's economy has become 
seriously distorted by the eight-year war. However, Iran showed considerable 
ingenuity in meeting the challenge of the war. It demonstrated resourcefulness 
and improvisation.on the work-bench as well as on the battlefield, mainly 
ignoring relative values of the experiment or enterprise. For instance the 
senseless use of the untrained and poorly equipped young men on the 
battlefield. Against all odds, the regime demonstrated skill in using nationalism 
and Shi'ism in mobilising and motivating its troops in the war and its 
supporters at home. It managed to keep the oil flowing and some refineries 
operating despite war damage. It was also able to export adequate oil to fund 
the war in the harsh economic and military conditions . Besides, Iran diversified 
the source of its arms supplies and increased the capabilities of its domestic 
arms industry and saved foreign exchange. 
In addition, the regime appealed to the commitment of the populace and 
capitalised on their support while squeezing the well-off and placating the 
bazaaris, on which it still depends. The economic hardship from the war has 
affected all the Iranian people, in particular the 'disinherited class* or 
'Mostazafin'. It was in their name the revolution was made and for whom 
Khomeini claimed to take power In 1979. Recurrent shortages of subsidised 
food, spiraling prices and the erosion of the real value of wages and salaries by 
rising inflation has placed consumer goods beyond the reach of many ordinary 
members of the public. In fact the already low living standards of many people 
have actually declined, owing to the negative growth in the past five years. 
There are many areas in which the Islamic regime has fallen short of its 
objectives, notably in Its approach to the ownership of property and wealth. 
Contrary to the regime's stated intention, the wealth has not been transferred 
from the rich to the poor. Instead, the transfer has been from the private sector 
to the public sector through expropriation and nationalisation. Since the 
revolution, the state has taken over all banking, insurance and major industries 
and large private enterprises. The public sector controls eighty per cent of 
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foreign trade and deals extensively with the retail distribution of goods. Also, it 
has taken over a signifacant amount of urban property. After the cease fire, as 
the country prepares itself for reconstruction, there appeared to be a tendency 
to reverse this process, whereby the private sector would be allowed a larger 
role in the economy. However, recent culmination of radicalism in Iran, 
advocating the maintenance of-the state control over the economy, makes this 
reversal unlikely in the near future. 
The extension of the state control has taken place in the name of social 
justice, i.e, the more equal distribution of wealth for the benefit of the 
'disinherited'. This pledge of the Islamic government has not been redeemed. 
Nor, has the pledge of an Islamic economy that was supposed to make the 
country self sufficient." Because these goals are fundamental to the self-image 
of the revolution, because they remain elusive, because no-one really knows 
any longer how to achieve them, they divide the leadership, lead to erratic 
economic policies and, to a degree, undermine the legitimacy of the regime ".1 
Although part of this failure can justly be blamed on the war, there are other 
factors that can hardly be attributed to it. For instance, proposals to redistribute 
agricultural land became frozen owing to the struggle between the Majlis and 
the Council of Guardians. As a result, the ownership of up to a third of Iran's 
farmland remains under dispute. 
The country has a population of over 50 million, with an annual growth of 
between 3.7-3.9 per cent, one of the highest rates of increase in the world. It is 
dependent on a high and ever increasing food imports. The regime has 
markedly failed in its goal of reversing the migration from land to the cities. 
Lack of active and structured policies has been particularly damaging for 
agriculture. The authorities in Iran, without acknowledging it , are urban 
oriented. The focus of their attentions have been for the majority of their 
followers in the cities and food subsidies are designed to assist the urban poor 
and not the farmers. Activities of the Reconstruction Crusade and allocation of 
funds by the government to promote agricultural production are mainly for short 
term objectives. Long term requirements such as reliable and larger irrigation 
water supplies are largely neglected. 
Lack of direction from the top, fall of Invesment in real terms, Insecurity of 
land tenure exacerbated by the adverse effects of the migration and the 
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explosive increase in population, obliged the regime to import some $3 billion 
worth of food a year. Food items were among the biggest imports after the war 
material. Although the war adversely affected agricultural work in most 
productive areas of Khuzestan and Kurdestan, the food imports cannot be 
attributed wholly to the war. Political and ideological differences within the 
leadership prevented efficient development of the agricultural sector. The 
agriculture that was supposed to be the 'axis of the country's economic 
development', has become a source of embarrasment to the government that 
was critical of the Shah's erosion of agricultural self sufficiency in the 1960s. 
The problems facing industry are similar to that of the agricultural sector. 
Though the all-out war effort showed Iranian capabilities and ingenuity in 
manufacturing a wide range of armaments, this was accomplished at a 
considerable cost to the manufacturing industry. With Iran spending over one 
third of its budget on the war, many of the country's most modern and best 
equipped industrial plants were turned over to munitions. Many industrial 
groups were charged with research related to arms production. The process of 
reconversion will be complex and time consuming. 
Iraqi air raids on industrial targets have wrecked or badly damaged some 
major heavy industrial plants. Factories, still in operation, are operating at less 
than 40 per cent capacity. This is a result of acute shortages of raw material, 
electricity and of parts for machinery as well as shortages of managers and 
skilled workers. 
Iran's industry has not undergone structural changes in the past decade in 
accordance with the Revolution's aspirations to become self sufficient .The 
country is far from this goal. Nevertheless, it has finally made a start and there 
exists the potential, if it is capitalised on and developed. For instance, there has 
been a considerable change and emphasis in terms of reliance on domestic 
manufacturing. Some of the changes are impressive but they are not 
coordinated or systematic. Most of the progress was made under the pressures 
of war and international sanctions, though it may be lost as pressures ease in 
peace time. Likewise, if the oil income rises considerably, government and 
industry, similar to'that of the Shah's era, may both take shot-cuts and become 
over-reliant on imports. 
As under the Shah's government, the current emphasis is on the oil sector 
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and petrochemicals. Nevertheless, the exigencies of war budgets have resulted 
in relatively small units being constructed. Private investment In the Iranian 
industry has been scarce. During the war, trading has provided easy porfits 
without the risk of investment in manufacturing. 
In respect of foreign trade, except for restrictions on import of luxury items, 
there has been few structural changes. The bulk of Iran's non-military imports 
still comes from OECD countries. West Germany and Japan remain major 
suppliers and only the USA has been officially excluded from the list of trade 
partners. In terms of military imports and defence procurements, Iran has been 
obliged to turn to the Eastern Bloc countries for less expensive armaments and 
those that can be paid for in bartered oil. This is chiefly due to shortage of 
foreign exchange and because of ideological constraints disapproving foreign 
loans. As for non-oil exports, there has been a rise in the contribution of foreign 
exchange earnings since the revolution. However, the improved ratio is due 
more to the fall in oil exports than to a genuine rise in non-oil exports. 
One of the key problems of the Iranian economy has been unemployment. Half 
of Iran's rapidly growing population is under fifteen years of age and according 
to the national census at the end of 1987, 3.8 million were unemployed. This 
figure would certainly be much higher if those in seasonal or part time 
employment, earning very low wages, were taken into account. The 
unemployment would be endemic when demobilisation of the war ends and 
men under arms return from the front in search of Jobs. 
The war mobilisation resulted in some 1.6 million men being employed in 
various branches of the regular forces ,the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij and 
war related organisations. The Basij volunteers , mainly recruited from the rural 
areas, have sustained more toss than any other forces during the war and as 
such, have compounded tha deteriorating problems in the agricultural sector. 
"Males in the 15-24 age group in the rural areas who assume many important 
agricultural tasks, number 1.5 million. If only half of the numbers estimated 
(very conservatively) to have died or been maimed in the war are of rural origin, 
there has been a loss of nearly 10 per cent of the rural labour force in this age 
group". 2 
Of the estimated total war-dead, placed at one million by many observers, 
Iran has suffered worst with also large numbers of permanently disabled. 
209 
However, in the short term', even the most comprehensive reconstruction 
programme - which is lacking at present - will be unable to find gainful 
employment for the millions of unemployed in Iran, as most of them have no 
specialised or vocational training. 
Stagnant productivity, high inflation, unemployment, migration of villagers 
into the cities, booming population, creation of jobs for returnees, lack of an 
adequate and efficient transport system, inadequate electric supplies and 
shortages of skilled managers and manpower are some of the major economic 
problems facing the Islamic Republic. Any solution to these problems has its 
roots in the formulation of a coherent economic policy to increase productivity. 
Iran, as in the Shah's era, is an oil based economy and therefore remains 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the international market. In 1986, the country's 
foreign exchange earnings were halved overnight owing to the collapse of oil 
prices. 
In addition to this vulnerability, ideological constraints present a major 
obstacle for the government in deciding on a consistent economic policy. Since 
the war ended the old disputes have erupted and have exacerbated the 
divisions within the regime over key issues including economic and social 
policies. Meanwhile, the checks and balances provided by the constitution 
ensure that legislation ends up being referred from one legislation body to 
another.i.e. the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, with no final decision 
being taken - an equilibrium of incompetency. 
Free marketeers like Rafsanjani wants to use the end of the war to restore 
laisser-faire while the radicals prefer state domination of the economy. 
Although Khomeini made several statements in support of the private sector, 
but these have been ambiguous. 
Though the leadership in Iran has resorted to cosmetic measures to cover 
up these differences, the divisions remain the same. Khomeini, as supreme 
jurist, vacillated during his rule. He sided with the Council of Guardians at 
times while on other occasions supported the Majlis. On many occasions, he 
gave varying and inconsistent views on economic matters and as such, added 
to the complexity of the issue - a divide and rule strategy. By the time of 
Khomeini's death, Iran's economy was In desparate straits, its people 
exhausted and its political future more uncertain than at any other time since 
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the fall of the Shah. 
Recommedations 
Khomeini made it clear at the outset that the Islamic Repulic should not be 
judged on its economic performance . He even stated that the revolution was 
not about the 'pricetof watermelons'.a Nevertheless, the economic issues are 
the major challenges facing the revolution and in the next few years will 
determine its course. 
Although the expectations of the Iranian people are lower than those of the 
Shah's era, the leadership cannot count on a population of over 50 million 
simply by preaching austerity or like Rafsanjani, after ten years of upheaval, 
urging people to believe that the revolution has just started'.4 With abatement 
of the war, further consolidation of the Islamic regime in Iran depends on its 
success in reconstructing the post war economy in favour of the former 
disadvantaged classes and the mass of war-striken people. 
In what follows, an attempt is made to provide some basic recommendations 
for the task of restructuring the economy. What these recommendations suggest 
is that, attempts in these directions should be taken seriously and their 
achievements are crucial for long term economic stability in Iran. 
1. At the outset, the Islamic Republic must clearly define the role of the 
economy and decide on its direction. The success in this task , In the final 
analysis , depends on the ingenuity of the leadership in either removing or 
modifying the existing ideological constraints. This in itself necessitates a 
confluence of values, expectations, objectives and instruments under the 
effetive control of the religio- political leader. 
2. The Islamic regime must establish corporate domestic and foreign 
economic policies and decide on the parameters of foreign participation in its 
post-war economy. It needs to integrate the Iranian economy into the world's 
economic system. The regime ought to redefine some its archaic tenets and 
ideals. Iran can not afford to isolate itself from the rest of the world. In the words 
of Rafsanjani it is impossible in today's world to be totally independent. The 
isolation and extreme xenophobia that prevailed in the last decade need to be 
ended. 
3. Prior to the formulation of economic policies, the regional imbalances 
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should be addressed fully. This serious shortcoming which existed during the 
Shah's rule, has been further exacerbated by the eight year war. Regional 
needs and available resources should be identified. Uneven economic activity 
of the pre-revolution era should not be allowed to persist. 
The policies in the long run, should focus on the promotion of a wider 
dispersion of economic activity and development of infrastructure in 
geographical terms including some disadvantaged and distant areas of the 
country. One of the major instruments for achieving this, could be the 
government's investment decision and allocation of funds. Even distribution of 
capital may contribute to reduction of migration from rural areas to towns. 
4. Strategic changes are to be put into the operation of Iran's economic 
planning machinery. So far central planning has been unsuccessful in Iran. 
Incremental changes , as against one-off major shift, must be allowed whereby 
in the long run various regions can formulate and implement their Own plans. A 
rational approach should be used in deciding the boundry of the regional 
plans. For instance, the level of oil production should be centrally planned, 
whereas production level in agriculture should be included in the regional 
plans. 
5. What should be planned ? And, what are the immediate economic 
priorities for post-war reconstruction? Considering Iran's shattered 
infrastructure and its moribund industrial base, a quick recovery is 
inconceivable. However, there is an urgent need to reverse the serious decline 
of agriculture and rural community in Iran. The continuation of present trends 
can aggravate the falling living standards and rising food imports. 
Another priority that must be addressed is the revival of Iran's industrial 
base with the establishment of. horizontal linkages among the production units 
within the economy. For instance, further use of oil in the petrochemical industry 
towards production of paint, plastics, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals for 
domestic use . Serious efforts should be made towards economic self-reliance. 
Iran needs to diversify its domestic energy consumption and substitute 
natural gas for oil products with the aim of freeing its daily consumption of 
700,000 barrels a of oil, for export. Oil revenue is a critical factor in the 
successful pursuing of economic policies. 
Other areas of concentration should be housing, transportation, 
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communications and electricity. Low -income housing ought to be supported by 
government expenditures. Increased efforts should be directed towards 
boosting productive capacity of industry where it could provide much of its own 
hardware. This can be achieved by securing a gradual transfer of suitable 
technology from abroad to Iran. 
Another major economic problem in Iran is education. The level of illiteracy 
is high and the young population of Iran cannot be expected to enter an 
unemployed workforce. The government must boost education and training for 
men and women alike. The country must have a skilled labour force that can 
fulfill the requirements of the economy. 
In conclusion, it should be stressed that the aforementioned 
recommendations are far from complete and by no means exhaustive. There 
are many economic, ideological and political issues that have to be decided 
and positively dealt with before Iran can rebuild its strained economy. 
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